A dozen knives in the back of the Islamic revolution: Secret FSB documents confirm Iran and Russia are waging a spy war against each other

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After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its ties with Iran’s intelligence services grew closer. High-level officials from Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU) and Federal Security Service (FSB) began visiting Iran more often, and military cooperation increased — most notably with Moscow receiving Shahed drones from Tehran in exchange for gold bars.

At the same time, however, both countries continued to spy on each other behind the scenes, as evidenced by documents from the FSB’s First Service (the agency’s counterintelligence department), which were obtained by The Insider. Despite strict regulations, FSB officers often handle classified information carelessly, frequently emailing top-secret reports and briefings to themselves or their colleagues. These confidential documents reveal the agency’s view of Russia’s relations with other countries.

Among these documents are the “Recommendations for Planning Operational and Service Activities on the Iranian Frontier,” which are prepared annually and begin with a brief overview of the current political situation.

How Iran spies in Russia

The “Recommendations” for 2024 are preceded by a brief introduction that notes the strengthening of Russian-Iranian relations:

“At the present stage, the development of relations between Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran has acquired particular relevance. They have moved from the bilateral level to the regional and even extra-regional level.

The unwillingness of Iran and Russia to accept the dominance of the West, and in particular the U.S., in international relations and their desire to build a multipolar world order, as well as to strengthen other centers of power to counterbalance unilateral hegemony, has become one of the points of contact in the foreign policy of the two countries.

In the context of the special military operation in Ukraine and the subsequent unprecedented pressure exerted by the collective West on our country, the Iranian leadership adopted a pro-Russian foreign policy vector, which led to increased pressure from the US and its allies on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Against this backdrop, Russia's efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue and attempts to ease international pressure on Iran have had a positive impact on inter-state relations, which have clear prospects for moving to a strategic level.”

Despite all this positivity, counterintelligence officials note that Iranian espionage against Russia shows no sign of stopping:

“At the same time, despite the active development of Russian-Iranian relations in the economic, political, cultural, and military spheres, the Iranian special services continue to work actively in Russia, focusing on obtaining advanced models of Russian weapons, technologies in the aerospace, radio-electronic, and nuclear fields, searching for channels to acquire military and dual-use products in circumvention of Russian legislation, forming positions of influence among the Russian Muslim clergy, spreading Shiite Islam, and gathering information on the domestic political and economic situation and foreign policy.

The following special services operate from the Iranian Embassy in Moscow: the Ministry of Information (MI), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Second Intelligence Directorate of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces of Iran.

…The results of an analysis of counterintelligence activities on the Iranian frontier in 2023 indicate that, despite the strengthening of intergovernmental ties and the multilateral development of cooperation, Iranian intelligence agencies are engaged in activities aimed at creating conditions for infiltrating Russian industrial, scientific research, design and engineering enterprises.

The main targets of the Iranian special services include turbojet engines and power plants used in the missile, aviation, and oil and gas industries, technologies in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles, radio-electronic warfare, radio-electronic products, and specialists in the missile, aviation, and space industries.

Amid intensified military-technical cooperation and an increase in the number of national delegations visiting our country and traveling to Iran, there have been reports of recruitment efforts targeting Russian specialists who are directly involved in the implementation of official contractual obligations and have access to restricted information, including state secrets.”

Some details of how exactly the Iranian special services are recruiting in Russia can be found in a document with the cumbersome title “Overview of the tactics of foreign special services' intelligence activities on the channel of departure of Russian citizens with access to information constituting state secrets abroad,” which is also available to The Insider. According to the FSB, Iranian spies “widely use visits by official delegations to Russian military-industrial complex enterprises, research institutes, state and commercial organizations for official negotiations, invitations to foreign business trips, including short-term ones, under plausible pretexts (the next stage of negotiations, familiarization with existing foreign experience, lectures on scientific research topics), vacations abroad, etc.”

It is noted that Iranian state security services often motivate recruited agents with money and actively practice “the use of secret carriers ‘in the dark,’ gradually drawing them into information exchange and commercial activities.”

According to the FSB's analysis, Iranian activities in Russia include “propaganda of Shiite Islam and the formation of positions in Muslim religious communities in Russia to promote Iran's strategic interests,” as well as “obtaining technologies, samples of materials and goods for dual and military use, both through official channels and in circumvention of Russian legislation.”

The document also lists Iranians who are responsible for interacting with Russian special services or recruiting agents on Russian territory.

For example, Basiri Sayed Alireza, an official representative of the Iranian Ministry of Information, is responsible for organizing contacts with Russia’s FSB (domestic) and SVR (foreign) intelligence services. Indeed, The Insider found that his telephone records included calls with Russian intelligence officers including Mikhail Khabrov —- an employee of the FSB's International Cooperation Directorate (Military Unit No. 55957), working under the cover of an employee of the defense corporation Almaz-Antey (although his main area of expertise is not Iran, but China) — along with Khabrov’s colleague at the FSB's International Cooperation Directorate, Artem Bitsur (specializing in Iran), and SVR veteran Murad Charev (attached to Military Unit No. 33949).

