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      <title><![CDATA[Tethered to Starlink: There are reasons why it&#039;s not so easy for Ukraine to quit using Elon Musk&#039;s services]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/politics/299508</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/politics/299508</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Anna Kuragina]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299508/7HBZlpfnfvofRwe35CV9e2blb9QHqugXAWq7yWJ7.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Since the spring of 2026, Ukrainian forces have steadily expanded their strikes against targets in the area of Russia's operational rear. Thanks to SpaceX’s satellite communications, Ukrainian drones have been able to hit moving objects dozens or even hundreds of kilometers behind the front line. Thousands of Russian military vehicles, supply routes, crossings, and air defense systems have come under attack, in part enabling Ukrainian offensives like Operation Vivaldi. However, in October sudden restrictions on satellite communications exposed Ukraine’s critical dependence on American infrastructure for its mid-range strike capabilities: on the first day of the disruption, the number of recorded hits on Russian equipment fell by 71%. Although the restrictions were lifted on Oct. 24, Volodymyr Zelensky announced on Nov. 12 that they had been reimposed along the entire front line and in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. Ukraine currently has no full-fledged alternative to SpaceX’s military satellite service, Starshield, and building an independent satellite network would take years. The most realistic alternative, therefore, is to combine different communications channels with the development of autonomous drone systems.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p> </p><h3 class="outline-heading">Starlink and Starshield: Ukraine&#039;s dependence has become a vulnerability</h3><p>Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian vehicles deep behind the front line fell sharply on Oct. 14. The disruption was linked to restrictions on SpaceX’s <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+U3RhcnNoaWVsZCBpcyBTcGFjZVjigJlzIG1pbGl0YXJ5IHNhdGVsbGl0ZSBjb21tdW5pY2F0aW9ucyBzeXN0ZW0sIGRldmVsb3BlZCBieSBFbG9uIE11c2vigJlzIGNvbXBhbnkuIFVubGlrZSB0aGUgY29tbWVyY2lhbCBTdGFybGluayBzZXJ2aWNlLCBpdCBpcyBkZXNpZ25lZCBmb3IgZ292ZXJubWVudCBjdXN0b21lcnMsIHByaW1hcmlseSB0aGUgVVMgRGVwYXJ0bWVudCBvZiBEZWZlbnNlIGFuZCBpbnRlbGxpZ2VuY2UgYWdlbmNpZXMuIEl0IHByb3ZpZGVzIGVuY3J5cHRlZCBjb21tdW5pY2F0aW9ucyBjaGFubmVscyBhbmQgaW1wb3NlcyBubyByZXN0cmljdGlvbnMgb24gaG93IGZhc3QgdGVybWluYWxzIGNhbiBtb3ZlIHdpdGhpbiBVa3JhaW5lLCBtYWtpbmcgaXQgcG9zc2libGUgdG8gY29udHJvbCBoaWdoLXNwZWVkIGRyb25lcy4gVGhlIHN5c3RlbSB1c2VzIFN0YXJsaW5rIGluZnJhc3RydWN0dXJlIGFzIHdlbGwgYXMgaXRzIG93biBzYXRlbGxpdGVzLiBUaGUgVVMgRGVwYXJ0bWVudCBvZiBEZWZlbnNlIHBheXMgZm9yIFVrcmFpbmlhbiBtaWxpdGFyeSBhY2Nlc3MgdG8gU3RhcnNoaWVsZCB1bmRlciBhbiBhZ3JlZW1lbnQgdGhhdCBleHBpcmVzIGluIG1pZC0yMDI3LjwvcD4=">Starshield</span> military satellite service, primarily affecting drones that rely on satellite communications for in-flight control.</p><p>According to <a href="https://t.me/oko_gora/20932">figures</a> compiled by the <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+PHNwYW4gc3R5bGU9ImJhY2tncm91bmQtY29sb3I6cmdiKDI1NSwyNTUsMjU1KTtjb2xvcjpyZ2IoNTEsNTEsNTEpOyI+PHN0cm9uZz5PU0lOVDwvc3Ryb25nPiBtZWFucyBPcGVuIFNvdXJjZSBJbnRlbGxpZ2VuY2U8aT4mbmJzcDs8L2k+PC9zcGFuPjwvcD4=">OSINT</span> project Oko Gora, the number of recorded hits on Russian equipment on the first day of the disruption was 71% below the average for the previous month. Ukrainian drone operators <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/24/world/europe/ukraine-starshield-drone-speed.html">described</a> the extent of the problems, with a representative of the 414th Separate Unmanned Systems Brigade, known as Magyar’s Birds, saying that units had to constantly test the speeds at which they could maintain communications and adjust their tactics accordingly. Slower drones mean greater vulnerability to Russian <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+TW9iaWxlIGZpcmUgZ3JvdXBzICg8c3Ryb25nPk1GRzwvc3Ryb25nPnMpIOKAkyBtb2JpbGUgYWlyIGRlZmVuc2UgdW5pdHMgZXF1aXBwZWQgd2l0aCB2ZWhpY2xlLW1vdW50ZWQgYXJ0aWxsZXJ5IGFuZCBtYWNoaW5lIGd1bnMuIFRoZXkgYXJlIGRlc2lnbmVkIHRvIGRlcGxveSByYXBpZGx5IGFsb25nIHRoZSBmbGlnaHQgcGF0aHMgb2YgZW5lbXkgZHJvbmVzIGFuZCBpbnRlcmNlcHQgdGhlbS48L3A+">mobile fire groups,</span>and another Ukrainian commander said his unit had lost more than $1 million worth of drones during the first night of the restrictions alone.</p><p>Starlink, developed by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, provides broadband internet access through a constellation of low-Earth-orbit satellites. Its relatively compact terminals, high data-transfer speeds, and low latency make it suitable for use in the field, including in areas without terrestrial communications infrastructure.</p><p><span class="termin" data-description="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">Starlink</span> became widely used in Ukraine in the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. The first batch of terminals supplied by SpaceX <a href="https://x.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1498392515262746630">arrived</a> in Ukraine on Feb. 28, 2022. By December 2023, around 47,000 terminals <a href="https://t.me/zedigital/4034">were operating</a> in the country, according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation, after being supplied under agreements with international partners.</p><p>In early 2025, the total number of Starlink terminals in Ukraine was <a href="https://t.me/fediienko_oleksandr/3101">estimated</a> at around 160,000. Up to 100,000 of them may have been used by the Ukrainian Defense Forces, <a href="https://defence-ua.com/minds_and_ideas/chi_gotovi_zsu_do_vidkljuchennja_starlink_ta_na_skilki_virogidno_te_scho_ilon_mask_tse_zrobit-18057.html" target="_blank">according</a> to <span class="termin" data-description="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">Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov</span>. By the fall of 2025, Ukraine had around 200,000 terminals, according to <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/289530"><i>The Insider</i></a>, making it Starlink’s largest European market by number of users. However, only half of those terminals had been paid for and supplied through official channels.</p><blockquote>Ukraine is Starlink’s largest European market by number of users</blockquote><p>In October 2026, the head of Adaptis, a Ukrainian company involved in supplying Starlink equipment, <a href="https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/chi-zalishitsya-ukrayina-suputnikovogo-zv-1791538636.html">said</a> that tens of thousands of new terminals were arriving in the country every month. Satellite communications have become central to Ukraine’s military command-and-control system, as units use Starlink to relay intelligence, receive live video feeds from drones, coordinate artillery fire, and maintain communications between command posts.</p><p>One Ukrainian artillery serviceman <a href="https://epravda.com.ua/rus/tehnologiji/chto-proizoydet-esli-vyklyuchat-starlink-803580/">said</a> that having access to a live feed from a reconnaissance drone enabled his unit to begin observing a target and open fire within 3–5 minutes. Without such a link, artillery crews would have to rely on coordinates relayed to them, increasing response times and reducing targeting accuracy.</p><p>However, commercial Starlink was not originally designed to control attack drones, and in February 2023, SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/02/08/spacexs-shotwell-says-ukraine-weaponized-starlink-network/">said</a> the company was restricting the use of its satellite network for that purpose. To meet military requirements, SpaceX <a href="https://apnews.com/article/starlink-starshield-ukraine-russia-war-shahed-spacex-pentagon-385eb944f6c34990bdf21f624416b820">launched</a> a separate service: Starshield. It uses Starlink technology but is provided under government contracts, primarily with the Pentagon. The service offers secure data transmission and other capabilities required by military users.</p><p>In December 2024, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/276990">it emerged</a> that the Pentagon had signed a new contract with SpaceX to connect an additional 2,500 Starlink terminals already in Ukraine to Starshield. Together with the 500 terminals covered by an earlier agreement, this brought the total to 3,000. The value of the new contract was not disclosed; the previous one was estimated at around $40 million.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af5e2b2b71d68.50551182/AJHTnrCE0TabJxQSpwY1u02QCM5BvY4QpMWpGNMY.jpg" alt="A Ukrainian serviceman sets up a Starlink terminal near the front line in the Donetsk region, October 2026  "/><figcaption>A Ukrainian serviceman sets up a Starlink terminal near the front line in the Donetsk region, October 2026  </figcaption></figure><p>The Ukrainian military’s dependence on SpaceX’s decisions was already apparent in 2022. While preparing an attack on Russian ships in Sevastopol that September, Ukrainian forces <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/289530">found</a> that there was no Starlink coverage around annexed Crimea to control its unmanned surface vehicles. As Elon Musk’s biographer Walter Isaacson later <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/09/07/elon-musk-starlink-ukraine-russia-invasion/">explained</a>, the restrictions were already in place before the operation, and Musk refused a request from Ukrainian authorities to activate the connection. During Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the fall of 2022, Kviv's troops advanced into territories previously occupied by Russia, they encountered Starlink outages — primarily in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions and, to a lesser extent, along the front line in the Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions. <i>Reuters</i> later <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigations/musk-ordered-shutdown-starlink-satellite-service-ukraine-retook-territory-russia-2025-07-25/">found</a> that at least some of the restrictions had been imposed as a result of Musk’s personal orders.</p><blockquote>Musk was already restricting Starlink’s capabilities for Ukrainian forces in 2022</blockquote><p>In February 2025, the possibility of a Starlink cutoff resurfaced during negotiations with the United States over a deal on Ukraine’s mineral resources. U.S. negotiators were reportedly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/us-could-cut-ukraines-access-starlink-internet-services-over-minerals-say-2025-02-22/">considering</a> restricting Ukraine’s access to satellite communications as a pressure tactic, even if Musk <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/musk-denies-us-threat-to-cut-starlink-over-ukraine-minerals-deal/">denied</a> reports that such threats had been made. Ukrainian military personnel were already <a href="https://epravda.com.ua/rus/tehnologiji/chto-proizoydet-esli-vyklyuchat-starlink-803580/">warning</a> that although a complete shutdown would not deprive the military of all communications, it would significantly slow the transmission of intelligence, target acquisition and coordination of fire.</p><p>On Oct. 14, 2026, restrictions <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298266">affected</a> Starshield’s operation on moving platforms. According to <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298354">Ukrainian military personnel</a>, connections on various types of drones dropped out at speeds ranging from 72 to 161 km/h. The precise threshold depended on the type of platform on which the terminal was mounted. For drones relying on Starshield as their primary control link, this meant having to change their flight speed or abandon certain missions, as a high-speed kamikaze drone cannot carry out its mission as planned if it loses contact with its operator when accelerating.</p><p>The reasons behind the imposition of the restrictions were unclear from the outset. On Oct. 15, <i>Reuters</i> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/order-limit-starshield-ukraine-came-inside-white-house-sources-say-2026-10-15/">reported</a> that the order to restrict Starshield had come from the White House and that the relevant instructions were subsequently passed on to the Pentagon. The Trump administration did not officially accept responsibility for the decision. Musk, for his part, <a href="https://x.com/elonmusk/status/2110445577184133456">said</a> that the military Starshield service was regulated by U.S. authorities, while the commercial Starlink network was controlled by SpaceX.</p><blockquote>The US administration has not accepted responsibility for the decision to restrict Starshield</blockquote><p>On Oct. 20, <i>The Wall Street Journal </i><a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-starlink-elon-musk-trump-dbc49193">reported</a> that Musk himself had ordered the restrictions. However, whether the decision was coordinated with the Trump administration remains unclear. Four days later, Musk publicly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/24/world/europe/ukraine-starshield-drone-speed.html">explained</a> the restrictions for the first time, <a href="https://x.com/elonmusk/status/2114063986744275011">accusing</a> Ukrainian forces of using commercial Starlink for offensive drone strikes in violation of the platform's terms of service. In a letter to Congress, SpaceX claimed that it had only changed Starlink’s settings, making no changes to Starshield.</p><p>Ukraine rejected Musk’s accusations. As former Defense Ministry adviser Serhiy Sternenko <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298706">explained</a>, since February 2026, satellite terminals operating on moving platforms had required a connection to the military Starshield service, making it technically impossible to use commercial Starlink to control kamikaze drones. As of Oct. 19, SpaceX equipment at various points along the front line <a href="https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21435">was ceasing to function</a> at speeds of 130–161 km/h, hampering frontline logistics and limiting the use of drones, particularly for <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/290817">mid-range strikes</a>.</p><p>Military analyst Michael Kofman <a href="https://x.com/KofmanMichael/status/2112167662789030368">clarified</a> that even with a nominal speed limit of 160 km/h, the connection remained unstable and could drop out at speeds as low as 130–140 km/h. Then, on Nov. 12, Volodymyr Zelensky <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299477">announced</a> that Ukrainian units had been experiencing Starshield outages for several days along the entire front line. According to Zelensky, the connection was again failing at speeds above 161 km/h. Ukrainian military personnel determined that these were not random disruptions but a systematic speed restriction. They were introduced around the time of trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States, held in Abu Dhabi on November 10–11.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af5e3514ed433.11505903/za8yucIPPD2DIrR0Hr6HW7gSmo0TG6ddmPHvD0xf.jpg" alt="Ukrainian troops prepare to launch a Zozulya mid-strike drone, 2026  "/><figcaption>Ukrainian troops prepare to launch a Zozulya mid-strike drone, 2026  </figcaption></figure><p>The restrictions also affect Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. Back in October, according to <a href="https://t.me/serhii_flash/7819">Serhiy Beskrestnov</a>, Starshield’s speed limit prevented Ukrainian forces from using jet-powered interceptor drones against fast-moving Russian Shaheds. The disruptions also affected one of the key channels for relaying information to Ukrainian combat helicopters, which also help repel drone attacks. Since helicopters fly at speeds exceeding 160 km/h, the satellite communications restrictions hampered their ability to carry out combat missions. This did not, however, mean that all drone interception capabilities had been disabled or that helicopters could no longer engage UAVs.</p><blockquote>Starshield restrictions hampered the use of Ukraine’s jet-powered interceptor drones</blockquote><p>Of course, not all Ukrainian drones use Starshield — those equipped with autonomous navigation, conventional radio links, or fiber-optic controls can operate without a direct connection to SpaceX’s service. Nevertheless, satellite communications have become a key factor in enabling the large-scale use of remotely controlled drones deep behind Russian lines.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Starlink and Ukraine’s mid-strike capabilities</h3><p>Starlink has enabled Ukrainian forces to control drones from hundreds of kilometers away, making it possible not only to <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/290817">strike</a> targets deep inside Russia, but also to hit targets whose locations are not known in advance. Operators can monitor the situation through a drone’s onboard camera, change its course, and select a target while the UAV is in flight. This is particularly important when targeting moving vehicles, mobile air defense systems, and other assets that can change location.</p><p>Previously, the range of communications links was one of the factors limiting the use of Ukrainian drones deep behind enemy lines. The reliability of conventional radio signals depend on terrain and the positioning of antennas and repeaters, and can also be jammed by electronic warfare systems. Starlink makes it possible to control drones beyond direct radio line of sight by relaying data through its satellite constellation (even if satellite signals can also be jammed, disrupting a drone’s navigation with the use of electronic warfare).</p><p>In 2025, Ukrainian forces began building a drone-saturated “<span class="termin" data-id="5888">kill zone</span>,” but even heavy Russian losses failed to halt their advance. Russian assault groups continued to infiltrate gaps in Ukraine’s thinly spread defensive lines, while Russian ammunition depots, command posts, drone crews, and major supply routes remained largely beyond the reach of mass-produced, low-cost strike weapons.</p><p>Changing this situation required extending the range of Ukrainian strikes and targeting not only assault units but also the logistical infrastructure supporting them. Conventional weapons for striking operational rear areas, primarily HIMARS and ATACMS, could not accomplish this task on the necessary scale. However, mass-produced, relatively inexpensive drones made it possible to attack a much wider range of targets. Satellite communications were one of the factors that made it possible to combine relatively long flight ranges with remote control.</p><blockquote>Satellite communications enabled Ukraine to deploy drones on a large scale against targets deep inside Russia</blockquote><p>Unlike long-range drones programmed to follow a predetermined route to a fixed point, drones with reliable video and command links can search for targets within a designated area and adapt to changing circumstances. Since the beginning of 2026, Ukrainian forces have stepped up their use of mid-strike drones, including the <a href="https://t.me/firepointofficial/417">FP-2</a>, <a href="https://t.me/in_factum/48624">RAM-2X</a>, <a href="https://t.me/MiliTJournal/35768">Bulava</a>, <a href="https://t.me/ButusovPlus/33240">Darts</a>, <a href="https://t.me/in_factum/48775">Baton</a>, and <a href="https://t.me/ButusovPlus/34114">Hornet</a>. Not all of these drones are equipped with Starlink, with some relying on other communications systems or autonomous targeting.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4279</div><p>In May 2026, Ukrainian forces launched a large-scale campaign against Russian logistics deep behind the front line, dubbing it <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/293937">“Logistics Lockdown.”</a> According to <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2107881525970633168">figures</a> compiled by French OSINT researcher Clément Molin, who analyzes strike footage published by Ukrainian military units, in May 214 Russian trucks and other vehicles were <a href="https://t.me/clement_molin/976">hit</a> at distances more than 20 km from the front line. The figure rose to 586 in June, <a href="https://t.me/clement_molin/1359">reached</a> 656 in July, and fell to 630 in August before <a href="https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/2107881501925024166.html">hitting</a> a record 770 in September. In October, however, only 537 strikes were recorded, a decline Molin <a href="https://t.me/clement_molin/1936">attributes</a> to a nine-day disruption of Starlink and Starshield services. (It should be noted that these figures cover only strikes documented in publicly available footage, not the full number of operations carried out.)</p><blockquote>Disruption to Starshield operations led to a 30% drop in strikes against Russian vehicles</blockquote><p>According to reports by Unmanned Systems Forces commander Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, the number of tactical and mid-range targets hit across all categories rose from 44,100 <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping?period=monthly_5">in May</a> to 64,800 <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping/?period=monthly_10">in October</a>, while the number of strike sorties increased from 113,300 to 151,500. Over the same period, strikes against vehicles, specialized equipment, and fuel tankers rose from 2,356 to 3,297, while attacks on depots increased from 443 to 574.</p><p>The main target of “Logistics Lockdown” was the land corridor running from Russia’s Rostov region through Mariupol, Berdiansk, and Melitopol to Crimea. The heaviest attacks were concentrated along the R-280 Novorossiya highway and surrounding roads.</p><p>Ukrainian drones primarily targeted trucks carrying fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. Bridges and railway infrastructure also came under attack. By the end of June, <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/293937">hundreds of attacks</a> on transport had been recorded, causing <a href="https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/2071568117851910528.html">damage</a> to several key bridges, including those on routes linking Crimea with the mainland part of occupied Ukraine. Russian authorities, for their part, repeatedly announced that traffic had been restored. </p><p>One notable incident occurred in late July, when Yevgeny Balitsky, the Russian-installed head of the occupied part of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia region, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/295128">told</a> Vladimir Putin that the R-280 highway was under full control. Russian military blogger Vladimir Romanov <a href="https://t.me/romanov_92/54871">accused</a> Balitsky of submitting a false report, pointing out that the highway was subjected to regular strikes from “Ukrainian kamikaze drones.” Magyar responded by <a href="https://t.me/robert_magyar/2636">publishing</a> footage showing a Hornet drone striking Russian trucks and a vehicle used by a mobile fire group.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/3975</div><p>By August, Russian forces had reorganized their transport operations. Trucks increasingly traveled in convoys escorted by mobile fire groups (MFGs) armed with antiaircraft weapons. A typical convoy <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2107881518391558623">consists</a> of three to five trucks and two to three escort vehicles. Russian forces also use electronic warfare (EW) systems and interceptor drones to counter Ukrainian UAVs.</p><p>In early October, Russia's Rubicon Center <a href="https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/2815">claimed</a> that its units had intercepted around 7,000 Ukrainian drones since the beginning of 2026, including 1,800 in September. Although Molin <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2107881541116235987">cautions</a> against taking these figures at face value, their sheer scale is striking. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces have <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297643">stepped up</a> their use of decoy drones.</p><p>The Russian MFGs themselves have <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2107881537710542918">become</a> targets in their own right. According to <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2104255672309211196">Molin’s estimates</a>, footage published by the end of September showed hundreds their personnel killed or wounded. However, he <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2085433681577959829">identifies</a> Starlink jammers as being Russia's most effective means of countering Ukraine’s mid-strike drones, noting that such systems are very expensive and cannot be deployed everywhere.</p><p>Attacks on bridges also forced Russian forces to reroute their supply lines. In August, Molin <a href="https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/2085433651253203390.html">identified</a> 15 locations where pontoon bridges and new crossings had been established along the Henichesk–Melitopol–Mariupol–Taganrog route. Some were set up near bridges previously targeted by Ukrainian forces. Trucks have to slow down when crossing pontoon bridges, making them easier targets for drones.</p><p>In July, the Ukrainian campaign expanded to include Crimea’s energy infrastructure, along with <a href="https://ru.krymr.com/amp/krym-news-paromkaya-pereprava-25-procentov/33806922.html">ships</a>. On July 6, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces launched Operation MoLoCHka (an acronym based on the Ukrainian phrase “Moscow Will Fall Through Crimea”), targeting Russian vessels in the Black and Azov seas.</p><p>By July 22, Brovdi had <a href="https://t.me/robert_magyar/2641">reported</a> 196 maritime targets struck, and the Unmanned Systems Forces’ final July figures <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping/?period=monthly_7">listed</a> 206 vessels hit. In total, 309 vessels had been struck between the start of the campaign and the end of October. By August, shipping in the Sea of Azov had <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/297546#2">ground to a halt</a>, and the region’s ports subsequently ceased operations as well.</p><p>At the same time, a large-scale campaign titled Operation Crimean Switch-Off began targeting the peninsula's energy infrastructure. After reporting no strikes against energy facilities in May, Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces claimed 181 in <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping/?period=monthly_7">July</a>, 168 in <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping/?period=monthly_8">August</a>, and 105 in <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping/?period=monthly_10">October</a>.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4037</div><p>It is important to note that these figures do not represent the number of vessels or energy facilities permanently put out of service. Still, attacks on electrical substations in Crimea have visibly caused periodic <a href="https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107608">blackouts</a> and <a href="https://t.me/Crimeanwind/111521">widespread power outages</a>. An Oct. 24 <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298780">strike</a> on the 500 kV Taman substation led to an energy crisis worse than the one the peninsula experienced over the summer. However, Ukrainian forces have yet to switch off the “Crimean power switch” completely.</p><p>Despite efforts by the occupation authorities, living conditions in Crimea <a href="https://mxstat.me/channel/@crimeaenergy/post/AaF9vp0ZRYY">continue to deteriorate</a>. Even the announced schedules for power cuts are not being followed. Meanwhile, the Unmanned Systems Forces were conducting a parallel campaign against Russian air defense systems, radar installations, communications equipment, and electronic warfare systems.</p><p>According to the Ukrainian reports, <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping?period=monthly_5">36 systems</a> across three designated categories were hit in May as part of Operation PPopad (a play on the Ukrainian abbreviation PPO, which is short for for "air defense"). The figures were <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping/?period=monthly_6">32 in June</a>, <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping?period=monthly_6">35 in July</a>, <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping?period=monthly_8">32 in August</a>б and <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping?period=monthly_9">43 in September</a>. The number of radar, electronic intelligenceб and communications systems hit increased particularly sharply, from 12 in May to 28 in September.</p><p>The geographical scope of the strikes also expanded. On August 24, Molin <a href="https://t.me/clement_molin/1630">noted</a> that footage was beginning to appear of attacks on airfields, air defense systemsб and radar installations inside Russia itself — “in places where Starlink cannot be used.” Previously, similar strikes involving live video feeds had been recorded mainly in occupied Ukrainian territory and along the coast. According to Molin's estimates, Ukrainian drones have damaged or destroyed more than 250 Russian air defense systems, radar installationsб and electronic warfare systems since the beginning of 2026.</p><blockquote>Ukrainian drones have damaged or destroyed more than 250 Russian air defense systems, radar installations and electronic warfare systems since the beginning of 2026</blockquote><p>Gradually, mid-strike operations came to cover virtually the entire Russian-occupied territory of Ukraine. While the campaign initially focused on southern supply routes, by the fall, footage of strikes deep inside the Russian-occupied part of the Donetsk region was appearing with increasing frequency. In October, Molin <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2109278036411466170">noted</a> that hundreds of vehicles had been targeted on roads connecting the main cities of the Donbas. Back in August, however, the analyst <a href="https://t.me/clement_molin/1665">acknowledged</a> that, despite the significant impact of the strikes on Russian logistics and energy supplies, their intensity was still insufficient to substantially alter the course of Moscow's offensive in the Donetsk region.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Vivaldi: Satellite communications amid the offensive</h3><p>By the fall, Ukrainian forces had begun using mid-strike drones not only to maintain pressure on Russian logistics but also to support ground offensives, most notably Operation <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297159">Vivaldi</a>, conducted on the Lyman axis by the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ 3rd Army Corps. The offensive unfolded in northern Donetsk region, where Russian forces were seeking to advance toward Lyman and Sloviansk.</p><p>According to the <a href="https://t.me/ab3army/7575">Ukrainian command</a>, Russian forces planned to outflank the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk urban agglomeration from the north and seize the Kharkiv–Sloviansk highway, a key supply route for Ukrainian forces. To thwart these plans, the 3rd Corps, commanded by Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky, <a href="https://t.me/ab3army/7468">launched</a> Operation Vivaldi, which unfolded in four stages (or “seasons,” taking inspiration from the famous cycle of Italian composer Antonio Vivaldi).</p><p>One of the main objectives was to disrupt Russian logistics before the ground assault began. In the first phase, Ukrainian drones <a href="https://t.me/ab3army/7474">targeted</a> transport and infrastructure up to 50 kilometers behind the front line, extending their range to 120 kilometers in the next. Targets <a href="https://t.me/ab3army/7492">included</a> trucks carrying ammunition and fuel, depots, crossings, command posts, and communications hubs belonging to Russia’s 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies.</p><p>According to Serafym “Falko” Hordiienko, an officer with Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, the sustained strikes forced support units of Russia’s 144th Motor Rifle Division to relocate some of their supply facilities to the Voronezh region, increasing the distance Russian forces had to transport damaged equipment for evacuation by around 250 kilometers.</p><p>The 3rd Corps <a href="https://t.me/ab3army/7495">said</a> that artillery and drone units struck Russian positions in the rear, while air defense and electronic warfare systems protected advancing troops. Drones and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) operated ahead of the infantry. Satellite communications played a key role, with John Roberts, an American adviser to the 3rd Corps, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-17/spacex-starlink-cuts-hobbled-ukraine-before-russian-bombardment">telling</a> <i>Bloomberg</i> that Starlink was used to maintain communications, relay reconnaissance footage, and coordinate strikes. It also enabled UGVs to be controlled over considerable distances.</p><blockquote>Starlink enabled Ukrainian forces to control ground robots during Operation Vivaldi</blockquote><p>Notably, the Ukrainian Defense Forces were able to convert Soviet-era BTR-60 armored personnel carriers into explosive-laden kamikaze vehicles controlled via Starshield. They also deployed small Hyena robots, which were delivered behind Russian lines by heavy-lift quadcopters that could be remotely controlled after landing.</p><p>To protect advancing troops from Russian drones, the 3rd Corps also integrated its electronic warfare equipment into a unified defense system, mounting some of the equipment on UGVs. According to the corps, the operation <a href="https://t.me/ab3army/7471">prevented</a> more than 20,000 Russian drone sorties.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4154</div><p>The 3rd Corps announced the first results of the operation in mid-September. On Oct. 14, the day restrictions on Starlink and Starshield were imposed, Biletsky <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298308">announced</a> the completion of the operation’s fourth and final phase. According to the corps, Ukrainian forces had regained control of 277 square kilometers of territory and 16 settlements.</p><p>Military expert Kirill Mikhailov believes Starshield enabled the 3rd Corps’ drone units to strike Russian logistics as far away as Luhansk. An expert with the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), who asked to remain anonymous, also considers satellite communications essential primarily for mid-strike operations, which played an important role in Operation Vivaldi. However, he believes conventional Starlink was sufficient for communications between military positions and command posts, as well as for controlling unmanned ground vehicles (including the aforementioned kamikaze armored personnel carriers).</p><p>Experts believe that a complete shutdown of Starshield would not prevent Ukrainian forces from conducting ground offensives but would significantly reduce their effectiveness. According to Mikhailov, conventional Starlink can still be used for communications at fixed positions, for controlling UGVs, and for operating heavy multirotor drones such as the Vampire (Baba Yaga).</p><p>In theory, conventional Starlink could also provide communications links for mid-strike drones and interceptor UAVs, but this would require the widespread use of airborne relays and a substantial overhaul of the system. The CIT expert stresses that without systematic strikes against Russian operational rear areas, it would become harder for Ukrainian forces to isolate the area of operations, disrupt supply routes, and prevent the movement of reinforcements, slowing their advance and increasing casualties. . This could slow the advance of Ukrainian units and increase their casualties, although the impact would depend on the circumstances of each operation.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">How Ukrainian forces can fight without Starlink and Starshield</h3><p>The Starshield restrictions primarily affected drones that require a constant connection to their operators. However, a substantial part of Ukraine’s long-range arsenal does not depend on satellite communications. UAVs programmed to fly to predetermined coordinates can strike stationary targets without the need for continuous remote control, while cruise missiles and drone missiles <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/297813">use</a> their own navigation systems.</p><p>As a result, disruptions to satellite communications do not prevent Ukrainian forces from striking Russian defense industry facilities, airfields, drone bases, and other targets in the operational and deep rear. Oil industry facilities remain among the main targets of Ukraine’s long-range strikes, with drones regularly attacking refineries, oil storage facilities, and pumping stations, causing fires and damaging equipment.</p><p>In October and early November, strikes against oil infrastructure were reported in Russia's <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298354">Ryazan</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297849">Volgograd</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297849">Samara</a>, and <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299068">Nizhny Novgorod</a> regions. In late September, successful strikes on refineries <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297543">forced</a> four facilities to shut down. Such attacks have a direct impact on the Russian economy and were among the main <a href="https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/566843-benzina-snova-net-rossiu-nakryla-vtoraa-volna-toplivnogo-krizisa">causes</a> of Russia’s summer fuel crisis.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af5e66b47db33.59815608/EVySEyXdXxYRh4FzTuM8YP38hOBeCzKy34cptdwc.jpg" alt="Aftermath of a Ukrainian drone strike on the Kstovo oil refinery in the Nizhny Novgorod region, November 1, 2026"/><figcaption>Aftermath of a Ukrainian drone strike on the Kstovo oil refinery in the Nizhny Novgorod region, November 1, 2026</figcaption></figure><p>Meanwhile, attacks on oil refineries were <a href="https://t.me/stanislav_osman/11191">halted</a> between <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298399">Oct. 16</a> and <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298946">30</a>, reportedly under <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-pauses-strikes-on-russian-refineries-after-pressure-from-u-s-a9e512f8?mod=hp_lead_pos1">pressure</a> from the Trump administration. Instead, Ukrainian forces shifted their focus to chemical plants. In late October, synthetic rubber plants in Tolyatti, Omsk, and Voronezh came <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298780">under attack</a>. Their products are used, among other things, to manufacture rocket propellant. The main objective for the Ukrainian Defense Forces is to hit polybutadiene production units at these plants, which are particularly difficult to repair. One such unit was <a href="https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13646">hit</a> at the Voronezhsintezkauchuk plant on Oct. 26.</p><p>The campaign against Russia’s defense industry is also expanding. On Sept. 25, drones <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297537">attacked</a> the Iskra plant in Ulyanovsk, part of the Almaz-Antey conglomerate, which manufactures electronic components for radio equipment and communications systems.</p><p>In October, Ukrainian forces also <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298780">reported</a> strikes on the Energiya plant in Yelets, which produces power supplies for missiles and guided bombs, and the Proton-Elektrotex facility, which manufactures components for Russian cruise and ballistic missiles.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4152</div><p>In addition to fixed-wing drones, Ukraine also uses domestically developed cruise missiles — including the Flamingo, upgraded versions of the Neptune, and several types of drone missiles — for these missions. In June, Russia's <a href="https://theins.ru/news/294174">Titan-Barrikady plant</a> in Volgograd, which manufactures missile launchers, came under attack.</p><p>In late September, Ukrainian forces also used several types of long-range weapons to strike the <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297574">Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant</a> in the Rostov region. The main limitation remains the relatively small number of such weapons and their inconsistent effectiveness.</p><p>Military equipment storage facilities have also been targeted. On the night of Oct. 22, Ukrainian drones <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298632">attacked</a> the 75th Arsenal of Russia's Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU), now known as the 75 Arsenal facility, in Serpukhov, near Moscow. Reports indicated <a href="https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13645">hits</a> on repair workshops and a storage hangar. According to OSINT analysts, as of 2024 the facility was Russia’s largest known storage facility for ground-based air defense equipment.</p><p>A massive missile and drone strike on the headquarters of Russia’s Center Group of Forces in Donetsk on Aug. 26, 2026, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298131">killed</a> at least 20 officers, whose identities were <a href="https://zona.media/news/2026/10/09/20_oficzerov">established</a> by <i>Mediazona</i>. Among those killed was Colonel Andrey Romanchuk, head of the engineering troops of Russia’s Central Military District. Storm Shadow / SCALP-EG missiles were reportedly used in the attack. According to <i>Mediazona</i>, this was single deadliest known incident for Russian officers over the course of the war. </p><p>Since July, Ukrainian long-range strikes have also <a href="https://theins.ru/news/295077">targeted</a> Russian commercial infrastructure. Between July 18 and Aug. 5, drones attacked at least 21 Wildberries logistics facilities in Russia and Crimea. Experts <a href="https://theins.ru/ekonomika/296695">estimated</a> that 17–22% of the company’s warehouse space had been damaged, with combined losses for the marketplace and its sellers <a href="https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/566547-kassovyj-razryv-80-menedzerov-sokratili-sellery-isut-zasity-u-gosudarstva">estimated</a> at 600–800 billion rubles ($7.2 billion to $9.7 billion).</p><p>Since Aug. 22, Ozon warehouses have also come under drone attack. The company <a href="https://corp.ozon.ru/ru/sth/ozon-obyavlyaet-finansovye-rezultaty-za-tretiy-kvartal-2026-goda-58924955">estimated</a> its losses from strikes on 11 logistics centers at 30 billion rubles ($362.2 million). Russian data centers have also <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298231">come under long-range attack</a>. After a strike on a Yandex data center in Vladimir on Oct. 11, the company reported that the facility had ceased operations, causing disruptions to its cloud services.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4059</div><p>Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks on the most obvious targets — Russian Shahed launch sites — have achieved relatively little. Despite repeated strikes on drone bases at Donetsk airport (<a href="https://theins.ru/news/286578">1</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/290117">2</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/291475">3</a>) and near the village of Tsymbulova in the Oryol region (<a href="https://theins.ru/news/296627">1</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297394">2</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297803">3</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297926">4</a>), both within range of Ukraine’s mid-strike drones, the facilities remain operational and continue to <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297130">expand</a>.</p><p>Donetsk airport, less than 50 kilometers from the front line, was struck with ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles in <a href="https://theins.ru/news/290117">March</a> and <a href="https://theins.ru/news/291475">April</a> 2026. Some of the drone shelters were destroyed or damaged. By June, however, the airport <a href="https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/donetskiy-aeroport-baza-rf-shakhedy/33816808.html">had</a> seven launch installations and more than 130 shelters, while Russian forces continued building fortified storage facilities.</p><p>A similar situation has developed at the drone base near Tsymbulova. According to <a href="https://oboronka.mezha.ua/zvidki-vorog-zapuskaye-tisyachi-shahediv-dronoporti-315502/">estimates</a> by Ukrainian OSINT analysts, the site has 23 launch installations, 387 shelters, and 26 underground storage facilities. Ukrainian strikes in <a href="https://theins.ru/news/296627">late August</a> and <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297394">September</a> damaged several structures, but most of the infrastructure remained intact. Attacks intensified in October. Following strikes on <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297803">Oct. 1</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297926">Oct. 3</a> and <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298231">Oct. 10</a>, satellite imagery revealed further damage to bunkers, a launch installation, and the drone storage area. Nevertheless, there were no reports that the facility had been put out of operation for any extended period. Analysts at the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) <a href="https://notes.citeam.org/ru-dispatch-sep-21-24-2026">suggest</a> that the relatively infrequent attacks give Russian forces enough time to repair the infrastructure and replace their losses.</p><blockquote>Long-range strikes have had little impact on Russian drone launch sites used to attack Ukraine</blockquote><p>The Hvardiiske airfield in Crimea has <a href="https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8312">become</a> one of Russia’s main launch sites for long-range drones. It first <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22467">appeared</a> in Ukrainian General Staff reports as a launch site for loitering munitions in March 2025. By the fall of 2026, launches from the airfield were taking place almost daily. Almost all manned aircraft previously stationed at Hvardiiske had been withdrawn by the summer of 2024. Nevertheless, Ukrainian sources have periodically <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22467">reported</a> strikes on helicopters there. The airfield has effectively been repurposed for drone operations, making it difficult to put out of action for any length of time.</p><p>The drone infrastructure is dispersed across the airfield: launch sites, maintenance facilities, and storage areas are located in different sections, while individual launch positions can be restored relatively quickly. Notably, drones are launched not from fixed installations but from mobile platforms mounted on vehicles that drive onto the runway. Moreover, Hvardiiske lies deep inside the peninsula, forcing Ukrainian drones to fly upwards of 100 kilometers over land, where they are more vulnerable to interception.</p><p>The Ukrainian Defense Forces have repeatedly attempted to strike this hub. On Aug. 7, the General Staff <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41792">reported</a> an attack on a facility near Hvardiiske that is used to store, prepare, and launch UAVs. Following another strike on the night of Oct. 12, NASA satellites <a href="https://t.me/Crimeanwind/110954">detected</a> a fire near the southeastern end of the runway.</p><p>The Conflict Intelligence Team <a href="https://notes.citeam.org/ru-dispatch-aug-13-17-2026#proJ">argues</a> that, given Ukraine's shortage of air defense missiles, it would be more effective to follow the principle of “shoot the archer, not the arrows” — prioritizing the destruction of launch installations and related infrastructure. Even facilities protected by air defense systems, mobile fire groups, and electronic warfare equipment can have their defenses overwhelmed by a mass attack.</p><p>Analysts question why Wildberries warehouses and similar facilities appear to take priority over drone bases as Ukrainian targets. Meanwhile, the authors of the Ukrainian OSINT project Dnipro Osint ⟨ Harbuz ⟩, <a href="https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8347">note</a> that Ukrainian forces have repeatedly attacked Russia's drone base near Tsymbulova, sometimes successfully hitting warehouses and launch installations. However, in their assessment, most strikes failed to reach their targets because of the site's extensive electronic warfare defenses.</p><p>Satellite images published by the project show numerous craters and traces of crashed drones around the facility. The authors suggest that medium-range ballistic missiles, particularly the FP-7, might be more effective against such targets.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af5e772525c75.31029831/M76XoGKYvl5YCOUmIzSyr9z8CASkSheBb2Ylgozq.jpg" alt="A satellite image showing impact sites from Ukrainian drone strikes near the Tsymbulova drone base in the Oryol region, November 2026  "/><figcaption>A satellite image showing impact sites from Ukrainian drone strikes near the Tsymbulova drone base in the Oryol region, November 2026  </figcaption></figure><p>Large industrial facilities protected by layered air defenses are even harder to strike. According to <a href="https://www.svoboda.org/a/chislo-pozitsiy-pvo-vokrug-osoboy-ekonomicheskoy-zony-alabuga-dostiglo-33-h/33880930.html"><i>Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty</i></a>, satellite imagery from Oct. 21 showed 33 air defense positions and installations around the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan, where Russia manufactures Shahed-type drones. In addition to towers and sites housing antiaircraft systems, the area is equipped with machine-gun positions and anti-drone netting. The last recorded Ukrainian drone attack on the facility took place in <a href="https://theins.ru/news/282181">June 2025</a>.</p><p>Ukrainian strikes against airbases inside Russia have been more successful. In October 2026 alone, the Russian Aerospace Forces lost seven Su-34 fighter-bombers: one at Khanskaya airbase in Adygea on <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297926">Oct. 4</a>, four at Borisoglebsk airbase in the Voronezh region on <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298354">Oct. 15</a> and two at Marinovka airbase on <a href="https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/22898">Oct. 29</a>.</p><p>Thus, even without Starshield, the Ukrainian Defense Forces retain the ability to strike Russian operational and deep rear areas. However, satellite communications restrictions limit their ability to locate and engage moving targets. Maintaining the scale of the mid-strike campaign therefore requires alternative drone control links.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">What could replace Starlink, and how long would it take?</h3><p>The October 2026 restrictions on satellite communications have forced the Ukrainian Defense Forces to look for independent providers. However, existing alternatives are not yet capable of fully replacing Starlink, particularly when it comes to controlling drones tens or hundreds of kilometers away. </p><p>Europe's Eutelsat OneWeb satellite system is already available in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Defense Forces <a href="https://ain.ua/2026/10/22/jevropa-ta-velika-britaniia-maiut-alternativu-starlink-ale-ukrayina-cim-ne-koristujetsia-poiasniujemo-comu/">use</a> it primarily for communications between headquarters and command posts, as well as to serve as a backup link (including on naval drones). However, there is no confirmation that OneWeb has been used to control UAVs during long-range strikes.</p><p>Unlike Starlink, which operates a constellation of more than 11,000 satellites, OneWeb has around 650. Its overall network capacity is considerably lower, while its equipment is more expensive than Starlink's and designed primarily for corporate and government customers.</p><p>Back in March 2025, Eutelsat <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/eutelsat-committed-boosting-europes-satellite-autonomy-continued-support-ukraine-2025-03-03/">reported</a> that several hundred terminals were operating in Ukraine — far too few to replace the tens of thousands of Starlink terminals in the country. Whether OneWeb can also support the control of fast-moving UAVs remains an open question.</p><p>As OSINT researcher Jakub Janovský has <a href="https://fronts.co/article/governments-are-scrambling-for-a-starlink-alternative-does-one-even-exist/">explained</a>, SpaceX's advantage lies not only in the number of satellites it has deployed but also in its ability to manufacture its own equipment, launch satellites using its own reusable rockets, and continually expand network capacity. European competitors, by contrast, have to rely on different contractors to manufacture and launch their satellites. In Janovský's assessment, even a substantial increase in government funding would not be enough to allow them to catch up with SpaceX quickly.</p><blockquote>Competitors will struggle to catch up with SpaceX, even with a substantial increase in government funding</blockquote><p>Another European alternative is the satellite terminals of Swedish company SatCube, which have been <a href="https://militarnyi.com/en/news/ukraine-will-receive-satcube-terminals-for-satellite-communications/">supplied</a> to Ukraine since 2023 (thanks to German financial support). They provide satellite internet via geostationary satellites operated by U.S. company Intelsat. However, their high signal latency and relatively bulky equipment make them better suited to stationary and field communications than to drone control.</p><p>A potentially promising option for long-range UAVs is the compact terminals developed by Israeli company HiSky. In late October 2026, Russia’s Coordination Center for Aid to Novorossiya <a href="https://t.me/kcpn2014/4551">reported</a> that it had obtained a SmartLITE SIRIUS 16×16 terminal recovered from a Ukrainian fixed-wing drone for examination. Unlike Starlink, HiSky uses satellite networks operated by third-party providers, potentially allowing communications to be maintained over Russian territory.</p><p>HiSky terminals are designed to transmit commands, telemetry, and other data via satellite. Their bandwidth <a href="https://hiskysat.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Smartellite%E2%84%A2-Dynamic-KU-16x16_v1_3db.pdf">depends</a> on the satellite network used, while their ability to transmit video and support remote drone control has yet to be fully assessed. </p><p>Another potential competitor to Starlink is Amazon Leo, the U.S. satellite system formerly known as Project Kuiper. By October 2026, Amazon had <a href="https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/innovation-at-amazon/project-kuiper-satellite-rocket-launch-progress-updates">launched</a> nearly 400 satellites into orbit and expected to begin providing limited internet access by the end of the year. The constellation is ultimately <a href="https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/innovation-at-amazon/what-is-amazon-project-kuiper">expected</a> to comprise more than 3,000 satellites. Unlike SpaceX, however, Amazon has no launch vehicles of its own and thus <a href="https://fronts.co/article/governments-are-scrambling-for-a-starlink-alternative-does-one-even-exist/">relies</a> on external providers, including <a href="https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/innovation-at-amazon/amazon-project-kuiper-spacex-launch">SpaceX itself</a>. Its satellite constellation has also yet to reach the necessary scale. Moreover, switching from one American commercial system to another would not resolve Ukraine’s dependence on U.S. government decisions.</p><p>In the longer term, Europe plans to develop its own secure satellite communications system, IRIS², which is closer in purpose to the military Starshield service than to commercial Starlink. The project is being developed by the SpaceRISE consortium, comprising Eutelsat, SES, and Hispasat.