Zolfaghari Abbas Mohammad, head of strategic intelligence, is in contact with the IRGC, GRU, and FSB. According to the FSB’s counterintelligence department, Mohammad “works on organizing the acquisition, including by illegal means, of special technical equipment.” However, the document does not make it clear whether this “illegal” acquisition of special equipment has been approved by the Russian authorities.

Military attaché Reza Khosravi Moghaddam coordinates with Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS), the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control (FSTEC), state arms exporter Rosoboronexport, and the Defense Ministry on matters related to military-technical cooperation. He is also involved in the “recruitment of Russian citizens from among military personnel.” While it is difficult to verify Moghaddam’s involvement in any actual recruitment, he is indeed in active contact with the Russian military, including with Alexander Blokhin of the Ministry of Defense's Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation.

How Russia spies in Iran

In the 2024 “Recommendations,” Russian counterintelligence officers explicitly state the need to infiltrate Iranian intelligence services in order to obtain valuable information about Iran’s subversive activities in Russia (such as “information campaigns” within religious communities that could lead to “interfaith conflicts”), as well as about Iran's domestic situation (which includes information on a potential successor to Ayatollah Khamenei). According to the document:

“In addition to this, in 2024 it is necessary to:

1. Step up operations focused on human intelligence and technical intelligence penetration of the intelligence services of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This area of operations should be treated as a strategic priority.

2. Collect preemptive intelligence on Iran’s plans to promote Shia Islam within the territory of Russia as a means of expanding its influence. Conduct operations to prevent the establishment of Iran-inspired interfaith conflict hotspots on Russian soil, counter Iranian influence campaigns aimed at expanding their reach within religious communities, and block efforts to bring Shia communities in Russia under the control of Iranian religious centers.

3. Disrupt attempts by Iranian intelligence services and organizations to illegally acquire in Russia — or transfer through its territory — technologies, equipment, materials, and scientific or technical information that could be used in the development of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, conventional arms, or military equipment subject to export controls. Also to prevent efforts to facilitate the unauthorized departure from Russia of scientists and technical specialists with access to state secrets.

4. Facilitate gathering intelligence on factors that could serve as a basis for reducing Iran’s motivation to maintain close cooperation with Russia. These include:

– Indicators of a potential revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program and the possible lifting of U.S. sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran

– A potential replacement of Iran’s current Supreme Leader due to his advanced age, possible candidates for the position, and their stance on the future direction of Iran’s foreign policy, including its orientation toward Russia

5. Collect intelligence on anti-Russian activities conducted by the embassies of Western countries and Ukraine in Iran in order to enable appropriate responses.

6. Facilitate the development of bilateral relations between Russia and Iran, promote connections between commercial organizations, and support the engagement of business and government representatives from the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region.”

The document outlines specific measures that the Russian side planned to take in order to achieve these goals, including “conducting counterintelligence operations targeting individuals originating from Iran” and “recruiting graduates of Iranian religious centers.”

Interestingly, despite the significant changes in global politics over recent years, the goals and methods of the FSB have changed little. For example, the 2021 edition of the “Recommendations” — drafted before the full-scale war in Ukraine, Trump’s return, the warming of relations between Russia and Iran, and the Iran-Israel conflict — is nearly identical to its 2024 successor, even if the earlier version is somewhat less detailed:

The Insider’s source in the FSB’s military counterintelligence arm explains that,already during the period of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency (2008-2012), Russia began to view Iran as more of an adversary than an ally. While publicly promoting friendship and cooperation, Russia has never wavered from its fundamental position that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons.

Indeed, in the 2024 “Recommendations,” we see that the FSB is particularly concerned about Iran’s attempts to access information on Russian nuclear technologies. Accordingly, the document emphasizes the need to “disrupt attempts by Iranian intelligence services and organizations to illegally acquire in Russia — or transfer through its territory — technologies, equipment, materials, or scientific and technical information that could be used in the development of weapons of mass destruction.”

As noted by the same source in military counterintelligence, even as Russia accelerated its rapprochement with Iran in recent years, it continued to engage in close cooperation with Israel through the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), thus playing a double game. Iran could not have been unaware of these contacts, which only deepened mutual distrust.

A high-ranking source in the GRU commented on the situation to The Insider in much the same way. According to him, the Kremlin has favored Israel in this rivalry since at least 2010, and all this time the covert espionage war with Iran has never stopped. The Iran-Israel conflict has put the Kremlin in an awkward position, but Moscow is still far more concerned with internal problems, he says, and the country’s leadership does not currently have the capacity to focus on Middle Eastern diplomacy.