</p><p>IRIS² is more expensive to deploy than Starlink because of its military-grade security and its resistance to electronic warfare, its complex multi-orbit architecture, the drive for technological independence, and the lack of a comparable manufacturing scale. The EU project envisages a constellation of 348 satellites, including those dedicated to military and government communications. Commercial services are also planned.</p><p>In August 2026, the European Commission <a href="https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/european-union-accelerating-and-reinforcing-iris2-2026-08-07_en">approved</a> an accelerated deployment schedule, with the first launches <a href="https://www.euspa.europa.eu/newsroom-events/news/commission-accelerates-iris2-deployment-enhanced-security-and-expanded">planned</a> for 2029 and secure services expected to begin in 2030. Even after the system becomes operational, however, expanding the network and deploying compatible equipment will take time. IRIS² could eventually become a strategic alternative to SpaceX, but it will not solve the Ukrainian Defense Forces’ immediate problems.</p><blockquote>Europe’s Starshield alternative is scheduled to become operational in 2030</blockquote><p>Ukrainian developers are also working to build an independent satellite network. On Oct. 1, Ukrainian company Himera and Denmark’s GomSpace <a href="https://oboronka.mezha.ua/ukrajinskiy-suverenniy-suputnik-vzhe-pracyuye-na-orbiti-316593/">launched</a> the first test satellite, OBRIA NANO, which is intended to form the basis of a future Ukrainian secure communications system.</p><p>In addition, conventional radio links, ground-based and airborne relays, and mesh networks could help the Ukrainian Defense Forces reduce their dependence on Starlink. Mesh networks route data through multiple interconnected devices, so the loss of an individual node does not necessarily disrupt communications. For example, the American <a href="https://silvustechnologies.com/products/streamcaster-radios">Silvus StreamCaster</a> and Ukrainian <a href="https://himeratech.com/en/">HIMERA</a> systems are designed to maintain communications between military units without a constant satellite internet connection. However, extending such networks over hundreds of kilometers is more difficult and requires relay stations that the enemy can jam or destroy.</p><p>Another option is 4G/LTE cellular networks, which are already used in military drones. As early as 2023, <a href="https://t.me/serhii_flash/1667">modems and SIM cards</a> from mobile operators were found in Russia's Shahed drones. Cellular networks allow data transmission without satellite terminals, but coverage may be unavailable in occupied territories. Network operators and the military can also restrict access for specific devices. Mobile internet can therefore supplement other control links but cannot guarantee a reliable connection throughout a drone’s flight.</p><p>Ukraine's dependence on Starlink creates vulnerabilities that are about more than just the whims of Donald Trump's White House — Russian military countermeasures are also playing a role. In 2026, Russian forces began making more <a href="https://theins.ru/news/296638" target="_blank">extensive use</a> of Volna Kupol Garant systems to jam Starlink signals. Deployed around Donetsk, Mariupol, Berdiansk, and Crimea, they make it harder for Ukrainian forces to strike Russian rear areas. However, their powerful radio emissions also make them easier to detect, and some have already been <a href="https://theins.ru/news/295880">destroyed</a> by Ukrainian drones.</p><p>A fundamentally different approach is to <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/295796">develop</a> autonomous drones that do not require a constant connection to an operator. For example, Hornet drones developed by Eric Schmidt’s Perennial Autonomy use <span class="termin" data-description="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">computer vision</span> to identify vehicles and to track targets. If satellite navigation is lost, they can navigate autonomously using images of the terrain. Once a target has been acquired, a drone can complete its attack independently, even if communications are lost. Germany’s <a href="https://t.me/MiliTJournal/35244">HX-2</a> drones can also perform part of their flight autonomously and use computer vision for terminal guidance.</p><p>Autonomous control is also being introduced into unmanned ground vehicles. In October 2026, the Lava Unmanned Systems Regiment of the Ukrainian National Guard’s 2nd Khartiia Corps <a href="https://militarnyi.com/uk/news/ukrayinskyj-nrk-iz-shi-samostijno-19-km/">announced</a> tests of an autonomously controlled UGV in the Kharkiv sector. The vehicle completed 93% of a 20-kilometer route on its own, with an operator taking control only for a 1.4-kilometer stretch.</p><p>Before a mission, the terrain is scanned using a lidar to create a three-dimensional map. The UGV then navigates using this map, while cameras and artificial intelligence help it identify obstacles and maneuver independently. The system, developed by Apex AI, reduces the need for continuous communication with an operator, including through Starlink.</p><p>However, current autonomous systems cannot yet fully replace human operators in complex missions, particularly in rapidly changing environments. According to Ukrainian military personnel interviewed by <a href="https://oboronka.mezha.ua/yak-ukrajina-stala-zaruchnikom-starlink-alternativi-316572/">Oboronka</a>, the widespread availability of inexpensive, easy-to-use Starlink terminals has slowed the development of domestic communications systems. </p><p>Building relay networks and other backup channels requires considerably more time, funding, and specialized personnel. Major Ihor Bohdan, head of the Center for Innovation and Technology of Ukraine's 7th Air Assault Corps, argues that rather than seeking a single replacement for Starlink, the military should focus on integrating different technologies into a decentralized network that can remain operational even when individual nodes are lost.</p><p>In the near term, Ukraine can reduce its dependence on SpaceX by combining different communications channels with the development of autonomous guidance systems. Replacing Starshield for high-speed drones, however, remains a much more difficult challenge. Building an independent satellite communications infrastructure would take several years at the very least.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/289800">No connection: Blocking Starlink for the Russian military has changed the situation at the front in Ukraine</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/291528">Ukraine’s “middle strike”: How Kyiv’s forces learned to hit targets up to 300 kilometers behind the front — and why Russia can’t stop them</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/294084">Roads of death: Ukrainian strikes on transport corridors are disrupting Russia’s military logistics</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 07:13:29 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[EU loses court battle over sanctions against convicted Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc but keeps him on an updated blacklist]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299582</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299582</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij5UaGUgQ291cnQgb2YgSnVzdGljZSBvZiB0aGUgRXVyb3BlYW4gVW5pb24gKENKRVUpIGlzIHRoZSBqdWRpY2lhbCBicmFuY2ggb2YgdGhlIEV1cm9wZWFuIFVuaW9uLCBzZWF0ZWQgaW4gTHV4ZW1ib3VyZywgdGFza2VkIHdpdGggZW5zdXJpbmcgdGhhdCBFVSBsYXcgaXMgaW50ZXJwcmV0ZWQgYW5kIGFwcGxpZWQgdW5pZm9ybWx5IGFjcm9zcyBhbGwgbWVtYmVyIHN0YXRlcy48L3A+">Court of Justice of the European Union</span> has rejected an appeal by the Council of the EU, upholding a ruling that annulled sanctions imposed in May 2023 on Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, who was sentenced in April to 19 years in prison for bank fraud. Despite the Council’s defeat in court, Plahotniuc remains on the sanctions list under an updated decision adopted in April 2026. The restrictions have been extended through April 29, 2027, with the justification expanded to include allegations that he met with Kremlin representatives with the aim of interfering in Moldovan elections.</p><p>The <a href="https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/document/C/2024/C-0897-24-00000000PV-01-P-01/ARRET_NP/329187-EN-1-html">ruling</a> was issued by the court’s Sixth Chamber and saw the judges uphold an October 2024 judgment by the EU’s <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij5UaGUgR2VuZXJhbCBDb3VydCBpcyB0aGUgbG93ZXIgb2YgdGhlIHR3byBjb3VydHMgdGhhdCBtYWtlIHVwIHRoZSBDb3VydCBvZiBKdXN0aWNlIG9mIHRoZSBFdXJvcGVhbiBVbmlvbiAoQ0pFVSksIGJhc2VkIGluIEx1eGVtYm91cmcuPC9wPg==">General Court</span>, which found Plahotniuc’s original inclusion on the sanctions list unlawful. The Council of the EU had <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62024CN0897">challenged</a> that decision since December 2024.</p><p>The court found that when Plahotniuc was added to the sanctions list, the Council had failed to verify whether his right to effective judicial protection had been respected in the criminal proceedings opened against him in Moldova. European authorities had relied on materials from those investigations to justify the sanctions.</p><p>In its original <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1047/oj/eng">decision</a> of May 30, 2023, the Council said Plahotniuc was implicated in several criminal cases involving the embezzlement of public funds, illegal capital transfers, and bank fraud. Moldovan investigators also suspected him of bribing a former president in exchange for political favors. The Council argued that the criminal investigations were only one of several sources of information it had relied on.</p><p>The court also rejected the Council’s argument that the alleged bribery of a Moldovan president could serve as an independent basis for sanctions because it amounted to interference in the democratic process. The judges said that even under that reasoning, the Council was still required to verify that Plahotniuc’s procedural rights had been respected when the criminal case was opened.</p><p>As a result of the proceedings, the Council of the EU was ordered to cover both its own legal costs and Plahotniuc’s.</p><h3>Despite the ruling, Plahotniuc remains under EU sanctions</h3><p>The annulment of the original sanctions decision does not mean Plahotniuc has been removed from the current list of designations. In April 2026, the Council of the EU <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/897/oj/eng">adopted</a> a new measure extending restrictions on individuals accused of destabilizing Moldova, and those measures will remain in place through April 29, 2027.</p><p>The Council also updated the justification for the sanctions by adding allegations that he interfered in Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections. In particular, the document says Plahotniuc held meetings with Kremlin representatives to seek support for interfering in the Moldovan vote. Those allegations were not included in the original 2023 sanctions decision that he challenged in court.</p><h3><i>The Insider</i> previously uncovered Plahotniuc’s secret trips to the Kremlin</h3><p>Plahotniuc <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/283588">held</a> secret talks with senior Russian officials. Flight records and copies of documents obtained by <i>The Insider</i> showed that he regularly traveled to Moscow using a passport issued under the false name Mikhail Taushanov. Passports bearing that name were later found when he was detained in Greece.</p><p>Recordings of conversations involving Vladislav Darvai, Russia’s former trade representative in Moldova, indicated that Dmitry Kozak, then deputy head of the Russian presidential administration, had been holding talks with Plahotniuc since June 2024. The discussions included the oligarch’s possible return to Moldovan politics and a potential meeting with Vladimir Putin. Plahotniuc last traveled to Moscow in late April 2025.</p><h3>A 19-year sentence and allegations of laundering billions of dollars</h3><p>In spring 2026, a court in Chisinau <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/291837">sentenced</a> Plahotniuc to 19 years in prison on charges of bank fraud, participation in a criminal organization and money laundering. The case stemmed from the theft of about $1 billion from three of Moldova’s largest banks in 2014. Prosecutors accused Plahotniuc of receiving $39 million and €3.5 million in stolen funds through affiliated companies. Plahotniuc denied the allegations, characterizing the verdict as political revenge. The trial court ruling has been appealed, and hearings on the appeal began in October 2026.</p><p>Plahotniuc also appeared in investigations into the so-called Moldovan Laundromat, a massive money-laundering scheme <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/project/the-russian-laundromat/the-russian-laundromat">uncovered</a> by the international investigative journalism network OCCRP. According to the investigation, around $20 billion was moved out of Russia between 2010 and 2014 through a network of fictitious loans, offshore companies, Moldovan courts, and banks.</p><p>Plahotniuc left Moldova in 2019 after a change of government. He was detained in Greece in July 2025 and was extradited to Chisinau in September. Russia had also sought his extradition in connection with a money-laundering case opened against him there.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/291837">Kremlin-linked Moldovan billionaire Vladimir Plahotniuc handed 19-year prison term in Chisinau</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/283588">The Kremlin’s laundromat: Billionaire Moldovan fraudster Vladimir Plahotniuc repeatedly flew to Moscow for secret high-level talks</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 19:00:09 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[U.S. intelligence previously identified Moscow bombing target Sergei Zavorotny as a Russian foreign intelligence officer]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299580</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299580</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299580/Q4gX278uWFAbwWkr2DD3EbILFiVpsgYjetNAcZYn.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sergei Zavorotny, a pro-Russian Ukrainian who was <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299576" target="_blank">targeted</a> in an assassination attempt in Moscow earlier today, is an officer of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), according to an August 2020 <a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20230621/116122/HHRG-118-JU00-20230621-SD012.pdf">report</a> from the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election. Zavorotny is a former spokesman and adviser to former Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov who later worked on a series of pro-Russian media projects after fleeing from Kyiv to Moscow in 2014.</p><p>The Russian investigative outlet <i>Important Stories</i> <a href="https://t.me/istories_media/14259">drew attention</a> to the report in a post on Telegram:</p><blockquote><p>“Azarov’s press secretary — both while he served as prime minister of Ukraine and when he announced from Moscow the creation of a government in exile — was Sergei Zavorotny, an SVR officer involved in influence operations.”</p></blockquote><p>The report said the conclusion was based on Zavorotny being identified as a serviceman assigned to Military Unit 33949, which is linked to the SVR. <i>The Insider</i> has repeatedly <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/292740">reported</a> on the unit’s ties to Russia’s foreign intelligence service.</p><p>A person who knows Zavorotny told <i>The Insider</i> that he had previously served in the Soviet KGB and had been its resident intelligence officer in Argentina, working under journalistic cover as a correspondent for the Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda. The source also said Zavorotny had been involved in Russian intelligence propaganda operations in Europe before the start of the war in Ukraine.</p><p>The assassination attempt on the 72-year-old Zavorotny took place on the morning of Nov. 13 on Kirovogradskaya Street in Moscow. An explosive device detonated inside his car. Russia’s Investigative Committee <a href="https://t.me/sledcom_press/33135">said</a> Zavorotny was driving the vehicle and was taken to a hospital after being wounded by the blast. Komsomolskaya Pravda <a href="https://www.kp.ru/daily/277833.5/5328198/">reported</a> that its former Latin America correspondent suffered shrapnel wounds to his chest and back, as well as severe injuries to his legs and one arm.</p><p>Zavorotny fled from Kyiv to Moscow after Ukraine’s 2014 Maidan revolution removed Viktor Yanukovych from the presidency, and he continued working on pro-Russian information projects in his new home. Zavorotny was <a href="https://www.trud.ru/article/26-10-2026/1848351_bozhestvennaja_komedija_ottsa_i_syna.html">described</a> as editor-in-chief of the “Antifascist” website, and in 2018, he and Alexei Berdnikov published a book titled <i>Yanukovych Gave Up. The State Department Took Over. How Russia Lost Ukraine. Notes of Mykola Azarov’s Adviser</i>. At a <a href="https://kmbook.ru/sergey-zavorotnyiy-02-04-2018-v-td-biblio-globu/">book presentation</a> in Moscow, the authors presented their own account of the events of the Euromaidan protests.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299576">Moscow’s latest car bombing targets pro-Russian propagandist from Ukraine</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/292740">Grabbing him by the “Beard”: The Insider identifies the FSB, GRU, and SVR agents Russia sent to Armenia to take on PM Nikol Pashinyan</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 18:41:50 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Moscow’s latest car bombing targets pro-Russian propagandist from Ukraine]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299576</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299576</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299576/8Nqa3r46WdGL1a6wxjjFGB6SPXLo5IwmCULXJgZM.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On the morning of Nov. 13, a Toyota Fortuner SUV exploded in Moscow’s Chertanovo district. According to Russian media, the vehicle belonged to 72-year-old Sergei Zavorotny, a former press secretary and adviser to former Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov. The injured driver was hospitalized.</p><p>As <i>The Insider</i> found, after moving to Moscow in 2014, Zavorotny went on to work on a series of pro-Russian information projects. As recently as the end of October, he was <a href="https://www.trud.ru/article/26-10-2026/1848351_bozhestvennaja_komedija_ottsa_i_syna.html">referred to</a> as the editor-in-chief of the pro-Kremlin website Antifashist.com.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af75376b4eda2.23480792/KzI76Bp5czfOlHPHEnmm14KTCOCaIxhyNytHzNCd.jpg" alt="Sergei Zavorotny "/><figcaption>Sergei Zavorotny </figcaption></figure><p>The explosion <a href="https://t.me/shot_shot/102044">occurred</a> on Kirovogradskaya Street. According to the Telegram channels SHOT and Mash, the SUV drove out of the courtyard of a residential building and traveled about 200 meters before the explosive device went off, blowing out the doors on the left side of the car and throwing the driver onto the roadway.</p><p>An eyewitness who was driving toward the Toyota <a href="https://auto.rambler.ru/roadaccidents/57409614-postradavshiy-pri-vzryve-v-moskve-eks-press-sekretar-premer-ministra-ukrainy/">told</a> Moskovsky Komsomolets that after the explosion, the SUV lost control and came to a stop about a meter from his car. The man approached the victim, checked his pulse, and called an ambulance.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af753a0383256.70952977/1YRPsa8jjUrXZiHu0Tgm2z4g6PTt49lyot3qvZRT.jpg" alt="Shot / Telegram"/><figcaption>Shot / Telegram</figcaption></figure><p>As SHOT reports, Zavorotny <a href="https://t.me/shot_shot/102050">suffered</a> shrapnel wounds to the chest and back as well as severe leg and arm injuries. The improvised explosive device is believed to have been placed under the driver’s seat.</p><p>Russia’s Investigative Committee dispatched a team to examine the crime scene and <a href="https://t.me/sledcom_press/33133">opened</a> a criminal case, without specifying the charges. Law enforcement authorities have not yet confirmed the identity of the injured driver.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af753bfd7bbd8.55202260/SOF3Fg7tdEbKj1gSJkTyLNUDJDghr0wUu3YRYp5a.jpg" alt="Shot / Telegram"/><figcaption>Shot / Telegram</figcaption></figure><h4>From advising PM Azarov to running a pro-Russian publication</h4><p>Sergei Zavorotny is an international affairs journalist and commentator with a Ph.D. in history. In 2010, he worked as an adviser to Mykola Azarov, who was then Ukraine’s prime minister. In May 2010, Zavorotny took part in a foreign information campaign staged by the Party of Regions, the political vehicle of then-president Viktor Yanukovych. As <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2010/05/13/5037675/">wrote</a> in 2010 shortly after Yanukovych was sworn in, Zavorotny accompanied a group of Party of Regions lawmakers and Yanukovych acolytes on trips to Israel and France in an effort to promote the positions of Ukraine’s new government.</p><p>After the Euromaidan protests of 2013-2014, which ended in Yanukovych’s flight to Russia, Zavorotny continued to work with Azarov, moving to Moscow along with several key figures in the old Party of Regions apparatus. In July 2015, Zavorotny <a href="http://gazeta.ru/politics/news/2015/07/29/n_7418113.shtml">announced</a> the creation of the Committee for the Salvation of Ukraine, effectively an alternative Ukrainian government in exile. Former Verkhovna Rada lawmakers Volodymyr Oliinyk, Ihor Markov, and Oleh Tsaryov took part in the project. The committee intended to put forward its own candidate for president of Ukraine, but its efforts never led to any notable political success.</p><p>In 2018, Zavorotny and Aleksei Berdnikov published the book “Yanukovych Gave Up. The State Department Accepted. How Russia Lost Ukraine. Notes of Mykola Azarov’s Adviser.” At a <a href="https://kmbook.ru/sergey-zavorotnyiy-02-04-2018-v-td-biblio-globu/">presentation</a> of the book in Moscow, the authors offered their own version of the events of the Euromaidan.</p><p>During his time in Moscow, Zavorotny also became editor-in-chief of the pro-Russian information resource Antifashist. In February 2022, shortly before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the outlet <a href="https://antifashist.com/item/anons-segodnya-v-pryamom-efire-v-1900-udalos-li-makronu-zastavit-zelenskogo-otkazatsya-ot-planov-atakovat-yugo-vostok-i-soblyudat-minskie-soglasheniya.html">presented</a> him in that capacity during a discussion of Ukrainian politics. In late October of this year, a <a href="https://www.trud.ru/article/26-10-2026/1848351_bozhestvennaja_komedija_ottsa_i_syna.html">piece</a> in the newspaper Trud identified Zavorotny as Antifashist’s editor-in-chief.</p><h4>What <i>The Insider</i> previously found about Azarov’s Moscow affairs</h4><p>In April 2017, <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.ru/korrupciya/49411">established</a> that the office of Azarov’s Committee for the Salvation of Ukraine was located on the 47th floor of the Naberezhnaya Tower in the Moscow City business center. Neighboring premises were occupied by entities of Ukrainian businessman Serhiy Kurchenko, who also moved to Russia after the Euromaidan. Former Verkhovna Rada lawmaker Volodymyr Oliinyk and journalist Yuriy Kot, who was in charge of media support for the organization, were regularly present at the committee’s office.</p><p>Today’s explosion follows a similar incident in St. Petersburg one day earlier. On the morning of Nov. 12, the car of an unnamed Russian colonel <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299513">exploded</a> in the Shushary district, killing the target at the scene. Investigators opened a murder case. According to the local outlet <i>Fontanka</i>, the explosive device was planted under the vehicle’s underbody.</p><p>No link has been reported between the two explosions. </p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299513">Russian colonel killed in St. Petersburg neighborhood’s second military car bombing since August</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296553">Russian officer killed in St. Petersburg car bombing identified as Sergei Sechkov, whose unit Ukraine accuses of strikes on civilians</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/280979">Russian general killed in car bombing outside Moscow prepared war briefings for Putin</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 18:17:18 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Hatemonger: What does Trump&#039;s appointment of Stephen Miller as chief of staff mean for the next two years?]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/politics/299525</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/politics/299525</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <description><![CDATA[<p>U.S. President Donald Trump has appointed trusted ally Stephen Miller to serve as White House chief of staff. Miller has been a key advocate of several controversial Trump initiatives, most prominently the policy of separating migrant children from their parents and of carrying out mass deportations. Although nearly half Trump's age, Miller has had an enormous influence on his development as a politician and was one of the key figures accompanying his rise to power. He is now set to take on even greater duties at a time when Trump faces a newly constituted U.S. Congress that is deeply hostile to him.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“He acted as if he wanted people to hate him,” recalled Stephen Miller's former classmate Justin Brownstone, <a href="https://lamag.com/politics/stephen-miller-samohi-oral-history/">telling journalists</a> how the future Trump loyalist was remembered by those who knew him in high school.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Sadist or reactionary?</h3><p>Brownstone and many others who went to school with Miller in Santa Monica, California, describe him as a conservative and reactionary whose rhetoric not merely borderline racist, but often openly so.</p><p>Miller was born in 1985 and graduated from high school in 2003. Given Santa Monica High School's liberal <a href="https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-speechwriter-santamonica-20170117-story.html">image</a> and Miller's own background (he was born into a prosperous Jewish family), his anti-immigrant rhetoric often seemed downright outrageous.</p><p>Miller was probably drawn into the Republican Party's right-wing camp by his classmate and closest high school friend, Christopher Moritz. Today, Moritz is known as an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T7MQOq1D4Lc">opponent</a> of transgender rights and as the author of <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/authors/Christopher-Moritz/238532305">books</a> portraying liberalism as the path to America's destruction. He served as a senior adviser at the U.S. Department of Commerce during Trump's first presidency.</p><p>Miller's parents also held reactionary views, but accounts differ as to how they came to support the Republicans. Some say Stephen's father had always leaned conservative, while others say his parents changed their political views under their son's influence. What is certain is that the elder Millers attended the 2016 Republican National Convention, where Donald Trump was nominated as the party's candidate for president. Their son was already working on the campaign.</p><p>In the relatively short time between his high school graduation and that fateful convention, Miller had already made his mark. He first attracted widespread attention while studying at Duke University, where he was among the first to defend members of the university's lacrosse team who had been accused of raping a Black female student.</p><p>Miller argued that the wealthy white athletes had been the victims of a “witch hunt” orchestrated by Democrats seeking political gain by portraying themselves as defenders of minorities, and his resulting television appearances brought him to the attention of Republican Party officials. He also acquired a reputation as a lucky charm: the rape case collapsed before reaching trial, and all charges were dropped.</p><p>It was hardly surprising, then, that after graduating, Miller joined the staff of Republican Congresswoman Michele Bachmann. He later worked for Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions, first as press secretary, then as communications director, and eventually as a senior adviser.</p><p>Sessions relied on on hard-line anti-immigration rhetoric, and he was close to political strategist and conspiracy theorist Steve Bannon. The Senator introduced his young aide to Bannon, who was then developing a new ideology aimed at uniting American conservatives, whose political standing had been badly weakened by the election (and re-election) of Barack Obama. </p><p>Bannon and Miller began working together in 2013, quickly agreeing that the Republicans should focus not on winning new voters but on mobilizing their existing base. They concluded that fear would be the most effective mobilizing force, with uncontrolled immigration serving as the ideal bogeyman.</p><p>This became the basis of a new Republican strategy: portraying Democrats as intent on flooding the United States with undocumented immigrants who would take Americans' jobs and government benefits. The strategy was in place even before the party found a candidate capable of serving as the face of the campaign.</p><blockquote>The Republican Party's new strategy rested on the claim that Democrats wanted to flood the United States with undocumented immigrants</blockquote><p>That candidate emerged in 2015 in the form of Donald Trump. Sessions personally asked Miller to join Trump's campaign, believing the young adviser could strengthen the team. Miller wrote speeches, crafted messaging, and spoke at campaign rallies, where he laid out Trump's planned immigration policy. After Trump's victory in 2016, he appointed Miller as a political adviser, and when he returned to the White House in 2025, Miller was named as deputy chief of staff and homeland security adviser.</p><p>The title translated into concrete policy. During Trump's first term, Miller helped devise the family separation policy under which adults who crossed the border without authorization were jailed, while their children were taken to separate facilities. Internal correspondence published by the watchdog group American Oversight shows that Miller discussed the policy with senior Justice Department officials and coordinated with the agency responsible for the children's custody.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af62173221b22.54059588/TuFaXQ31x11wHsyF1WkbI6dkC73mjFHbp3pmq4G9.jpg" alt="During Trump&#039;s first term, Miller helped devise the policy of separating migrant families."/><figcaption>During Trump&#039;s first term, Miller helped devise the policy of separating migrant families.</figcaption></figure><p>After returning to the White House in 2025, Miller demanded a sharp increase in migrant arrests. In late May of that year, he set a target for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) of at least 3,000 arrests a day. According to <i>Reuters</i>, he urged agents to detain anyone without legal status. To meet the target, raids spread well beyond border areas, with federal agents showing up at restaurants and workplaces and making arrests outside courthouses. Those targeted included people who had lived in the United States for decades and had no criminal records.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Students not welcome here</h3><p>Another focus of Miller's work was education. According to CNN, he was one of the architects of the administration's pressure campaign against universities, ostensibly aimed at combating antisemitism. University representatives held private talks with May Mailman, a member of Miller's team, seeking to find out what concessions they would have to make to avoid losing federal funding.</p><p>The scale of the pressure is most evident from the case involving Harvard. In the spring of 2025, the administration demanded changes to the university's admissions and faculty hiring policies, the closure of its diversity and inclusion programs, and an external audit of “viewpoint diversity” on campus. Harvard refused, and the authorities in Washington responded by freezing $2.2 billion in grants and $60 million in contracts. In May, the Department of Homeland Security tried to strip the university of its right to enroll international students, but a court blocked the move.</p><p>Columbia University, by contrast, reached a deal with the White House. After its federal funding was suspended, it agreed to tighten disciplinary rules and change oversight of its Middle East studies programs.</p><p>In July 2025, Columbia agreed to pay the federal government $200 million over three years to settle investigations into alleged discrimination. In return, the authorities agreed to restore most of its grants. The agreement also stipulated, however, that the government could not dictate admissions or hiring policies or influence the content of academic speech.</p><p>Miller is now poised for another promotion — the biggest of his career. Following the Republicans' defeat in the midterm elections, his boss, Susie Wiles, lost her position (officially, Trump merely reassigned her to another post on his team). Miller has taken her place. White House insiders see the change as entirely predictable, <a href="https://www.axios.com/2026/11/06/susie-wiles-trump-stephen-miller-chief-of-staff">describing</a> Miller as a “wartime” adviser — an apt description given the challenges the Republican Party faces after its crushing defeat in the midterms.</p><blockquote>White House insiders describe Miller as a “wartime” adviser</blockquote><p>Officially, the White House chief of staff is an administrative rather than a political position. The job carries no authority to shape legislation, interfere with government agencies, or submit documents to Congress. Yet the chief of staff controls access to the president, decides which messages and news briefings reach his desk, and is often the last person America's commander-in-chief consults before making a decision.</p><p>In effect, Stephen Miller is becoming one of the most powerful figures in American politics, giving him who will  a key hand in shaping the president's worldview. It is not hard to guess what that worldview will look like. A 2020 biography of Miller was aptly titled <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hatemonger-Stephen-Miller-Donald-Nationalist/dp/0062986724"><i>Hatemonger</i></a>.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/299356">Making America democratic again: How Trump&#039;s poor performance led to a rout of his Republican party</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/299028">The taming of the elephant: How the Democrats could shape Trump’s agenda if they win both the House and the Senate</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/293567">The loyalty test: Trump’s purge of moderate Republicans is an electoral gift to the Democrats</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/298340">First among ladies: How Trump aide Natalie Harp came to wield extraordinary influence in the White House</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 15:49:59 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russia’s MoD uses footage from other locations to show alleged demining of Kostiantynivka as Putin proposes a ceasefire in the town]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299529</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299529</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On Nov. 10, Russia’s Defense Ministry <a href="https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/28301407">said</a> service members from the 3rd Army Corps and the 11th Separate Engineering Brigade of Russia’s Southern Group of Forces were clearing houses and roads in what it called “liberated Kostiantynivka.” However, at least two of the segments were filmed in other settlements — occupied Toretsk and Pivnichne. </p><p>Open source intelligence (OSINT) researcher Bielitz <a href="https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2120274628610527686">established</a> the locations by geolocating footage published by the Russian side. The sites he identified are each located around 20 kilometers away from Kostiantynivka, a town that Moscow claimed to have fully captured in July even though fighting for the city is ongoing.</p><div><blockquote class="twitter-tweet"><p lang="en" dir="ltr">Russian soldiers from the 3rd Army &amp;amp; the 11th Separate Engineering Brigade show claimed mine clearing in Kostiantynivka, however its Toretsk/Pivnichne, Donetsk Oblast

@GeoConfirmed @UAControlMap

48.392569,37.853516 (1:14)

48.393930,37.902723 (1:31)

s: https://t.co/1c35CNFa6T https://t.co/gZtjCjjhNB</p>&mdash; Bielitz (@Bielitzling) <a href="https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2120274628610527686?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November 10, 2026</a></blockquote>

<script async src="https://platform.x.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></div><p>The <a href="https://vk.ru/wall-121828295_119492">video</a> put out by the Ministry of Defense shows Russian combat engineers who are said to be clearing mines from roads and buildings in Kostiantynivka. Bielitz, however, determined that footage at the 1:14 mark was filmed in Toretsk at coordinates 48.392569, 37.853516. Another segment, at 1:31, was geolocated farther east in Pivnichne at coordinates 48.393930, 37.902723. Both settlements are in territory controlled by Russian forces. The geolocation of those segments does not establish where the rest of the video was filmed.</p><div><iframe src="https://vk.ru/video_ext.php?oid=-121828295&id=456257927&hd=4" width="1920" height="1080" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media; fullscreen; picture-in-picture; screen-wake-lock;" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe></div><p>“We are working successfully in Kostiantynivka, clearing roads of explosive hazards so people can be evacuated and supplies and personnel rotations can take place. There is a lot of work for our unit in Kostiantynivka,” said a combat engineer using the call sign Korshun (lit. “Kite”). The footage was also <a href="https://rutube.ru/video/6d36dea372295212ec0bbb65d48294ea/">broadcast</a> by the Russian television channel Pervy Sevastopolsky, which presented it as video of demining operations in Kostiantynivka.</p><p>Two days later, on Nov. 12, Vladimir Putin <a href="https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/28311721">proposed</a> carrying out a joint humanitarian mission in Kostiantynivka modeled on the <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298841">recent evacuation</a> of civilians from Russian-occupied <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299060">Oleshky</a>, located in Ukraine’s Kherson Region. Putin said Russian troops would need five days to clear mines from approaches to Kostiantynivka, again claiming that the town was under Russia’s control.</p><p>Russian forces, however, continue offensive operations around Kostiantynivka. According to <i>The Insider</i>’s <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299463">Nov. 11 battlefield summary</a>, Russian units expanded the area under their control southeast of the city. On the morning of Nov. 12, Ukraine’s General Staff <a href="https://suspilne.media/donbas/1441931-najgaracisa-dilanka-pokrovskomu-front-doneccini-ta-lugansini-12-listopada-2026-roku/">reported</a> 14 Russian attacks in the Kostiantynivka sector over the previous 24 hours. There is no independent confirmation that Russia has full control of the city.</p><p>Russian forces have previously used footage from other settlements to illustrate purported battlefield gains. In early November, Bielitz <a href="https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2116287409323466953">found</a> that a video claiming to show Russian marines in Dobropillia had actually been filmed in occupied Myrnohrad, behind Russian lines.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/274102">Russia’s MoD publishes new batch of “successful strikes on Ukrainian forces in Kursk” — which were actually filmed in Ukraine </a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/273776">Russian MoD videos claim “successful strikes” against Ukrainian forces in Kursk Region — but the footage is old and filmed elsewhere</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/273878">Russian MoD and propagandists present footage originally filmed in Kharkiv as “strikes against Ukraine in Kursk”</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/288166">Russian military’s TV channel passes off footage of troops withdrawing from Kupiansk as evidence of them capturing the city</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/274346">Russian Defense Ministry again portrays Ukraine combat footage as “strikes on AFU in Kursk” despite partially blurred video exposing terrain</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 22:53:38 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Poland marks Independence Day with a massive march for President Nawrocki — and against PM Tusk]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299527</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299527</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Warsaw marked Poland’s Independence Day with a march that city authorities say drew upwards of 250,000 participants. As <i>The Insider</i>’s Warsaw correspondent<strong> Witold Reszka</strong> reported, the procession ultimately turned into a rally in support of President Karol Nawrocki and against current Prime Minister Donald Tusk. According to the organizers’ estimates, half a million people took to the streets of the Polish capital on Nov. 11.</p><h4>Hundreds of thousands of conservatives took to the streets</h4><p>Every Independence Day, Warsaw holds a march that draws a variety of right-wing forces. In recent years, it has been attended by several tens of thousands of people. For example, in <a href="https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/marsz-niepodleglosci-w-stolicy-jeszcze-polska-nie-zginela-56-osob-zatrzymanych-nasze">2023</a> the authorities put the number of participants at 40,000, in <a href="https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/wielkiej-polski-moc-my-marsz-niepodleglosci-w-warszawie-ratusz-podal-szacunki-zdjecia">2024</a> at 90,000, and in <a href="https://www.pap.pl/relacja-na-zywo/obchody-narodowego-swieta-niepodleglosci-ulicami-stolicy-przeszedl-marsz">2025</a> at 100,000. The 2018 march, when Poland <a href="https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C356361%2Cruszyl-bialo-czerwony-marsz-dla-ciebie-polsko.html">celebrated</a> the 100th anniversary of its regained independence, was the largest, with 250,000 participants. However, <i>The Insider</i>’s correspondent who witnessed the Nov. 11 march believes that in 2026 the number of participants may have exceeded the figures from eight years ago.</p><p>The march organizers <a href="https://www.rmf24.pl/regiony/warszawa/news-ile-osob-szlo-w-marszu-niepodleglosci-w-warszawie-sa-pierwsz%2CnIdn%2C1025748">claim</a> that more than 500,000 people walked the streets of Warsaw on Wednesday, while city authorities put the figure at half that much. However, even if the organizers’ figures are exaggerated, participation in the event still represents a record.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af640f2e03977.83596861/vRmvWoPo3aPaH5hjaMVmg8HUjLyh3qil3FJwDG4E.jpg" alt="Witold Reszka/The Insider"/><figcaption>Witold Reszka/The Insider</figcaption></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af640f4205290.97763543/sm2PyacQ2Vb5OVGDUNaukqzemb4VvOFIuHukXXwn.jpg" alt="Witold Reszka/The Insider"/><figcaption>Witold Reszka/The Insider</figcaption></figure><p>In the past, such Independence Day processions mainly attracted nationalists and football hooligans, but today the nature of the event has changed markedly, with many families choosing to spend their day off at the rally. However, the political content of the march — a reflection of Poland’s right-wing patriotic landscape — has remained the same.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af6411ebfe4c3.17962549/ujGB8GbEGWVWj6ffPInjA5z5cNsW05w5PsOJgubF.jpg" alt="Witold Reszka/The Insider"/><figcaption>Witold Reszka/The Insider</figcaption></figure><p>As Jan, a law student at one of the capital’s universities, told <i>The Insider</i>:</p><blockquote><p>“Over the years, the march has attracted more and more families with children and ‘normal’ people in general. I would also say that more and more young people take part from year to year. There are football fans and all kinds of radicals, but not in great numbers. The makeup of the participants does not change; the proportions do.”</p></blockquote><p>This year’s Independence Day procession turned into a rally in support of the country’s conservative President Nawrocki, who is currently in a state of open conflict with the liberal Prime Minister Tusk.</p><p>At the end of October, Poland <a href="https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art45423911-policja-w-trybunale-konstytucyjnym-kaczynski-apeluje-do-karola-nawrockiego">saw</a> another round of confrontation between its president and government when Constitutional Tribunal judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska suspended the tribunal’s president, Bogdan Święczkowski, and his deputy, Bartłomiej Sochański, from their duties. Tusk’s government does not recognize the tribunal’s rulings because the tribunal still includes judges who, in the government’s view, were appointed illegally under the rule of the Law and Justice party. Nawrocki and Święczkowski, for their part, do not recognize the judges elected by the Sejm in 2026, including Korwin-Piotrowska. After the tribunal’s president was suspended, Nawrocki even spoke of an attempted coup d’état.</p><p>In this context, the Nov.11 march acquired additional meaning, with the dispute between the government and the president over the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal becoming the key topic of conversation among the participants. In the demonstrators’ view, Poland has indeed been confronted with a “creeping coup d’état” headed by the prime minister.</p><p>Fears were voiced that the crowd gathering on the capital’s streets would at some point storm the Constitutional Tribunal, but this did not happen. Moreover, protesters reined in some especially active participants who tried to disturb public order. When one activist tried to climb the <a href="https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pozdrowienia_z_Alej_Jerozolimskich">Palm</a> at the Charles de Gaulle Roundabout, the others began shouting at him:</p><blockquote><p>“Do you want us to be seen as savages?”</p></blockquote><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af64150ecd2b6.14426538/m8KwFhzEnxhCEZwRhHHhn43BX3XRB1cWukLgIvoo.jpg" alt="Witold Reszka/The Insider"/><figcaption>Witold Reszka/The Insider</figcaption></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af64150a8d170.30719579/TW2qlJu1qKA2zlfMiGvyjiLr9lzT4eUW8mQGArjs.jpg" alt="Witold Reszka/The Insider"/><figcaption>Witold Reszka/The Insider</figcaption></figure><p>On the whole, as police noted, very few incidents were recorded during the march, apart from the mass disregard of the ban on flares and firecrackers.</p><h4>No place for leftists and liberals</h4><p>The hundreds of thousands of conservatives who had gathered did not hold back from harsh words about members of the government. Also in attendance were Catholic prayer circles, whose members pray in time with their steps “for the well-being of the Fatherland.” Between prayers, they shouted: “F*** Tusk!”, “God, honor, and fatherland!” and “Honor and glory to the heroes!”</p><p>Other anti-government statements were heard as well. Participants in the procession said that “the country is being plundered” and reminded one another that “Poland is not Brussels.” The latter fit well with the official slogan of the march: “A Pole is the master in Poland.”</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af64191ef5ac8.39774764/SAdGnlfRx1Cxw8FNtSMA7O1ODOBL6SsybV0G4Ufq.jpg" alt="Witold Reszka/The Insider"/><figcaption>Witold Reszka/The Insider</figcaption></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af64192891ef4.46833747/RXcgDwndwJbky9inFKlTrRU1PSlYArRTKRtFMojn.jpg" alt="Witold Reszka/The Insider"/><figcaption>Witold Reszka/The Insider</figcaption></figure><p>The event took place against the backdrop of two days of national mourning — Nov. 8 and 9 — following a terrorist attack in Kraków that saw a man open fire in the square, killing six random passersby and wounding at least 15, after earlier killing his own family. For that reason, representatives of the Tusk government also decided to address the crowd. However, when Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz wanted to tell the citizens gathered in Piłsudski Square about the importance of unity, he was booed off the stage.</p><p>By contrast, the speech by Nawrocki, who called on Poles to unite in the face of the tragedy, was received with enthusiasm.</p><p>The left-wing movement Antifa organized its own counterdemonstration. As Antoni, a rock band drummer who took part in the parallel protest in the ranks of Antifa, explained to <i>The Insider</i>, the need for such an action arose because of the large number of radicals who use the Independence Day march for their own purposes. He said:</p><blockquote><p>“The Independence March is exploited by far-right organizations: ONR (National Radical Camp), All-Polish Youth, and other fascist and even neo-Nazi groups. People on the left are aware of this problem, which is why they are protesting. I would take part in the march if xenophobia and nationalism could be eradicated from it. An independent Poland does not mean a Poland exclusively for Poles, and nationalism is not patriotism.”</p></blockquote><p>Janek, a participant in the march, believes that for many years the event has actually suffered from “negative coverage in the press,” which mainly drew attention to disorder and racist slogans. He assured <i>The Insider</i> that:</p><blockquote><p>“The march has changed. It is no longer as vocal as it used to be, but many people still believe the media’s manipulations.”</p></blockquote><p>In previous years, racist and antisemitic symbols did often appear at such processions, along with slogans about a “pure race” and “white blood.” In 2017, representatives of the organization Forza Nuova (New Force), which glorifies the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and holds antisemitic and extreme Italian nationalist views, took part in the march, with its leader even speaking during the procession.</p><p>Outbreaks of violence have also occurred. In 2020, a group of hooligans with white-and-red flags clashed with police.</p><p>However, as <i>The Insider</i>’s correspondent observed, lately such incidents have been rare, and the presence of radical groups in the procession is often condemned by other participants. At the same time, the Celtic cross is still a common symbol.</p><p>The Independence March has divided Poles for many years. According to SW Research, 42% of Poles believe that the march unites the country, while 37% are convinced that it deepens divisions in society. At the same time, 62% of Poles currently consider Nov. 11 the country’s most important national holiday, whereas in 2014 only about 30% held that view.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/pavel-reshka/296125">To Putin’s delight: Politicians in Poland and Ukraine are stoking mutual hostility for the sake of their ratings</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/294997">Poland creates new military formation to protect border with Russia and Belarus</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 22:47:50 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Germany, France and the UK demand Russia release three Ukrainian former OSCE staff members imprisoned since 2022]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299530</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299530</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Germany, France, and the United Kingdom have demanded that Russia immediately release three former employees of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), who were arrested in 2022 after serving in the group’s monitoring mission in Ukraine. In a joint <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russias-unlawful-detention-of-former-osce-officials-e3-statement-to-the-osce">statement</a> delivered Nov. 12 at a meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna, representatives of the three countries called for the release of Vadym Golda, Maksym Petrov, and Dmytro Shabanov, expressing particular concern about Golda’s health. He was reportedly transferred from the occupied Donetsk Region of Ukraine to a medical correctional facility in Russia’s Tambov Region, around 300 miles northeast of Kharkiv.</p><blockquote><p>“They are not bargaining chips. They are our colleagues, and they should be at home with their families.</p><p>Russia’s treatment of them is a direct affront to the OSCE and every participating State represented around this table. It also sets a dangerous precedent for those serving in international missions on our collective behalf. Personnel deployed under an international mandate must be able to perform their duties without fear of arbitrary detention, politically motivated prosecution or imprisonment,” the statement read.</p></blockquote><p>According to the Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group, which <a href="https://ulag.org.ua/resources/osce-smm-staff-member-vadym-golda-deported-to-russia/">cited</a> Golda’s relatives, he had been transferred to Medical Correctional Facility No. 7 of Russia’s Federal Penitentiary Service. The facility is in the settlement of Polevoy in the Kirsanovsky District of the Tambov Region and is used to hold and provide outpatient treatment to prisoners who suffer from alcohol and drug dependence or who have active cases of tuberculosis.</p><p>The reason for Golda’s transfer to the facility remains unknown. His relatives said he had never had tuberculosis and had not suffered from alcohol or drug dependence. Golda last contacted his family on Oct. 15; his transfer was expected on Oct. 19. There has been no official information about his condition.</p><p>In their statement, representatives of Germany, France, and the UK stressed that at the time of their arrest the OSCE employees had been carrying out their duties as part of an international mission established with the consent of all participating states, including Russia. The three countries called on Moscow to disclose the detainees’ whereabouts and health conditions, provide them with medical care, and allow them to contact their relatives.</p><h3>Russia has transferred all three OSCE staff members from the occupied territories of Ukraine to prisons inside Russia</h3><p>Golda was the third OSCE mission employee to be transferred from occupied Ukrainian territory to Russia. In 2025, Dmytro Shabanov was <a href="https://ulag.org.ua/cases/ua-osce-staff-members/">transferred</a> to Penal Colony No. 9 in Russia’s Omsk Region, while Maksym Petrov was sent to Penal Colony No. 1 in the Chelyabinsk Region.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af655d08cb969.63724879/JIPrV3amRUxK24LszaVR5qfPUsuJNbWkCk24phhb.jpg" alt="Maksym Yuriyovych Petrov, interpreter with the Luhansk office of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission"/><figcaption>Maksym Yuriyovych Petrov, interpreter with the Luhansk office of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission</figcaption></figure><p>On Nov. 11, leaders of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly <a href="https://www.oscepa.org/en/news-a-media/press-releases/2026/osce-parliamentary-assembly-leaders-raise-concern-over-whereabouts-of-vadym-golda-reiterate-calls-to-release-all-three-unlawfully-detained-osce-officials">expressed</a> concern over Golda’s transfer. The organization noted that Articles 49 and 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibit the forcible transfer and deportation of protected civilians from occupied territories.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af655e4df0188.16686480/goSywzNzKWaIOBYqCZ3xdikYnfH8jVVAjfFuemsA.jpg" alt="Dmytro Pavlovych Shabanov, security assistant at the Stakhanov forward patrol base of the OSCE mission"/><figcaption>Dmytro Pavlovych Shabanov, security assistant at the Stakhanov forward patrol base of the OSCE mission</figcaption></figure><p>The OSCE also said there is still no reliable, independently verified information about the detention conditions or health of any of the three men. The organization demanded that its representatives and the International Committee of the Red Cross be granted unhindered access to the former mission employees.</p><h3>Why Russia imprisoned the OSCE staff members</h3><p>Vadym Golda, who worked as a security assistant for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, was detained in April 2022. In July 2024, a Russia-installed court in the occupied part of the Donetsk Region <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-donetsk-osce-d0e95897d42a1dbf9e038ae2f0ba26d9">sentenced</a> him to 14 years in a strict-regime penal colony on charges of espionage.</p><p>According to the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office, in 2021 Golda had collected information about industrial facilities in the Donetsk Region on behalf of an unnamed foreign intelligence service. Russian authorities claimed the facilities were later targeted by missile strikes that caused nearly 100 million rubles in damage. The court also ordered the confiscation of 43 armored vehicles belonging to the OSCE mission.</p><p>In September 2022, Dmytro Shabanov and Maksym Petrov were each <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/20/osce-ukrainian-staff-russian-court-00057715">sentenced</a> to 13 years in prison. Russia-backed separatists in the so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic” accused them of treason and of passing information to U.S. intelligence agencies.</p><p>The OSCE has rejected the accusations against its employees and repeatedly demanded their release. In July 2024, the organization’s leadership <a href="https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/572758">condemned</a> Golda’s sentence, describing the prosecution as a violation of Russia’s international commitments.</p><p>Russia was among the states that approved the creation of the OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine in 2014. In March 2022, however, Moscow blocked an extension of its mandate. The mission ceased operations in April of that year.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/270824">“Dying isn’t as bad as being a Russian POW”: Freed Ukrainian soldiers speak out about their time in Russian captivity</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/299400">“We cooked over open fires but were afraid to go outside”: Evacuated residents of Oleshky describe life under siege</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299060">Evacuees from Russian-occupied Oleshky reach Ukraine — recounting hunger, disappearances, and life under Moscow’s rule</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298554">Moscow and Washington are discussing possible prisoner releases through intelligence channels, Russia says</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/295932">Russia frees seriously ill former U.S. Marine Robert Gilman without prisoner swap</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/295004">“He was burning in the hallway, and they laughed”: Inside Russia’s systematic torture apparatus for Ukrainian POWs</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/293638">Released defenders of Mariupol report on torture and deaths of Ukrainian POWs at detention facility in Russia’s Kamyshin</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 22:45:06 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russian authorities seek to expand military training for children, hiring war veterans as instructors]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299526</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299526</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russia is expanding its system of military training for schoolchildren. In 2026, the Ministry of Education made basic military training a separate course and issued national guidelines on military training camps for eighth graders. Under these guidelines, children are sent to specialized centers and military bases, where they undergo drill and firearms training, learn how weapons work, and master tactical medicine and drone operation. The ministry has proposed hiring veterans of the war against Ukraine to serve as instructors.</p><p>The state is allocating millions of dollars to develop the program. The 2026 federal budget set aside 3.72 billion rubles ($45 million) for the Voin military-sports training center and another 1.05 billion rubles ($12.7 million) for activities related to the Yunarmiya (Young Army) movement.</p><h4>Military training in Russian schools before and after 2022</h4><p>Military training for schoolchildren existed in Russia even before the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In particular, training camps for high school students were provided for in a 2010 joint order of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Education and Science.</p><p>After February 2022, the authorities began steadily expanding the infrastructure and content of the training. In 2022, the Voin center was created, and Sakhalin introduced the Military Affairs course for eighth graders. In 2023, the Ministry of Education approved changes to high school programs to include elements of basic military training. Since September 2024, the compulsory school course Basics of Safety and Defense of the Motherland (OBZR) has replaced Basics of Life Safety (OBZh). In 2025, the ministry issued guidelines for organizing military camps for students in grades 8 and 9. The latest documents outline the authorities’ efforts to develop a network of specialized centers and extend hands-on training to younger age groups.</p><h4>What the federal documents prescribe</h4><p>In 2026, the Ministry of Education amended the content of OBZR. By an order dated Aug. 19, 2026, the ministry <a href="http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202610130011">split</a> OBZR into two distinct courses: Basic Military Training and Life Safety. According to the ministry’s guidelines, 34 hours are allotted to basic military training at both the basic and secondary levels of general education.</p><p>In August 2026, the ministry also distributed national <a href="https://edsoo.ru/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/obzr-1.pdf">guidelines</a> on organizing military training camps for eighth-grade students. The three-day extracurricular program includes 17 hours of training, replete with drills, first aid, survival basics, and other practical classes. A visit to a military base or similar facility is also envisioned. One version of the program includes studying the AK-74 assault rifle.</p><p>In addition to school grounds, the sessions may be held at military bases or branches of the DOSAAF (Volunteer Society for the Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy). Classes may be organized during school breaks.</p><p>The program is aimed primarily at boys. Girls can participate on a voluntary basis but have to meet several requirements.</p><h4>Can schoolchildren refuse to attend military camps?</h4><p>It depends on the form of the classes and the students’ age. OBZR is part of the compulsory school curriculum, so in effect military subjects are taught as part of a compulsory school subject, with practical camps supplementing mandatory courses. However, different rules apply to practical camps and additional courses.</p><p>In particular, under the 2010 joint order, students who skip such camps without a valid reason receive a failing grade, while those who miss classes for a valid reason are supposed to study the theory independently and pass a knowledge check.</p><h4>How the camps work in the regions</h4><p>Authorities in Russia’s Primorye Territory have provided for longer camps than those described in the federal guidelines. According to a <a href="https://prim-pravo.ru/postanovlenie/2026/08/24/n-73-pg/">resolution</a> by the governor dated Aug. 24, 2026, the regional Ministry of Education must organize five-day camps for students in grades 8 and 10, making extensive use of branches of the DOSAAF’s Avangard training and methodological center.</p><p>The document provides for the use of military base infrastructure for the practical training of schoolchildren, though schools must submit requests to the command of the relevant bases. Municipal authorities are instructed to organize and fund the camps. The resolution also provides for cooperation with military enlistment offices, visits to military academies, and career guidance for schoolchildren to promote military occupations.</p><p>The regional government program for 2026 has set a target: 5,790 students in grades 8–11 are expected to complete a full five-day camp session.</p><p>Sakhalin Region introduced its own course, Military Affairs, as early as 2022. Initially, the program was intended for eighth graders, but it was later extended to grades 9 and 10. The curriculum includes training in drill, firearms, tactics, engineering, and basic medicine, along with instruction focusing on military topography and protection against weapons of mass destruction.</p><p>Over three years, the program is expected to reach 8,000 schoolchildren. All schools teaching grades 8–10 must take part in a themed week devoted to military service, the oath, and the performance of military duty.</p><p>In October 2026, five-day camps for tenth graders took place on Sakhalin. The program included drone classes, tactical medicine, and practical training.</p><p>In the Chelyabinsk Region, students attend camps at the Avangard center. Reports from educational organizations describe classes on assembling and disassembling the AK-74 rifle, operating drones, providing military medicine, and driving trucks. In particular, such a course was reported by a school in Troitsk, whose students took part in several camps in the fall of 2026. A published <a href="https://457100.ru/sbory-v-avangarde/">report</a> lists practical classes involving weapons, drones, and motor vehicles.</p><p>In Mari El, schoolchildren attend camps that include tactical and firearms training, military medicine, and drone classes, according to regional media <a href="https://newsmariel.ru/news/v_tsentre_avangard_startovali_sbory_dlya_shkolnikov/">reports</a>.</p><p>In Tatarstan, military camps for eighth and tenth graders are provided for in a <a href="https://base.garant.ru/414844825/">resolution</a> of the republic’s government for the 2026/27 school year. The Kazan Higher Tank Command School is listed among the organizations participating in the training.</p><h4>War participants are brought in to teach</h4><p>One of the main participants in the military training system is the Voin center (created in 2022), which organizes classes in firearms, tactical, and engineering training, tactical medicine, and drone operation. Its programs are designed for teenagers and young people but also offers training for school teachers wishing to teach OBZR. According to official reports, by September 2026 more than 165,000 people had completed the center’s programs.</p><p>In March 2026, Deputy Prime Minister Yury Trutnev said that by the end of 2027, all of the center’s instructors must gain combat experience in the war in Ukraine. According to the figures he cited, more than 200 of the center’s instructors had already taken part in combat operations by that time.</p><p>Regional authorities also hire war veterans to teach. On Sakhalin, the Military Affairs course is taught by combat participants, including those who fought in the war against Ukraine. In 2024, Governor Valery Limarenko emphasized the need to bring in specialists with combat experience. By his estimate, the region needed about 170 such instructors. Under the new program, the relevant authorities are expected to offer training to ten combat veterans to teach the compulsory subject Basics of Safety and Defense of the Motherland.</p><h4>Millions of dollars allocated for military training</h4><p>Russia’s system of military-patriotic education and pre-conscription training is funded from both federal and regional budgets. Regional pre-conscription training centers are funded separately, while the regions pay for Avangard centers, military-patriotic events, and practical camps for schoolchildren themselves.</p><p>In Primorye Territory, the Avangard center received 470,067,818 rubles (5.7 million) in 2026, double the 234.1 million rubles (2.8 million) of the year before, according to regional budget documents.</p><p>The scale of funding for such centers was previously <a href="https://vot-tak.tv/93147824/voennye-sbory-dla-shkolnikov-rassledovanie">examined</a> by <i>Vot Tak</i>. The outlet estimates that since 2020, Russian regions have allocated at least 36.5 billion rubles ($442 million) to build and operate Avangard centers. Federal spending on the Voin center since September 2022 has come to almost 15 billion rubles ($181 million).</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/294286">Russian schoolgirls in Izhevsk tasked with sewing underwear for frontline soldiers taking part in the invasion of Ukraine</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/288668">Russian school curriculum to include training in assembling and operating drones</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/283794">“Men in uniform watched us fill out tests”: How Russia “re-educates” Ukrainian schoolchildren in the occupied territories</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/283351">“We must not say it’s for the war”: Hundreds of thousands of Russian schoolkids are building drones that kill Ukrainians</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/282037">“Even if you feel opposition inside, you have to demonstrate support”: Confessions of teachers in Belgorod schools</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 22:36:33 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russian activist who declined to cooperate with German intelligence banned from entering the Schengen Area]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299524</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299524</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Immediately after clearing passport control in Germany, a Russian activist was approached by officers of the country’s Federal Intelligence Service, who asked her if she suspected any of her acquaintances of harboring ties to Moscow’s intelligence services. At the end of the conversation, she was offered a cooperation agreement, according to a <a href="https://t.me/pivovarov_team/13809">post</a> by Andrei Pivovarov, a Russian opposition politician and coordinator of the Consuls project for the Anti-War Committee.</p><p>The activist refused to sign the document German authorities had offered her. As a result, she was deemed a possible threat to Germany’s national security and was added to the list of persons barred from entering the Schengen Area.</p><p>Pivovarov reminded readers that in Russia, confidential cooperation with representatives of foreign states constitutes a serious crime, and may be classified as treason under certain circumstances. He added that an invitation to a conversation does not in itself mean that a person is in danger or that cooperation will necessarily be offered. However, it is important for anti-war Russians and those who have faced political persecution to be aware of such risks, advising:</p><blockquote><p>“If you are invited to such a conversation, clarify who is conducting it and on what grounds, whether participation is voluntary, and, if possible, decline to take part in the conversation.”</p></blockquote><p>Earlier, the independent outlet <i>Holod</i> <a href="https://holod.media/2026/11/06/rossiian-nachali-vyzyvat-na-politicheskie-besedy-v-aeroportu-berlina/">reported</a> on two Russian women who, after clearing passport control at Berlin airport, were taken for additional conversations. They were asked about the war in Ukraine, mobilization, and rising prices in Russia. One of the women answered questions for about an hour; the other declined to talk and was released.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296480">Antiwar Russian asylum seeker faces deportation from U.S.</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297929">Russian activist deported from U.S. sentenced to six years in prison</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 20:23:59 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Prominent Russian lawyer who defended political prisoners sentenced to 12 years on treason charge]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299521</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299521</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Earlier today, Kaliningrad Regional Court Judge Alexander Marochkin sentenced 66-year-old lawyer Maria Bontsler to 12 years in prison after finding her guilty of treason, according to a <a href="https://t.me/endoflaw/4160">report</a> by independent media and legal rights advocacy project Slovo Zashchite (lit. “Word to the Defense”). The court also ordered her phone to be reset to factory settings and to be confiscated by the state; her SIM card is to be destroyed.</p><p>The case was heard behind closed doors, with the judge excluding Bontsler herself from the proceedings. She was allowed to appear only to deliver her final statement; the court denied her request to make that statement publicly. Bontsler’s lawyers were removed from the case over a dispute about access to classified materials, even though Bontsler has said the case contains no state secrets. She is now represented by court-appointed lawyer Anastasia Rikhter.</p><p>Bontsler, herself a lawyer, is known for her representation of clients facing politically motivated charges — <a href="https://ovd.info/en/persons/igor-baryshnikov">Igor Baryshnikov</a>, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/amp/31979134.html">Vadim Khairullin</a>, and <a href="https://ovd.info/en/how-they-taught-us-fear-protests#20-17">Evgenia Fedulova</a> prominent among them. She was detained in May 2025 under Russia’s law on “confidential cooperation with a foreign state,” and the charge was later upgraded to treason. Bontsler said she suffered cardiac arrest and hypertensive crises while in pretrial detention. Lawyer Roman Morozov said her health worsened because of a noise-generating device used during court hearings, but his lawsuit against the judge was rejected.</p><p>Bontsler’s son, Vyacheslav Medkov, previously <a href="https://theins.ru/news/286223">told</a> Slovo Zashchite that security officers had demanded that his mother testify against a fellow lawyer, threatening to upgrade the case against her to treason if she refused. In exchange, he said, they offered her a sentence of around 2.5 years instead of the 15 prosecutors were asking for. Bontsler refused.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/293126">Number of politically motivated criminal cases against lawyers in Russia doubled in 2025, Memorial reports</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/278002">Three of Alexei Navalny’s lawyers handed prison sentences of up to 5.5 years on “extremism” charges</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/269185">Evidence in case against Navalny lawyer suggests Russian investigators violated attorney-client privilege </a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/266481">The devil and the advocate: The rationale behind the Kremlin&#039;s crackdown on attorneys and the new “rules of the game”</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 18:26:17 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Bomb used to kill army colonel in St. Petersburg was smuggled into the country by balloon, Russian media claim]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299519</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299519</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russian publication <i>Fontanka</i> has <a href="https://t.me/fontankaspb/113838">published</a> a photograph of the suspected perpetrator in the <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299513">killing</a> of an unnamed Russian army colonel, who died in a car explosion in St. Petersburg early this morning. According to the outlet, an improvised explosive device was planted under the vehicle by a 31-year-old native of Pskov named Yan, who had lived in St. Petersburg for the past several years. The outlet 47news <a href="https://47news.ru/articles/295627/">identified</a> the suspect’s last name as “Bashkirev.”</p><p><i>Fontanka</i> reported that about a month ago, Yan took a job as a general laborer at a Lenta supermarket on Kolpinskoye Highway, where the late colonel regularly parked his car. Investigators believe that Yan monitored the 51-year-old officer in order to establish his daily routine and determine the best time to plant the bomb. The explosive was later detonated remotely.</p><p>According to investigators, Yan attached the explosive device to the underside of the officer’s car at 1 a.m. Moscow time on Nov. 12, then took a taxi to Pulkovo Airport and flew to Turkey. He landed in Istanbul at 6:05 a.m. and immediately traveled on to Chisinau, Moldova. As previously reported, the explosion on Kolpinskoye Highway near the Lenta hypermarket occurred at around 7 a.m. The officer, whose identity has not yet been disclosed, died at the scene.</p><p><i>Fontanka</i> and 47news also reported that the explosives used in the attack were transported into Russia’s Leningrad Region from one of the Baltic states by balloon. Near the border, an unidentified person allegedly retrieved the package and hid it in a dead drop — a concealed location used to pass items without a face-to-face meeting. Yan later collected the bomb from the cache, according to the reports.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299513">Russian colonel killed in St. Petersburg neighborhood’s second military car bombing since August</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 17:57:50 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russian colonel killed in St. Petersburg neighborhood’s second military car bombing since August]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299513</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299513</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On the morning of Nov. 12, a car driven by a Russian military officer exploded in southern St. Petersburg. The local outlet <i>Fontanka</i> <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/11/12/76760363/">reported</a> that a Russian army colonel was killed. Russia’s Investigative Committee has <a href="https://max.ru/id7838454421_gos/AaHOVSG6Zqw">opened</a> a criminal investigation into the car bombing — the second involving a military officer in the same St. Petersburg neighborhood in less than three months.</p><p>The explosion occurred at around 7 a.m. on Kolpinskoye Highway in the Slavyanka neighborhood, near a supermarket and a Tatneft gas station, according to a report by local broadcaster <a href="https://max.ru/news78/AaHOKNDTAuA">Channel 78</a>, citing witnesses. The blast was captured by a building intercom camera. According to <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/11/12/76760385/"><i>Fontanka</i></a>, an explosive device had been attached to the underside of the vehicle and was detonated remotely as the colonel drove out of a courtyard.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4290</div><p>The officer died at the scene. <i>Fontanka</i> initially reported that a relative had been in the vehicle with him and was injured. The outlet later <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/11/12/76760407/">clarified</a> that the colonel had been alone in the car. His name has not been released.</p><p>Security service personnel were working at the scene, and Kolpinskoye Highway was closed. Traffic police shut the road between Polotskaya and Turovskaya streets. Five bus routes were altered as a result, according to the Dorozhny Kontrol SPB | LO Telegram channel. Buses Nos. 179, 254, 325 and 374 were rerouted via Rostovskaya and Turovskaya streets, while Route 388 was temporarily shortened. According to <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/11/12/76760388/?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><i>Fontanka</i></a>, traffic jams stretched for about 1.5 kilometers in both directions.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4291</div><p>On Aug. 27, a car carrying another Russian officer <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296505">exploded</a> on the same stretch of Kolpinskoye Highway in the Slavyanka residential neighborhood in the southern outskirts of the city. <i>Fontanka </i>described the deceased in that incident as a lieutenant colonel in the Russian Aerospace Forces. The man was killed and his wife was injured and hospitalized. The victim was believed to be 43-year-old Sergei Sechkov, who served in the 332nd Separate Guards Helicopter Regiment. Sechkov’s father <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296553">confirmed</a> to the independent Russian investigative outlet <i>Agentstvo </i>that his son had died in the explosion. In May 2022, Ukrainian military intelligence accused members of Sechkov’s regiment of carrying out missile and bomb strikes against Ukrainian civilians in the Slobozhansky sector (a Russian and Ukrainian military term for an operational area in northeastern Ukraine).</p><p>According to <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/08/28/76611899/"><i>Fontanka</i></a>, the explosive device under Sechkov’s car was planted by a 24-year-old Russian woman who flew to Turkey several hours before the blast and later moved to Moldova. The outlet said she acted with the involvement of representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but provided no evidence to support the claim. Ukrainian authorities have not confirmed their involvement in the bombing.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296505">Russian army lieutenant colonel killed in car bombing in St. Petersburg</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296553">Russian officer killed in St. Petersburg car bombing identified as Sergei Sechkov, whose unit Ukraine accuses of strikes on civilians</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296765">Commander of strategic bomber division responsible for Russian strike on children’s hospital in Kyiv shot near air base</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 09:41:42 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russian missile ship damaged in Ukrainian drone attack in Gulf of Finland]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299489</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299489</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A Russian missile ship was struck by Ukrainian drones in the Gulf of Finland overnight into Nov 11. The attack was first <a href="https://t.me/evilsailor2/1693">reported</a> by the Russian Telegram channel Zloy Moryachok (lit. “Angry Little Sailor”) and was later <a href="https://t.me/SBUkr/19036">confirmed</a> by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).</p><p>The vessel targeted was the <i>Naro-Fominsk</i>, classified by the Russian Navy as a “small missile ship,” a category of compact warships equipped with long-range missiles. It was hit during a <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299486" target="_blank">drone attack on Russia’s Leningrad Region</a> that also sparked a major fire at the port of Ust-Luga and reportedly damaged several Russian helicopters.</p><div>https://t.me/exilenova_plus/34469</div><p>The extent of the damage to the vessel is currently unknown. Zloy Moryachok reported that the ship was near Gogland Island — around 180 kilometers west of St. Petersburg — when it was attacked. The channel said the vessel then began heading toward Kronstadt under its own power. And unstated number of people were killed and wounded in the attack, according to the report.</p><p>The <i>Naro-Fominsk</i> <a href="https://rg.ru/2022/12/12/rakety-na-plavu.html">launched</a> in late 2022, the 11th vessel built under Russia’s Project 21631, known as the Buyan-M class. It can carry Kalibr and Oniks cruise missiles. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Russian forces have repeatedly used missiles of these types to strike Ukraine (typically <a href="https://24tv.ua/ru/raketa-kalibr-pletenchuk-rasskazal-iz-kakih-akvatorij-rossijane_n2631692">launching</a> them from the Black Sea and Sea of Azov).</p><p>The SBU also confirmed the overnight strike on Ust-Luga, one of Russia’s largest oil-export hubs. Several petroleum-product storage tanks were damaged in the attack.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299486">Drone strike on key northern port of Ust-Luga sparks major fire as Russian military bloggers report three helicopter crews killed</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 23:38:25 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Drone strike on key northern port of Ust-Luga sparks major fire as Russian military bloggers report three helicopter crews killed]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299486</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299486</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Three Russian helicopter crews — totaling seven service members — were reportedly killed while responding to a Ukrainian drone attack against the port of Ust-Luga in Russia’s Leningrad Region on Nov. 11. The claim was made by the pro-war Telegram channel Voevoda Veshchayet, with other Russian pro-war military bloggers reporting the loss of a Ka-52 attack helicopter and the possible loss of a Mi-8. The reports about the lost aircraft have not been officially confirmed. However, a major fire broke out at the port during the attack, and three workers were injured. <i>The Insider</i> compiled what is known about the strike and its aftermath.</p><h3>The attack on the port and the blaze that followed</h3><p>Ukrainian drones attacked the port of Ust-Luga overnight into Nov. 11. The port is one of Russia’s largest hubs for the export of oil and other commodities.</p><p>At about 6 a.m., Leningrad Region governor Alexander Drozdenko <a href="https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/13189">reported</a> a fire in the Ust-Luga port area after several drones struck the site. He said 150 drones had been shot down over the region overnight. Drozdenko later said three port workers had been injured, but that their lives were not in danger.</p><p>According to <a href="https://t.me/astrapress/130812">the independent outlet Astra</a>, the fire broke out at the northern production and technology cluster of NOVATEK-Ust-Luga LLC’s complex for fractionating and transshipping stable gas condensate. NASA FIRMS satellite data showed several new thermal anomalies in the port area on the morning of Nov. 11, and the glow from the fire over Ust-Luga was visible from Estonia.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af5ae82963724.88758564/hE0BjBVdfopXW2DOLw2jMgbEbyhSJoW3gQktxGXZ.jpg" alt="The glow over Ust-Luga visible from Estonia"/><figcaption>The glow over Ust-Luga visible from Estonia</figcaption></figure><h3>Reports of three crews killed</h3><p>The pro-war Telegram channel Voevoda Veshchayet <a href="https://t.me/ZOV_Voevoda/56670">reported</a> that three Russian Aerospace Forces crews had been killed, totaling seven service members.</p><p>“Tonight dealt a tremendous blow to the Aerospace Forces. Three experienced crews, seven brave Warriors, have departed for the Heavenly Garrison,” the channel said.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af5aea4c0b5c7.56869955/vf5PV3vPJf8tRJHVQh8dwVRxUixKjkLupEoh1kIc.jpg" alt="“Tonight dealt a tremendous blow to the Aerospace Forces. Three experienced crews, seven brave Warriors, have departed for the Heavenly Garrison.” "/><figcaption>“Tonight dealt a tremendous blow to the Aerospace Forces. Three experienced crews, seven brave Warriors, have departed for the Heavenly Garrison.” </figcaption></figure><p>The Telegram channel “Ya i drug moi vertolyot” (lit. “My Helicopter Friend and I”), which is believed to be run by an active pilot or someone close to Russia’s military aviation, published a poem commemorating the dead pilots, along with a photograph showing a Ka-52 and a Mi-8.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af5aeb1517bd1.50136490/N6TlWkwFrD8cFCs8wlH8wnkiihcAqIwbfCktmlNo.jpg" alt=""/></figure><p>The Voenny Osvedomitely (lit. “Military Informant”) Telegram channel <a href="https://t.me/milinfolive/183063">reported</a> the suspected loss of a Ka-52 attack helicopter and its crew. Other pro-war Russian channels also hinted that Russian pilots had been killed.</p><p>“Defending the skies over St. Petersburg from today’s drone attack cost us very dearly. Very, very, very dearly. Eternal flight, brothers,” <a href="https://t.me/bomber_fighter/27133">wrote</a> Fighterbomber, a channel linked to Russia’s Aerospace Forces.</p><p>The pro-war channel Na Predele (lit. “At the Limit”) <a href="https://t.me/na_predel/10498">posted</a>: “Sometimes we lose the most precious thing we have. And, unfortunately, the guys cannot be brought back. Eternal flight, heavenly warriors.”</p><p>The cause of the reported helicopter losses is unknown. Possible explanations circulating online include a midair collision and friendly fire from Russian air defenses. There is currently no confirmation of either theory.</p><p>Russian authorities and the Defense Ministry have not confirmed the loss of the helicopters or the deaths of the pilots.</p><h3>Flight restrictions and air alerts in the Baltic states</h3><p>Residents of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/latvia-lithuania-warn-threat-airspace-near-belarus-2026-11-10/">warned</a> of an aerial threat during the attack. There were also reports that drones had <a href="https://www.mil.lv/en/node/7429">entered</a> the airspace of Baltic states and that NATO aircraft were operating in the area.</p><p>Because of flight restrictions at St. Petersburg’s Pulkovo Airport, passenger planes flying there from Istanbul and Hurghada <a href="https://www.business-gazeta.ru/news/715513">landed</a> in Helsinki instead.</p><h3>Ust-Luga’s importance to Russian exports</h3><p>Ust-Luga is one of Russia’s largest ports on the Baltic Sea. Russia exports crude oil, petroleum products, stable gas condensate, coal, fertilizers, and grain through the port.</p><p>According to an <a href="https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/KSE_Drone-Strike-Impact-Assessment_April-9-2026.pdf">estimate</a> by the KSE Institute at the Kyiv School of Economics, Ust-Luga accounted for about 20% of Russia’s seaborne oil exports in 2025, putting it second only to nearby Primorsk, which accounted for 22%.</p><p>Ust-Luga also became significantly more important for Russian grain exports in 2026, as shipments through the Baltic rose sharply amid Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s Black Sea ports.</p><p>However, in March 2026, a series of Ukrainian drone strikes on Ust-Luga and Primorsk halted oil loadings, and exports from the two facilities <a href="https://theins.ru/news/290934">fell</a> to their lowest level since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.</p><p>Drones also <a href="https://theins.ru/news/296636">attacked</a> Ust-Luga in September, damaging a NOVATEK facility.</p><h3>New wave of strikes on Russian oil infrastructure</h3><p>The attack on Ust-Luga came amid a new series of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil infrastructure. According to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-11-11/drone-attack-sparks-fire-at-russia-s-ust-luga-port-injures-3">Bloomberg</a>, six Russian oil refineries with a combined capacity of around 1.7 million barrels per day have been attacked since the beginning of November. (The Nov. 11 strike on Ust-Luga was not included in that estimate).</p><p>On Nov. 9, drones <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299409">struck</a> the Kirishi oil refinery in the Leningrad region, which has a capacity of about 400,000 barrels per day. A fire broke out at the facility and was later contained, according to the governor. Regional authorities recommended that fuel suppliers limit gasoline sales to 30 liters per customer and diesel sales to 50 liters per vehicle in order to prevent panic buying.</p><p>Drones also attacked Russia’s Smolensk region overnight into Nov. 11. Governor Vasily Anokhin <a href="https://t.me/anohin67/16375">reported</a> that 37 drones had been shot down and that two people were killed in Yartsevo, where he said drone debris struck a residential building and started a fire. A Rosneft oil depot is located in the city.</p><p>The strike on Ust-Luga took place several hours before Russia and Ukraine were set to resume U.S.-mediated talks in Abu Dhabi. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the sides planned to discuss possible de-escalation measures, including a ceasefire in the Black Sea and restrictions on strikes against energy infrastructure, as well as a potential meeting between the two countries’ leaders.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/294513">Fire breaks out near Yaroslavl refinery after Ukrainian drone attack, facilities near Ust-Luga and Vysotsk ports damaged in Leningrad Region</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/291209">Ust-Luga port attacked again after Russia accuses Baltic states of aiding Ukrainian drones</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/290828">Key ports of Ust-Luga and Primorsk attacked again as strikes on Russia’s Baltic Sea oil infrastructure enter fourth consecutive night</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/290734">Fire in Russia’s key oil port of Ust-Luga confirmed by satellite images and NASA data</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 22:19:44 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Munich trade fair removes products from Chinese firm Harxon over the company&#039;s links to Russian drone manufacturer]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299465</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299465</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Harxon, a Chinese company <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/292355" target="_blank">known</a> for supplying GNSS antennas that help Russian drones overcome GPS jamming on the battlefield, <a href="https://droneexpos.co.uk/harxon-to-showcase-gnss-and-wireless-antenna-solutions-at-electronica-2026" target="_blank">showcased</a> its products at Electronica 2026, a prestigious international trade fair held in Munich, Germany. Harxon's products have been shipped to the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan, where they are used in the production of Russian Geran drones. Following an inquiry from <i>The Insider</i>, the organizers of the Munich trade fair said the products in question had been removed from display.</p><p>Electronica 2026 is being held at the Messe München exhibition center from Nov. 10 to 13. Harxon's products were initially displayed in Hall <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20261111184238/https://exhibitors.electronica.de/exhibitor-portal/2026/list-of-exhibitors/exhibitordetails/bdstar-navigation-co-ltd/?elb=809.1100.11803.1.111" target="_blank">C2.641</a>, officially occupied by its parent company, BDStar, which was placed under U.S. sanctions in 2024.</p><p>Harxon itself is subject only to British sanctions. It was added to the UK sanctions list following an <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/292355" target="_blank">investigation</a> by <i>The Insider</i> that was published in May this year.</p><p><i>The Insider</i> contacted the exhibition organizers for clarification. They replied that Harxon was not an official exhibitor and that they had therefore instructed exhibitors to remove any “unauthorized” products from display. They also stressed that all products showcased at the fair must fall within the event's designated scope.</p><p>The organizers did not, however, say that the BDStar booth had been closed. <i>The Insider</i> has sent them a follow-up inquiry concerning BDStar's sanctioned status.</p><p>Asked whether suppliers of antennas for Russian drones would be allowed to exhibit at future Electronica fairs, the organizers replied:</p><blockquote><p>“The technologies and components showcased at Electronica are used across a variety of industries. As organizers, we cannot control all possible applications of these products and services beyond the free-trade environment.”</p></blockquote><p>The Chinese Consulate General in Munich did not answer a phone call and did not respond to an inquiry from <i>The Insider</i>.</p><p>For more on how Chinese suppliers send critically important antennas for Geran drones to Russia under the guise of agricultural equipment, read <i>The Insider's</i> <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/292355" target="_blank">investigation</a>.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/292355">Geraniums in bloom: The Insider and Nordsint reveal how a large Chinese firm supplies Russian drone production</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 20:29:25 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Serbian manufacturer Grindex supplied Russia with with €27.5 million in machine tools, with some reaching defense plants, RFE/RL reports]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299459</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299459</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Serbian machine-tool manufacturer Grindex continued supplying equipment to Russian companies after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including to firms affiliated with the defense industry. The findings were <a href="https://www.svoboda.org/a/stanki-dlya-oboronki-kak-serbskoe-oborudovanie-popadaet-v-rosteh/33893898.html">reported</a> in a joint investigation by <i>Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s</i> Balkan Service and its investigative projects Schemes (Skhemy) and Sistema. According to the findings, about €27.5 million worth of Grindex products were imported into Russia between March 2022 and March 2025.</p><p>The investigation found that some of the machines shipped to Russia during that period ended up at sanctioned Russian military-industrial enterprises including companies belonging to Rostec, the Russian state-owned defense and technology conglomerate led by Sergei Chemezov, a former KGB officer and a friend of Vladimir Putin since they were both stationed in East Germany in the 1980s.</p><p>One intermediary facilitating imports was the Russian Alfa Machinery Group (AMG). The United States imposed sanctions on the company in November 2023, followed by the European Union in December 2024. According to Ukrainian military intelligence, Grindex signed a contract with AMG in December 2022 to supply a cylindrical grinding machine worth around €778,000. The equipment was ultimately delivered to the I. Rumyantsev Machine-Building Production Association, a Rostec company that manufactures aircraft components.</p><p>Another machine, this one worth just over $384,000, arrived in Russia in February 2025 and was later transferred to Ufa Aggregate Enterprise Hydraulics, another Rostec company that produces aircraft components and has been under EU sanctions since 2025.</p><p>In 2024, another machine was delivered through a different intermediary — Krona — to the Research and Production Corp. Machine-Building Design Bureau (KBM). The Rostec subsidiary, which is involved in the development of the Iskander-M missile system, is under U.S. and EU sanctions. <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.press/en/economics/267767">reported</a> in December 2023 that Krona had purchased Grindex machines.</p><p>In 2025, another Grindex machine was being leased by the Perm Research and Production Instrument-Making Company, which manufactures navigation, control, and stabilization systems for aircraft.</p><p>Shipments were also made through other intermediaries, including Finval Energo and Unimatic MSK, but investigators were unable to identify the recipients of other consignments.</p><p>Grindex is based in Kikinda,Serbia. The company was established in 2003 after being spun off from the industrial holding company Livnica Kikinda. It employs around 250 people.</p><p>Grindex manufactures metalworking equipment, including computer numerical control (CNC) and cylindrical grinding machines. The investigation noted that the company operated at a loss in 2021 and 2022 but became profitable in 2023, with profits increasing each year since then.</p><p>Serbia’s Trade Ministry told <i>RFE/RL</i> that it had not issued Grindex licenses to export dual-use goods, but said it could not determine whether the company’s machine tools were subject to export controls.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/economics/267767">Sanction-dodging armor: Which Western countries are helping Russia make Armata and Proryv tanks</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/289721">UK government sanctions British citizen exposed by The Insider for supplying machine tools to Russia’s defense industry</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/283707">German investigators raid machine tool manufacturer Spinner over suspicions of equipment supplies to Russia</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/279019">High-precision Hyundai Wia machine tools critical for Moscow’s arms industry reach Russia disguised as domestic imports to Kazakhstan</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/266740">Germanу indicts key figure from The Insider investigation who supplied machine tools to Russian arms manufacturers</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 18:25:33 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[“Summer was nothing compared to this”: Severe blackouts leave residents in Russian-occupied Crimea facing days without power, water and heat]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299458</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299458</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Residents of Russian-occupied Crimea are facing a new large-scale energy crisis. In some areas, electricity is unavailable for 20 hours a day, with water and heating also disappearing when the power goes out. Children sit in classrooms wearing coats, daycares are left without hot meals, medical clinics stop seeing patients, and residents are compelled to spend money on fuel for generators.</p><p>Authorities in Sevastopol have acknowledged that the city is receiving only about half the electricity it needs. Residents across the peninsula have recorded video appeals to Vladimir Putin, complaining that the current situation is worse than the 2015 energy crisis that followed Moscow’s illegal annexation in 2014. <i>The Insider</i> reviewed accounts from Crimea residents and spoke with a local woman who described the situation in detail.</p><h3>“We’re freezing. We have electricity for two hours a day”</h3><p>Two women from Crimea recorded an appeal to Vladimir Putin in front of the Monument to the Sunken Ships in Sevastopol. But the video, originally posted on Instagram, was later deleted.</p><p>“We’re freezing. The amount of electricity reaching our city is not enough. We have power for two hours a day, and not even in every neighborhood. Our children have to sit in school wearing coats, and even that doesn’t help,” the speaker explained.</p><p>Residents added that in some buildings, water and heating also disappear when the electricity is cut. In Sevastopol’s Gagarinsky District, power is shut off from 6 a.m. until noon. In the Nakhimovsky District, outages can last for 20 hours, with some reportedly lasting as long as 48 hours.</p><p>“We are asked not to overload the power grid, but apartments that have been without electricity for 20 hours are only 16 degrees Celsius [61℉], so of course people turn on every electrical appliance they have. Elderly people and children are freezing. Not everyone can afford to buy a generator or a portable power station,” the women said.</p><p>She added that some residents have been forced to cook food over open fires because they cannot use their electric stoves, comparing the situation with the 2015 energy crisis, when Crimea suffered widespread blackouts after electricity supplies from mainland Ukraine were cut off.</p><p>“Yes, we’ve had a blackout before, but our homes were warm and we could cook food for the children. Now we don’t even have that,” residents said in a video asking Putin to provide the peninsula with assistance similar to what they said Crimea received in 2014.</p><p>In another video, a woman from the peninsula wondered whether people elsewhere in Russia knew what was happening:</p><blockquote><p>“I wonder whether anyone in our country besides Crimeans knows that there is no electricity in Crimea. We’re getting ready for work — there’s no electricity. We wake up in the morning — there’s no electricity. We come home from work — there’s no electricity. Does anyone besides us know that we have no electricity?”</p></blockquote><h3>“Summer was nothing compared to this”: Why the current outages are worse</h3><p>A Sevastopol resident who spoke with <i>The Insider</i> said electricity problems began in the summer, but the situation was far more predictable then.</p><blockquote><p>“In the summer, we had schedules of three hours on, three hours off, or two hours on, six hours off. They were not always followed — mostly they weren’t — but we never had outages lasting this long. There were two serious incidents: once we had no power for almost an entire day, and another time for about 12 hours. The rest of the time, there was at least some kind of schedule, so you could plan something. Now I look back at that period and think, ’that was nothing compared with this,’” she said, explaining that the situation had stabilized in September and for much of October before new strikes on energy infrastructure led to even deeper outages during the first week of November.</p></blockquote><p>The source said energy facilities had been damaged, including a substation near the Crimean Bridge. Shortly before one of the suspected strikes, she drove past the facility and saw protective structures being installed around it. She later heard from other residents that the substation had been hit.</p><p>The main difference now, she said, is the absence of any outage schedule:</p><blockquote><p>“There hasn’t been a schedule for about a week and a half, maybe even two weeks. They said things are so bad that there’s no point in having schedules anymore. They turn the electricity on whenever they feel like it.”</p></blockquote><p>In some parts of Sevastopol, residents are without electricity for 13 to 17 hours at a time, and sometimes for as long as 21 hours. Meanwhile, neighboring buildings may continue to have power:</p><blockquote><p>“Yesterday, we had no electricity from 7:40 a.m. until 8:30 p.m. My parents went 17 hours without electricity yesterday. Some people are without power for 20 or 21 hours, while the other half of the neighborhood is lit up like a Christmas tree. People are furious.”</p></blockquote><p>She said that the uneven nature of the outages has become a frequent topic of discussion in closed chat groups for residents of individual buildings, and Sevastopol authorities themselves have confirmed the scale of the electricity shortage. At a city government meeting on Nov. 9, officials said Sevastopol was receiving only about 50% of the power it needed, according to the local outlet ForPost.</p><h3>Children without hot meals and hospitals running on generators</h3><p>The energy crisis has affected schools, kindergartens, and medical facilities.</p><p><i>The Insider</i>’s source said one of her children spent an entire school day without electricity, while her younger child spent the day in a daycare that also had no power. School holidays were extended by several days due to the outages.</p><p>Providing meals for children has become a particularly serious problem. Daycares use electric stoves, and not all have backup generators. When the power goes out, staff cannot prepare hot meals. At one daycare, cooks were called in during the night in order to prepare food before the next outage.</p><blockquote><p>“It turned out there are no generators in the daycares. When the electricity is cut, the children get dry rations: juice and cookies, cookies and juice.”</p></blockquote><p>Medical facilities have also experienced problems. <i>The Insider</i>’s source said she knew of a large Sevastopol hospital that switches to a generator when the electricity goes out. However, the hospital must find diesel fuel itself and arrange maintenance for the equipment.</p><p>On Nov. 10, ForPost reported that Sevastopol outpatient clinics and women’s health facilities stop seeing patients during power outages. There is no way to find out in advance whether a particular facility has electricity, as the unified 122 public-service hotline does not provide that information.</p><p>One ForPost reader said her daughter, who was eight months pregnant, traveled to a women’s health clinic but could not see a doctor. Nevertheless, Vladimir Nemtsev, chairman of Sevastopol’s legislative assembly, thanked the city authorities and Health Department for ensuring the uninterrupted operation of medical facilities.</p><p>Health Department head Vitaly Denisov said all inpatient hospitals were fully equipped with generators and operating without interruption. However, his statement did not address problems with appointments at outpatient clinics.</p><h3>“A friend came over to take a shower”: How people live without heat and water</h3><p>In many buildings, heating disappears along with electricity, and sometimes the water supply does as well. Residents of homes with gas boilers are still vulnerable, because the boilers require electricity to operate.</p><p>Power outages have also periodically shut down heating systems. <i>The Insider</i>’s source said apartments became so cold that some residents tried to warm themselves with gas ovens despite the risk of carbon monoxide poisoning.</p><p>The heating situation improved somewhat, she said, after boiler houses stopped being disconnected from the grid at the same time as residential buildings. During one outage lasting almost 13 hours, she said, the radiators in her apartment remained hot.</p><p>But conditions are considerably worse in other parts of the peninsula. In Koktebel, residents go without electricity for 16 to 20 hours at a stretch. Prolonged outages have also affected Feodosia, Sudak, Alushta and Alupka — where, the source said, schools have shortened lessons because of the lack of electricity.</p><p>The situation is particularly severe in Kerch. In some parts of the city, residents have received almost no electricity for about a week, also going without heating and running water. In local chat groups, residents are trying to find out where they can get water and are arranging to help one another where possible.</p><p>One Crimea resident described in a video how she spent a cold night without electricity or communications. She was most worried about her aquarium fish: the water temperature had fallen to 10 degrees Celsius because of the outage, and the fish required temperatures of at least 22 degrees. The woman recalled how, when she lived in Siberia, her family heated bricks in a stove and placed them under an incubator to keep eggs warm during power outages. She was now trying to figure out how to warm the aquarium.</p><h3>Thousands of rubles spent on gasoline and generators</h3><p>Crimea residents are trying to provide their homes with electricity themselves. Videos posted on social media show homemade backup power systems, generators, and batteries.</p><p>In one video, a woman shows a a boxy Soviet van with a generator installed inside. A cable runs from the vehicle to a fourth-floor apartment and enters through a window. Plastic bags have been used to seal the gap around the cable, keeping cold air out. The woman said the generator powers the refrigerator, water heater, and other appliances.</p><p>But the setup is expensive. The woman said her family used 60 liters of gasoline over four or five days, paying 100 rubles per liter — 6,000 rubles ($72) in total. Even then, the temperature inside the home remained below 17 degrees Celsius (63℉). If fuel consumption continues at that rate, the family would have to spend up to 45,000 rubles ($540) a month on gasoline for the generator alone.</p><h3>Russia-installed authorities promise compensation, but not everyone will qualify</h3><p>Amid the energy crisis, the Russia-installed authorities in Sevastopol announced a compensation program for purchases of backup power equipment.</p><p>Starting on Nov. 16, residents will be able to submit applications through Gosuslugi, Russia’s state-run online public-services portal, for reimbursement of 50% of the equipment’s cost. The maximum compensation will be 70,000 rubles ($840) for a generator, 150,000 rubles ($1,800) for a portable power station, and 200,000 rubles ($2,400) for a solar power system. Businesses will be eligible for reimbursement of 30% of their costs within specified limits.</p><p>Authorities initially allocated 100 million rubles ($1.2 million) for the program.</p><p>The compensation, however, applies only to new equipment purchased from a Russian seller on or after June 26, 2026. Purchases must be documented with a full cash-register receipt. Authorities also will not reimburse fuel-powered generators bought for use in apartment buildings, citing safety requirements.</p><p>One Sevastopol resident said in a video that he would not be eligible for compensation because he bought a portable power station from resellers without a receipt or warranty.</p><p>Another Sevastopol resident said he contacted the city administration to ask how the payments would work, but officials could not explain when the system would actually begin operating:</p><blockquote><p>“At the moment, there is no payment mechanism. So it’s still all being worked out. No one knows yet when the mechanism will be launched. The only thing they told me was: keep your receipts.”</p></blockquote><p>At the Nov. 9 meeting, Natalia Borisova, head of Sevastopol’s Economic Development Department, confirmed that the application system was still being finalized. Officials plan to begin accepting applications Nov. 16 and stop on April 1, 2027. Applications will take no more than 10 days to process.</p><p>Meanwhile, Sevastopol “governor” Mikhail Razvozhayev has already reported complaints from residents of a rise in generator prices following the announcement of the compensation program. He asked prosecutors and the Federal Antimonopoly Service to examine sellers’ actions.</p><h3><strong>Dark streets and pedestrians hit by cars</strong></h3><p>The power outages have also affected outdoor lighting in Sevastopol. <i>The Insider</i>’s source said many streets have been dark for an extended period:</p><blockquote><p>“We haven’t had street lighting for a long time. We’ve had a lot of traffic accidents involving pedestrians. It’s genuinely pitch-black — you can’t see anything.”</p></blockquote><p>On Nov. 10, ForPost reported several incidents on unlit roads. On Nov. 6, a car struck a 55-year-old woman at an uncontrolled pedestrian crossing on Nikolaya Muzyki Street. The following day, a 60-year-old woman was hit by a car on Fiolentovskoye Highway.</p><p>Razvozhayev ordered road services to take urgent measures to improve pedestrian safety, citing the Tavrida highway, the main route running across Crimea, where utility poles had been wrapped in reflective material.</p><p>Sevastopol police are advising residents to carry flashlights and wear reflective items on their clothing so drivers can see them in the dark.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/dispatch/294425">“I looked at the gas shortages and closed my cafe before I went broke”: Russian-occupied Crimea is bracing for a summer without fuel</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 18:16:11 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russia’s Matryoshka bot network launches new campaign ahead of Spanish general election]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299427</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299427</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s Matryoshka bot network has launched a new disinformation campaign ahead of Spain’s snap parliamentary elections, scheduled for Nov. 29. The bots are spreading claims that European economies are supposedly collapsing because of aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, and that elections cannot change the situation for the better. Instead, the solutions offered by the bots include Spain leaving the European Union, Madrid lifting its anti-Russian sanctions, and even Catalonian secession.</p><p>Researchers with the <a href="https://x.com/antibot4navalny?utm_source=chatgpt.com">AntiBot4Navalny</a> project, which monitors pro-Russian bot activity on social media, shared its findings about the campaign with <i>The Insider</i>.</p><p>The bot network is circulating videos designed to look like reports by major media outlets, including <i>Euronews</i>, <i>Reuters</i>, <i>AFP</i>, <i>France 24,</i> and Spain’s <i>El País</i>, as well as fake covers of the French publications <i>Libération</i>, <i>La Croix,</i> and <i>Le Nouvel Économiste</i>. All of the inauthentic materials promote the same message: support for Ukraine has supposedly plunged European countries into an economic crisis, and a change of government will achieve nothing so long as sanctions against Russia remain in place.</p><h3>Housing crisis and the futility of elections</h3><p>One of the campaign’s central themes is Spain’s housing crisis. A video styled as a report by <i>El País</i> claims that failed reforms, problems with housing affordability, and restrictions on the rental market constitute evidence of a deep economic crisis. The authors attribute the situation to anti-Russian sanctions and support for Ukraine.</p><p>Similar claims appear in a video bearing <i>Euronews </i>branding, which alleges that European countries are sacrificing their own prosperity to finance Kyiv. As evidence of economic and social decline, it cites events that have nothing to do with aid to Ukraine: a railway disaster in Spain, protests by French students, and clashes with police.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af4254fe81df8.13711083/q5QsFn8fT0e6QalIufV0MvZ6fixn0GKvskE2LZg1.jpg" alt=""/></figure><p>Another video, styled as an <i>AFP </i>report, claims that 71% of Europeans do not believe elections can improve their socioeconomic situation. Distrust is supposedly particularly high in Spain and France. The campaign materials provide no source for this figure.</p><p>Nevertheless, the same message appears on a fake cover of the French newspaper <i>La Croix</i> — dated November 10, with the headline “Elections Will Change Nothing.” Beneath a photograph of Spanish voters, it claims that one pro-Ukrainian political force will simply be replaced by another, while Spain’s citizens will remain indebted to Ukraine forever.</p><h3>Catalan independence and Spain's EU exit</h3><p>In other publications, Matryoshka proposes more radical solutions to Europe’s problems.</p><p>One video, styled as a France 24 report, claims that Barcelona School of Economics professor Jordi Galí has is calling for Catalonian independence and advocates once again dividing Germany between East and West. The authors claim that smaller independent states would find it easier to resist Brussels’ policies, including decisions on aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia.</p><p>Another video attributes to economist Xavier Sala-i-Martin the claim that the European Union is holding back Spain’s economic development. The proposed solution is for Spain to leave the EU and lift anti-Russian sanctions unilaterally. The authors caution, however, that the country’s economic situation is so dire even these measures might not be enough.</p><h3>Fake covers and statements attributed to real experts</h3><p>In addition to videos, Matryoshka is circulating images mimicking the front pages of French publications.</p><p>A fake cover of <i>Libération</i> dated November 10–11 carries the headline: “Pro-Ukrainian Forces Are Leading Europe to Ruin.” Below it, the text claims that calls are growing louder in Spain, Germany, and France for the lifting of anti-Russian sanctions.</p><p>Another fake is designed as the November issue of the economic publication <i>Le Nouvel Économiste</i>. Its cover shows a woman turning out her empty pockets, beneath the headline “Pro-Ukrainian Forces Have Driven Europe into Bankruptcy.” The subheading claims that France and Spain have run out of money ahead of elections.</p><p>In yet another video, this one styled as a <i>Reuters</i> report, French philosopher and essayist Raphaël Enthoven is shown comparing support for anti-Russian political forces with support for the Nazi Party. The authors claim that these forces are leading Europe towards economic stagnation, rising crime, and uncontrolled migration.</p><p>All of these inauthentic posts use the branding of well-known media outlets and the names of experts to create the impression that the claims being circulated come from independent journalists and analysts.</p><h3>What is known about Matryoshka's organizers</h3><p>As <i>The Insider</i> revealed as part of its <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/298359" target="_blank">investigation</a> into the Kremlin’s Doppelgänger operation, the idea of producing fake video reports in the names of Western media outlets dates back to 2022. Documents from the Agency for Social Design (ASD), which worked on behalf of the Russian presidential administration, contained detailed instructions on how to produce the fake content. One proposal, for example, was to invent a story about a crime committed by Ukrainian teenagers in Germany and present it as a preview of an investigation by <i>Die Zeit</i>.</p><p>According to internal correspondence reviewed by <i>The Insider</i>, one of the initiators of the Doppelgänger operation was Sergei Kiriyenko, first deputy chief of staff of the Russian presidential administration. The operation was carried out by political strategist Ilya Gambashidze and his Agency for Social Design. As early as 2022, one of its objectives was to persuade Europeans to oppose sanctions against Russia.</p><p>To promote their message, campaign organizers exploited genuine social problems in European countries. Internal documents, for example, proposed creating posts in the names of ordinary residents complaining about rising prices, migration, and the cost of aid to Ukraine. Matryoshka’s current campaign follows the same playbook.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/291361">“Matryoshka” enters the fray: The Kremlin and the GRU are spreading disinformation in Hungary ahead of its pivotal parliamentary election</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/298359">Putin’s “Doppelgängers”: The Insider gets inside the operations of the Kremlin&#039;s foreign disinformation network</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 18:04:41 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Last of three tankers carrying Russian diesel to the U.S. turns back in the Atlantic before reaching New York]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299454</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299454</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The last of three tankers that U.S. media reported were carrying Russian diesel fuel to the United States has changed course before reaching its destination. <i>Bloomberg</i> <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-11-10/ship-carrying-russian-diesel-makes-u-turn-after-heading-to-us">reported</a> that the <i>Agioi Fanendes</i> (IMO: 9798375), carrying 300,000 barrels of fuel, made a sharp turn after coming within around 740 kilometers of New York.</p><p>Two other vessels carrying Russian diesel to the United States — the <i>Talisman</i> (IMO: 9292060) and the <i>Leruo</i> (IMO: 9385831) — had previously changed course. According to vessel-tracking data, no shipment of Russian diesel has reached the United States so far. Greenpeace Ukraine had said it <a href="https://www.greenpeace.org/ukraine/en/novyny/6603/greenpeace-reveals-location-of-seven-secret-russian-diesel-shipments-to-us/">identified</a> at least four additional tankers involved in the deal, but those claims were not confirmed.</p><p>On Oct. 9, Trump <a href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117412435306815143">announced</a> an agreement with Putin that called for 4.8 million metric tons of Russian diesel to be supplied to the U.S. and global markets, and Moscow immediately lifted a ban on diesel exports that had been in effect until then, promising to ship 300,000 metric tons in October, another 500,000 tons in November, followed by larger quantities at later dates. Trump said the deal would help address rising diesel prices in the United States; however, congressional Democrats said they intended to investigate its compliance with sanctions legislation.</p><p>As the <i>Washington Sun</i> <a href="https://www.washingtonsun.com/whitehouse/trump-aides-leaning-us-firms-accept-russian-diesel">reported</a> in late October, officials in the Trump administration were privately urging American companies to accept the Russian diesel then being shipped across the Atlantic. The report said businesses were refusing out of concern about potential legal liability and reputational damage.</p><p>The U.S. midterm elections, held on Nov. 3, saw the Democratic Party <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/US-ELECTIONS/GRAPHICS-BLOG/akpelkldzvr/">win</a> majorities in both chambers of Congress. On Nov. 5, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov commented on speculation that the results might have affected companies’ calculus regarding the acceptance of Russian diesel, <a href="https://tass.ru/ekonomika/28288495">saying</a> that “one should not see any connection here with the elections” and that “all the diesel will find buyers.”</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298871">Three tankers carrying Russian diesel fuel head to the U.S. after Trump and Putin agree on sanctions relief</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298678">First tanker carrying Russian diesel to U.S. heads for New York after Trump-Putin deal, set to arrive after midterm elections</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298214">Russia can meet promised diesel exports to U.S. and global markets only at the expense of domestic strategic reserves, expert says</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 17:53:41 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[“We cooked over open fires but were afraid to go outside”: Evacuated residents of Oleshky describe life under siege]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/confession/299400</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/confession/299400</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tetiana Popova]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299400/KCTivznGW6VPMaU4TDAadx8MXa6q7UH7BIYoPnr6.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The largest humanitarian operation of the war in Ukraine — the evacuation of residents from Russian-occupied Oleshky — <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299060" target="_blank">was completed</a> on October 31. After safely returning to Ukrainian-controlled territory, several residents who evacuated from the besieged town told <i>The Insider</i> what they had endured over four and a half years of Russian occupation.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The condition of life in the Ukrainian town of Oleshky, located on the Russian-occupied eastern bank of the Dnipro River, had been precipitiously declining for months before a localized ceasefire was agreed to in late October. Residents were given the choice to evacuate, and could opt for buses that would take them either to Russia, or, ultimately, back to Ukraine. At the insistence of the Russian side, no official figures were released on the number of Oleshky residents who left the town, let alone of where they chose to relocate. However, journalists' estimates suggest that considerably more buses carrying residents to Ukraine left the town than those heading to Russia.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4253</div><h3 class="outline-heading">Anastasiia</h3><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af32561a10721.00697896/OadWBN0eyMTvI3yBlDPRVbl7KBJFZDIQW1AF9IoV.jpg" alt="Anastasiia"/><figcaption>Anastasiia</figcaption></figure><p>I was born in Oleshky and have spent all 17 years of my life here — before the war, throughout the siege, and until the evacuation.</p><p>On February 24, 2022, my mother woke me up and told me the war had started. By 5 or 6 a.m., Russian tanks and soldiers were already outside our fence. Then came the helicopters, planes, and shelling. We hid in the basement. We took in my grandmother, who lived in the town center, near the Dnipro. We spent the next 10 days in the basement without going outside. I was 13 at the time. We also hid the belongings of our neighbors who were serving in the military and burned their uniforms and documents. They stayed with us for a while before managing to leave.</p><p>After that, we lived at my grandmother's house, but later had to move to another house in Oleshky.</p><p>My grandfather helped build the Antonivskyi Bridge. We were even proud that the Russians hadn't managed to destroy it right away. My grandfather cried when Russian forces blew it up during their retreat.</p><p>Then came the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam. That was probably one of the most devastating events. We lost everything. Our house by the Dnipro was completely flooded. We couldn't get there until three months after the hydroelectric plant was blown up. Even then, we had to go by boat.</p><p>The power went out after the dam's destruction and was never restored. Food supplies then became scarce. There was no gas either. We had nothing. We cooked over open fires, setting up bricks, putting plates on top, and cooking on them.</p><p>We hardly ever left the house because it was dangerous outside. Russian soldiers could simply come in and check our documents. If they didn't like something, they could take you away — and that was it, you would disappear without a trace. Young women were especially vulnerable; they could simply be raped. A woman I knew tried to leave but was detained at a checkpoint. From what I heard, she was raped and then taken to Crimea and held in a basement. I don't know what happened after that. I knew her personally, and it was horrifying.</p><p>A year before the evacuation, even ambulances could no longer get through. Russian soldiers claimed the roads were mined. Whether that was true, nobody knew. But no one could leave, and everyone had to survive on whatever supplies they had stored. Those living in private houses could at least grow something. People in apartments had a much harder time. They were genuinely starving.</p><p>My mother, brother, grandmother, grandfather, and I lived mainly on buckwheat, rice, pasta, and vegetables. We had food reserves. We knew supplies could run short, so we had prepared for that.</p><p>Pensions and some other assistance were distributed at the beginning of the occupation, but later it became increasingly difficult to collect them. People had to travel to Skadovsk [80 kilometers away]. At first, people arranged powers of attorney to collect the money, but once the siege began, leaving was impossible. People survived as best they could. Those who had money could buy something, but prices sometimes included markups of as much as 1,000%.</p><p>Ukrainians dropped humanitarian aid from the air. Sometimes we managed to get some. We'd hear from other people that aid had been dropped, go to the site, and collect it.</p><p>The phone signal where we lived was very poor. Sometimes it took up to half an hour just to find a spot with reception.</p><p>A month ago, our neighbor was killed in an explosion. We went over immediately because another man who had been nearby and escaped unharmed ran straight to our house. Another neighbor, a woman about 70 who lived across the street, also disappeared. Her friend, another neighbor of ours, was worried. She said it wasn't like her to stay away, and she hadn't come by for two days. We climbed over the fence. The doors were open, the key was still in the lock, everything was in its place, but the woman was nowhere to be found.</p><p>I don't know how many people died, starved to death, or disappeared without a trace. There were dozens of people we knew personally; the number of people we didn't know could be in the hundreds or even thousands.</p><p>Before the siege, we used gasoline-powered generators. Later, those who had solar panels relied on them. Some people watched television, others listened to the radio. We occasionally watched Ukrainian television too. For a while, only Russian channels were broadcasting. We didn't watch them. I don't know who believed what they heard on Russian television and radio. We didn't discuss such things with strangers — it was dangerous.</p><p>Why didn't people leave earlier? Everyone had their own circumstances. Some had no money; others had relatives they couldn't abandon. Some were still clinging to their homes and belongings. I know that when the evacuation took place, some of those who supposedly chose Russia actually stayed in Skadovsk. We went to Ukraine because we are Ukrainian and were born in Ukraine.</p><p>We realized that this evacuation was our last chance to reach safety in Ukraine — not Russia, not the occupied territories, but Ukraine itself. That's why we decided to go.</p><p>Those who remain there need liberation and support. Something must be done to show them that they haven't been forgotten.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Anastasiia&#039;s mother, who asked not to be named</h3><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af32613c371d1.33439394/H6YiOmKxA9YFjQOhf5oPr7DaD6b77igcdAmYyeGU.jpg" alt="Anastasiia&#039;s mother"/><figcaption>Anastasiia&#039;s mother</figcaption></figure><p>About a thousand people remain in Oleshky. People have also been unable to leave nearby settlements. Solontsi, Kardashynka, and Hola Prystan have not been demined, and people are still living there. Many are elderly or have limited mobility. There are children and young people, too. You understand, they're burying children there. I hid my own children, for example. I didn't want anyone to know they were there. Whenever anyone asked, I would say, “They're not here. They've left.”</p><p>Russian soldiers often asked us, “Why don't you leave?” They would brazenly barge into people's homes —armed — or simply kick the doors in. They'd search the houses or look for somewhere to stay — whatever they felt like doing.</p><p>Russian soldiers took my husband away back in 2022. To this day, we don't know what happened to him. He is considered missing. Without a Russian passport, you can't approach any government agency to ask questions or make inquiries. So I was unable to find out anything about him.</p><p>We tried to make inquiries back in 2022, but they hinted that we shouldn't, because it would end badly. I was told, “Do you want to end up like your husband, with your legs broken?” But we kept hoping he would come back, so we stayed in Oleshky for a long time.</p><p>I really want to thank Melania Trump because, honestly, I didn't believe the evacuation would happen. It was only when we heard that some vehicles were on their way that we realized the evacuation really was going ahead.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Volodymyr Vasylovych</h3><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af3269fc5fae9.74930621/KFGuSft2wqPtrv7bHwXxKvcqRk3HP5Jpa0uR6RFl.jpg" alt="Volodymyr Vasylovych"/><figcaption>Volodymyr Vasylovych</figcaption></figure><p>We're actually from Kherson, but we've lived in Oleshky for five years. We bought a house from my sister, and the war caught us there. The worst was when the blockade began. It was like Leningrad [during WWII]. During that time, I was hospitalized seven times. For the past three weeks, there hasn't been a single medicine available. Food was scarce, too. I lost 20 kilograms over the past year. I'll turn 80 in two weeks. I've become very weak, and one illness after another has taken hold.</p><p>The Russians distributed humanitarian aid until the final year. Previously, they gave out decent pasta, salt, and grains, but in the last year all we got was two small cans of condensed milk. Try living on that for a month. And that was only for pensioners. There was no bread at all throughout the last year.</p><blockquote>Previously, they gave out decent pasta, salt, and grains, but in the last year all we got was two small cans of condensed milk. And that was only for pensioners. Try living on that for a month</blockquote><p>Pension payments were stopped. For the second year running, we couldn't get to Skadovsk, the only place where pensions were paid out. The roads there were mined. Some people managed to reach Radensk by bicycle or on foot. Sometimes, men trying to get through were killed, although a man traveling with a woman might be allowed to pass. Many people died on the roads while trying to escape — or simply trying to get around.</p><p>We had no electricity or gas at all for the past three years. There was nowhere to buy gas cylinders either. I scraped together the money to buy solar panels and batteries. But they ran out of charge quickly, and they were very expensive.</p><p>Sometimes humanitarian aid was dropped by drones. Prices at our market were three to ten times higher than in cities outside the blockade.</p><p>On June 17, a shell hit the corner of our house. Fortunately, we weren't sleeping in that room. It damaged the bread maker and some canned food and shattered the window.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Tetiana Vasylivna</h3><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af3275f01c0f0.34938436/efFIjxZrpFmq6TuwXEgjsCcN2VE5xtENHZqNlv72.jpg" alt=""/></figure><p>We hadn't left Oleshky before because we were afraid of filtration screening. Interrogations there last three to five hours, and people are sometimes driven to the point of having strokes. But now we've decided to take that risk. Here, we've been promised accommodation for three months while we adjust to our new circumstances.</p><p>When the war began, I didn't understand at first what was happening. I'm a seamstress, and I'd been working until four in the morning. I finished my work and heard explosions. Then came the APCs, KAMAZ trucks, and tanks. I watched it all and asked my husband, “Is this really a war, or are they shooting a movie?”</p><p>At first, when the Russians had just arrived, they did whatever they pleased, driving around in tanks. One soldier, holding an assault rifle, asked me why I wouldn't accept rubles. Initially, we flatly refused to sell our homegrown produce — potatoes, strawberries, and raspberries — for rubles. I thought Ukraine would soon return, so why would I need Russian money? But gradually, the hryvnia disappeared from circulation.</p><p>Russian soldiers were often high on drugs or drunk. They would shout, “We're soldiers, we're here to save you, and you have to help us.” They took our last food. I personally know of a family of acquaintances who sold food at the market and were shot dead over it. The soldiers came to take their food. The man objected, and they killed the whole family.</p><blockquote>Russian soldiers were often high on drugs or stoned, and drunk. They would shout, “We're soldiers, we're here to save you, and you have to help us”</blockquote><p>I don't know exactly how many people were beaten to death there. There's a store near our house. People were robbed, beaten, and sometimes beaten to death right outside it. It made me furious. When the soldiers came to the market, they were polite, laughing and smiling. But once they left, they started doing things that were simply beyond comprehension. You understand?</p><p>An acquaintance of ours, Yarik, was killed in a drone strike. Another man, Vova, worked at a pharmacy, selling medicines. They interrogated him so brutally at a checkpoint that he came home and died of a stroke. Our acquaintance Igor Bilous was also tortured and beaten because he had served in the [war in the Donbas]. They held him for a month, and he lost 30 kilograms. He said he had barely survived. He spent a month in the hospital, then another month going for dressing changes. They beat him particularly badly about the head.</p><p>In general, anyone out on the street after noon could simply be killed for no reason.</p><p>At the beginning of the year, vehicles were still bringing us food because the shops had already closed. But they started hitting mines, and after that nobody came anymore. The area was completely sealed off and mined. But we're Ukrainians — we're good at stocking up. Somehow, we managed to lay in enough food for six months.</p><p>An acquaintance of ours, Oleh, was recently traveling when he hit a mine and was killed instantly. Yuliana Latysheva was also killed in a mine explosion, while her twin sister Diana survived. Just a few days ago, Andrei hit a mine too. He survived but was injured.</p><p>If this is occupied territory, the Russians should be responsible for it, but they aren't. They don't care that the hospitals have no medicines. There was no electricity after the hydroelectric power plant was blown up. Everyone had to fend for themselves — some installed solar panels, others bought generators.</p><p>At the beginning of the war, Russian soldiers were well-groomed, but later, as their forces began taking losses, they started sending all sorts of riffraff and homeless people. We even had one walking around in a woman's coat and a pink hat. We used to joke that even our homeless people didn't dress like that. Basically, they just threw on whatever they found in bombed-out houses.</p><p>On the day of the evacuation, we arrived at the meeting point at 8 a.m., but didn't leave until 2 p.m. There were so many people. We stood in the rain and got soaked.</p><p>We were in the line of people heading to Ukraine when a Russian man asked me, “Why aren't you going to Russia?” He wasn't a soldier but one of the evacuation organizers. He approached other people, too. I cautiously replied, “Well, I don't know. Somehow, Ukraine feels closer to me.” He said, “Well, you should think it over. Russia is a big country, after all.”</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/dispatch/285758">“Drones fly right above the stores”: Residents flee the border areas of Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk Region amid Russian advance</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/288075">“You must not show that you are afraid”: Tales of captivity in the Kremlin-controlled “People’s Republics”</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/289152">“Programs about Christ followed by beatings half to death”: Kherson’s ex-mayor Volodymyr Mykolaienko on his years in Russian captivity</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 07:10:36 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Johnny on the spot: A hack of ex-Marine-turned-defector John Dougan’s messages reveals the rise and fall of a Russian disinformation asset]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/inv/299417</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/inv/299417</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dada Lyndell]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299417/w6qbVe6X9HanOtVxm1gk8alUasRTO7bmccIwWfUp.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><i>The Insider</i> has obtained access to an&nbsp;<a href="https://x.com/baldvolf">archive</a> of hacked correspondence belonging to John Mark Dougan, a former U.S. sheriff’s deputy who fled to Russia and became a fixture of Kremlin propaganda and an important conduit for disinformation campaigns. The messages not only show how false narratives were developed, but also trace Dougan’s rise from an obscure police officer to a star on Russian television, and his fall to a largely forgotten and increasingly bothersome supplicant complaining about internet censorship and meager earnings while threatening to leave for Belarus. As Dougan’s correspondence makes clear, many of his activities were coordinated by the Kremlin’s intelligence services.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:right;"><i>When quoted in the original language, the authors’ spelling and punctuation have been preserved.</i></p><p>By midday on July 15, 2022, 49-year-old American John Mark Dougan had already been standing in a corridor at the Sakharovo migration center outside Moscow for three hours. He needed to file documents in order to receive a Russian residence permit: copies of his passport, proof of registration, the names of his family members still in the United States, certificates showing he was HIV-negative, and proof that he had 165,000 rubles (just under $2,000) in a Sberbank account. The money was not his — in fact, he did not have that kind of money. A few days earlier, however, his friend “oligarch Igor” had sent him 70,000 rubles ($840) so he could show the authorities his bank statement. “It's a pity it won't stay there. 🤣🤣,” Dougan joked in a chat with his Moscow friend Alexei Kiristayev, who was helping him collect and file the application.</p><p>A few months later, Dougan would turn 50. A year and a half after that, Western outlets would <a href="https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/john-mark-dougan-russian-disinformation-network/">call</a> him a “Kremlin disinformation impresario,” and his name would appear in major U.S. newspapers. “God damn, but I love that photo. Lol,” the former police officer wrote in response to an October 2024 <i>Washington Post</i> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/23/dougan-russian-disinformation-harris/">article about his cooperation with the GRU</a>. Dougan sent the investigation to all his friends — and even people he barely knew. He became convinced that one of his close friends, former British Army serviceman Mike Jones, who recently <a href="https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/28048311">became</a> a Russian mercenary, had leaked the information to American journalists. Dougan was so angry with Jones that he even considered suing him.</p><p>In 2026, Dougan marked the tenth anniversary of his move to Russia. By then, he was so unhappy that he was ready to rebel. “Whatever these stupid bastards in the Russian government are doing right now to block the internet, if they keep this up, it will shut us off completely. I’m almost ready to call citizens to action to rise up against this extreme censorship. It pisses me off so much… I’m going to start a campaign to turn the public against the Nazis running <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+PHN0cm9uZz5Sb3Nrb21uYWR6b3I8L3N0cm9uZz4gaXM8c3Ryb25nPiA8L3N0cm9uZz5SdXNzaWHigJlzIGZlZGVyYWwgY29tbXVuaWNhdGlvbnMgYW5kIG1lZGlhIHJlZ3VsYXRvciwgcmVzcG9uc2libGUgZm9yIG92ZXJzZWVpbmcgdGhlIGludGVybmV0IGFuZCBlbmZvcmNpbmcgZ292ZXJubWVudCByZXN0cmljdGlvbnMgb24gb25saW5lIGNvbnRlbnQsIGluY2x1ZGluZyBibG9ja2luZyB3ZWJzaXRlcyBhbmQgcGxhdGZvcm1zLjwvcD4=">Roskomnadzor</span>. Their policies are getting people killed,” he fumed in chats with his Moscow friends this past March, after Russia’s communications regulator Roskomnadzor began officially blocking Telegram and stepped up restrictions on VPN services. Valery Korovin, a close associate of ultranationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin, attempted to talk Dougan down, writing that it wasn’t worth moving to Russia “just to end up in prison — you could have done that in America We’ll discuss it when we meet.”</p><p>However, Dougan’s standing in the country had clearly deteriorated. Once a fixture on propaganda television, a self-styled “keeper of compromising material on U.S. authorities” and a useful contact for the Kremlin’s security services, he gradually became a largely forgotten — and broke — figure still trying to sell his services to security officials who had grown tired of him.</p><p>In the end, Dougan, who claimed to be fighting corruption in America, moved to Russia to avoid prison, befriended the circle around fascist “philosopher” Alexander Dugin, claimed to be the hacker Guccifer 2.0, was eager to “destroy as many Ukrainians as possible,” became a miniature cryptocurrency exchange for the GRU, and “wove a tapestry of disinformation” — all while receiving virtually no money for it.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">A fake for the U.S. director of national intelligence</h3><p>On the evening of May 19, 2022 — just under three months after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine —  an officer with the GRU’s Unit 29155 wrote to Dougan: “Hi John!!! How are you?” The author of the message, Yuri Khoroshenky (also known as Khoroshevsky), worked under cover as a <a href="https://dipacademy.ru/documents/5756/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BC%D0%B0_%D0%9C%D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B4%D1%8B_%D0%9C%D0%93%D0%9B%D0%A3-_26-28.10.2022.pdf">deputy</a> director at the Dugin-linked Center for Geopolitical Expertise.</p><p>He sent the American two links: one to the channel of Tim Kirby, a host on the nationalist Russian outlet Tsargrad and on state broadcaster RT, and another to Global American Review, a channel with fewer than 1,000 subscribers. “I would like to ask you to post both of them in your telegram channel,” Khoroshenky explained. The stories in question concerned a conspiracy theory that Unit 29155 had been promoting since 2018 — an infamous and long-since debunked story about the purportedly nefarious activities of U.S.-backed scientific laboratories in Ukraine and Georgia. Dougan immediately complied.</p><p>In February 2022, Russian propaganda had revived the false claim that the United States was developing biological weapons in secret laboratories in Ukraine, and on March 6 of that year, Russia’s Defense Ministry <a href="https://www.kp.ru/daily/27373/4555096/">claimed</a> that “pathogens had been destroyed in biological laboratories in Poltava and Kharkiv.” According to ministry spokesperson Igor Konashenkov: “The Pentagon had serious concerns that secret biological experiments being conducted on Ukrainian territory would be exposed. The documents obtained confirm that components of biological weapons were being developed in Ukrainian biological laboratories in close proximity to Russian territory. The claim was repeated across the U.S. far-right media ecosystem, with former Trump advisor Steve Bannon, whose episode about the supposed biolabs was <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/popular-podcasters-spread-russian-disinformation-about-ukraine-biolabs/">downloaded</a> by at least 135 million users on Apple Podcasts alone, figuring prominently among the early adopters. The story, unsurprisingly, spread widely among the <span class="termin" data-description="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">QAnon</span> community.</p><p>Dougan, meanwhile, used his <a href="https://rumble.com/v23ed5f-victoria-nulands-role-in-bloiabs-and-ukrainian-government-overthrow.html?e9s=src_v1_cbl%2Csrc_v1_upp_a">Rumble channel</a> to advertise tours of the supposed biological laboratories, promising to show “the truth the State Department is hiding.” </p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af396e73cf3c1.85124874/UAqG9KofOhMYLhNu1L72b0fXnIBIGqMtAhAhjohf.png" alt="Video previews on John Dougan’s Rumble channel, February 2022"/><figcaption>Video previews on John Dougan’s Rumble channel, February 2022</figcaption></figure><p>Soon thereafter, he became seen as one of the key “sources” for the laboratory claims. In 2021, Dougan had already <a href="https://rumble.com/vyrq6d-american-big-pharma-using-ukrainians-as-lab-rats-what-the-msm-wont-tell-you.html?e9s=src_v1_cbl%2Csrc_v1_upp_a">published</a> his own investigation, which was repeated almost word for word by the Russian Defense Ministry the following March. He then began delivering presentations at Russia’s Public Chamber (a Kremlin-established consultative body) and also joined a Defense Ministry press tour, bringing along his translator, Maria Lelyanova, whom he <a href="https://rumble.com/v23dj7n-i-took-a-liberal-anti-war-protester-to-see-the-truth-in-donbass-and-this-ha.html">introduced</a> as a “fierce liberal, anti-war protester” who had apparently changed her views on the issue after touring the Donbas.</p><p>Dougan’s moment of triumph came in June 2026, when information from his investigation was endorsed by Tulsi Gabbard, who was serving as director of national intelligence in the Trump administration.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af397c3571746.40834023/vZjXKVhGeyiBaSEyiom1zqZLOEZnRBgrxzypb3JS.png" alt="Dougan, using the moniker badvolf, boasts to his FSB handler that his story about Ukrainian biolabs has been “confirmed”"/><figcaption>Dougan, using the moniker badvolf, boasts to his FSB handler that his story about Ukrainian biolabs has been “confirmed”</figcaption></figure><p>On June 30, a few days after Gabbard <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/293795">“declassified”</a> a geographically dubious map of supposed “U.S. biolabs” that placed Crimea and Kyiv next to Odesa, she resigned, <a href="https://x.com/DNIGabbard/status/2057875828810092718">citing</a> her husband’s serious illness as the reason for the career move.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">A cutout for the GRU and an FSB informant</h3><p>Dougan had known his “friend Yuri” — i.e. Khoroshenky — even before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. They appear to have met through the community around the Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE). Valery Korovin, an associate of Russian fascist ideologue Alexander Dugin, became one of John Dougan’s closest contacts in Russia. Beginning in 2021, Khoroshenky began transferring small amounts of money through Dougan, some intended for Dougan himself and some for unidentified third parties, about whom the former American cop asked no questions. In November 2021, for example, Khoroshenky complained that Western Union would not allow him to send $200 to a recipient in Costa Rica. “I can send from my American account. But not western union. I can send to a bank account or bank card,” Dougan replied. In effect, the GRU unit responsible for spreading disinformation and organizing sabotage around the world was using John Dougan as a financial cutout to obscure the source of its payments.</p><p>In March 2022, Khoroshenky coordinated the first trips to the Donbas for Dougan and other foreign journalists who had settled in Russia. It appears that this was when his GRU handlers remembered that Dougan was a former U.S. Marine and had served as a machine gunner. He was assigned to prepare a presentation on how to use the Javelin anti-tank missile system, hundreds of which had been sent from America to Ukraine in the weeks leading up to Russia’s full-scale invasion. “John, we should to create presentation about using US antitank rocket sistems,” Khoroshenky wrote to him March 26. Dougan replied: “I did. It is done. It just needs translation into Russian. I went through the latest 230 page instruction manual pulled out the most important pieces so they can learn quickly. Because we live in a video game era, they will be able to learn how to shoot this weapon within 4 hours.”</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af397b91fd469.55986273/ueB64rE4G7uU2I6gEasjn0V1yUHrru4Dht7bcBYi.png" alt="Dougan poses as a member of the press in occupied Henichesk on March 28, 2022, while saying he wants to kill Ukrainians"/><figcaption>Dougan poses as a member of the press in occupied Henichesk on March 28, 2022, while saying he wants to kill Ukrainians</figcaption></figure><p>Dougan was eager to go to the front and volunteered to teach Russian troops how to use American weapons. But the trip kept being delayed, and Dougan grew impatient. On the afternoon of March 28, he sent the following message to his closest contacts:</p><p>“Guys, I’m leaving tomorrow, with or without your help. I’ll get to Donetsk even if I have to crawl across the border river. And I’m going to take part unless I die. If they won’t take me as a Javelin instructor, I’ll find an AK-74 somewhere and go to the front where I’m needed. I’m not waiting around like a frightened mouse for the conflict to end.”</p><p>When Khoroshenky tried to calm him down, explaining that Dougan needed to be a “cyber soldier,” the American responded: “I need to help fight the Ukrainians. I’ve seen what they did to our beautiful Russian boys, and I want to destroy as many as possible. It’s wrong that I’m in Moscow.”</p><p>Eventually, after several trips to the Donbas with the Russian Defense Ministry’s press service and foreign journalists, Dougan appears to have accepted the role assigned to him: carrying out requests not only for the GRU, but also for the FSB. His messages contain conversations with at least two handlers from the FSB’s Economic Security Service — <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij5WbGFkaXNsYXYgQWxleGFuZHJvdmljaCBZZXZzeXVrb3YsIGJvcm4gb24gSnVuZSAxNiwgMTk5MSAo0JXQstGB0Y7QutC+0LIg0JLQu9Cw0LTQuNGB0LvQsNCyINCQ0LvQtdC60YHQsNC90LTRgNC+0LLQuNGHLCAxNi4wNi4xOTkxKS48L3A+">Vladislav Yevsyukov</span> of Directorate K and <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij5ZZXZnZW55IEFsZXhhbmRyb3ZpY2ggRmlyc292LCBib3JuIG9uIEp1bHkgNCwgMTk4MyAo0KTQuNGA0YHQvtCyINCV0LLQs9C10L3QuNC5INCQ0LvQtdC60YHQsNC90LTRgNC+0LLQuNGHLCAwNC4wNy4xOTgzKS48L3A+">Yevgeny Firsov</span> of Directorate M. Dougan helped FSB officers establish contact with a Swedish source recruited by <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/295621#4">Ben Stimson</a>, a Briton who had likewise fled to Russia. Dougan also made requests of his handlers, asking them to intervene on behalf of a troll factory manager whom Dougan claimed had previously financed his activities.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af38f45b7c357.03519994/71BdOuWFDZlQmHKenhc7nDHuM29MVv36om7McSm5.jpg" alt=""/></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af38f48f0f339.85392618/4MEXwr6jJURv99F385WtUzIGgVIzUp64FXBIEb5g.jpg" alt=""/></figure><h3 class="outline-heading">“The Architect of Deception” and the Storm-1516 campaign</h3><p>In 2018, Dougan <a href="https://www.amazon.com/BadVolf-American-retaliation-politics-political/dp/1721583777">published</a> an autobiography — <i>BadVolf: The true story of an American cop’s retaliation against a corrupt system of justice and politics, forcing him to seek political asylum in Russia </i> — that lays out his version of the events that led him to seek political asylum in Russia. It starts with a chapter called “The Architect of Deception,” where he describes the art of disinformation: </p><blockquote><p>“An authentic-looking news site needs a dose of reality. Truth laced with lies, facts intertwined with fiction. It's essential to mix the real with the fabricated, create a canvas where your cooked-up story can blend in seamlessly. Picture this: you log onto a site with only one news article. Fishy, right? Now, building a collection of genuine news isn't a Herculean task.”</p></blockquote><p>Dougan was not describing the Russian propaganda websites that would later proliferate across the West, but rather his own activities after leaving the U.S. law enforcement community around 2011 and launching the PBSOTalk forum as part of a personal crusade against his former colleagues. “I became the phantom they feared the most. I duped them all, not just the feds but the media, the public, everyone. I cloaked myself in the guise of a Russian hacker and went on a personal crusade against those who had wronged me. Disinformation, <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+PHN0cm9uZz5Eb3hpbmc8L3N0cm9uZz4gKG9yIDxzdHJvbmc+ZG94eGluZzwvc3Ryb25nPikgcmVmZXJzIHRvIHRoZSBjb2xsZWN0aW9uIGFuZCBwdWJsaWMgcmVsZWFzZSBvZiBhIHBlcnNvbuKAmXMgcHJpdmF0ZSBpbmZvcm1hdGlvbiDigJQgc3VjaCBhcyB0aGVpciBhZGRyZXNzLCBwaG9uZSBudW1iZXIgb3IgdGhlIG5hbWVzIG9mIGZhbWlseSBtZW1iZXJzIOKAlCB3aXRob3V0IHRoZWlyIGNvbnNlbnQsIHR5cGljYWxseSB0byBoYXJhc3MsIHByZXNzdXJlIG9yIGludGltaWRhdGUgdGhlbS48L3A+">doxing</span>, hacking, fake news - I engaged in the very activities the government loved to pin on foreign adversaries. I did it all, right here on American soil, a single American citizen challenging the might of a corrupt system,” Dougan wrote after he had already applied for asylum in Russia.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af397adba21b0.64880525/CO2R2nGKGspVbjcCmFx98a5tZC1uG1DmwcNwbwlg.png" alt="Dougan’s book and a photograph of him working on it in 2018"/><figcaption>Dougan’s book and a photograph of him working on it in 2018</figcaption></figure><p>Dougan described in detail how he built websites <span class="termin" data-description="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">filled through RSS feeds</span> that plucked stories from other outlets (RT prominent among them), effectively the same activity he would formally be accused of in 2024. According to <a href="https://open.clemson.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=mfh_ci_reports">researchers</a> at Clemson University, Dougan is behind the infrastructure supporting a network of inauthentic media sites associated with the Storm-1516 campaign, which comprises hundreds of outlets that purport to be based in small U.S. cities or European capitals but are actually populated using artificial intelligence. Researchers say Dougan and several associates operate the network and that its servers are located in a small Moscow apartment.</p><p>Suspicions that Dougan was behind the fake news sites emerged as early as 2024. Researchers at Clemson University, <a href="https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/john-mark-dougan-russian-disinformation-network/">NewsGuard</a>, and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20240514025809/https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2024-0509.pdf">Insikt Group</a> had analyzed collections of domain names, hosting infrastructure, and website trackers, concluding that the networks ultimately led back to Dougan and his personal website, BadVolf.com. But that did not stop him from denying his involvement, even as he shared links to each new Storm-1516 investigation with people close to him, adding only brief comments like “damn” or “fuck them.”</p><p>In 2026, <i>The Insider</i> obtained access to the Storm-1516 control panel (whichDougan called DarkPulsar).</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af397a40f6e70.31076066/P5adonj2WRPl7JQHJ9bEEwIdmLhIcdFFplKYfxmb.png" alt="Control panel for websites in the Storm-1516 network"/><figcaption>Control panel for websites in the Storm-1516 network</figcaption></figure><p>In his book, Dougan effectively provided instructions on how to make a fake news website appear as credible as possible:</p><p>“Propagation of information became my weapon of choice, my way of fighting back against the charlatans who ran the local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.</p><p>My collection of web domains includes DCPost.org, designed to mimic a legitimate news outlet, following the blueprint I'd outlined. With a steady stream of stories from RT news, DCPost teemed with breaking events from around the globe. The site updated automatically, maintaining a credible history that lent authenticity. Amidst this backdrop of reality, I injected tales so outrageous they had to be true. Stories that poked at the seething emotions of the populace, goading them into action. I played the puppeteer, stirring the pot of public unrest.”</p><p><i>The Insider</i> was also able to trace how one of those fabrications was produced.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Pornographic fakes</h3><p>On the morning of Sept. 24, 2024, Dougan wrote to his assistant, Demid Vakhitov: “Hey, question... You have your exchange student paperwork? And, you want to do an interview as a Lithuanian exchange student?” Vakhitov replied that he could find photographs of the papers. “Great, I want to edit it so that it shows a school kid from Lithuania that went to Waltz school,” Dougan added.</p><p>Dougan was referring to Tim Walz, who was running alongside Kamala Harris on the Democratic ticket. In the 2000s, Walz had worked as a high school geography teacher and football coach in Mankato, Minnesota.</p><p>At the same time, Dougan was messaging far-right <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210427150442/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/27/technology/twitch-livestream-extremists.html">conspiracy theorist</a> Zak Paine, known online as Redpill78: “Hey man, you awake? I got contacted by an exchange student who went to Tim Waltz school. [He] says in 2005, kids were praired for exercises but he was an extra, so he had Waltz. Waltz began trying to plant the idea the kid was homosexual in his mind. Kept telling him it was okay to be gay. During the school year, Waltz kept leering at him and suggesting he just open up about being gay.”</p><p>Paine replied — “Wow wtf you can put him in my email I’ll vet him. Should be easy to verify” — and Dougan then began adding pornographic details: “One day in the high school pool, kids were paired up once again. And again he was the extra. He said he never got picked to pair up by other kids because he was kind of an outcast immigrant from Europe that they just didn't accept. Anyway…Waltz had him by the arm and lower back to support him floating. He began moving his hand to his ass to support him. Which, he said wasn't really strange at first, but then Waltz's hand found his way up the leg into his baggy bathing suit and started wiggling a finger into his anus. He said he was really shocked but was kind of in denial, thinking that Waltz didnt realize what his hand was. Because Waltz was looking at him and talking about swimming.” Continuing in the same vein, Dougan concluded: “Dudes a fucking pedo, man. The thing is, lots of kids that are gay, they won't say shit about this kind of thing.” He then promised that the “student” would be willing to speak with Paine and said he would send over the “student’s” documents for verification.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af3972a4e4d28.55744882/ftEqXCAt0bSkjM13EESxJZ3bg3o6apXXvm46ZdhM.png" alt="John Mark Dougan’s messages with Zak Paine"/><figcaption>John Mark Dougan’s messages with Zak Paine</figcaption></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af39733b80201.64833322/ZJLCcv7EY0GhASlfe8cYQm39Kn93GriVL8D2rFTk.png" alt="John Mark Dougan and Demid Vakhitov in Moscow"/><figcaption>John Mark Dougan and Demid Vakhitov in Moscow</figcaption></figure><p>“What a story you created😂😂😂😂,” Vakhitov replied after Dougan forwarded screenshots of the conversation. “Yeah hahaha. Well, shocker, some shit like this happened to me when I was 12. Some swimming coach from France kept trying to finger my ass. I'm just drawing from experience 😂😂,” Dougan responded. (It is worth noting that Dougan drew inspiration not only from memories of his youth but also from pornography websites, where, according to his browser history, he spent much of his day.)</p><p>Not long after their initial online conversation, Dougan embellished the story further for Redpill78, adding that his supposed source was in Kazakhstan. To make it appear more credible, he contacted Daniil Bednov, an acquaintance at the Russian outlet Ukraina.ru, and asked him to alter an American visa in Photoshop so that it appeared to have been issued to “Amir Osipov” for 2004-2005.</p><p>The interview was recorded and published. On Oct. 13, Dougan reported back to his FSB contact Vladislav Yevsyukov: “Great news! The Tim Walz interview, where Demid said he was a foreign exchange student, was picked up by major channels late last night and has now gotten more than a million views with thousands of retweets, reposts and comments! This may be the coup de grâce claim that kills the Harris campaign. Now everyone is talking about it.”</p><h3 class="outline-heading">BadVolf, accused of harassment</h3><p>But how did a former police officer become a “journalist” in the first place? In 1996, Dougan joined the Marine Corps, operating the Dragon anti-tank guided missile system. His duties also included demolitions, where he learned to use different types of explosives and specialized techniques for destroying bridges and buildings. However, he did not complete his four-year enlistment, later claiming on a police job application that he had left because of a broken leg. However, Yvonne Reid-Carlock, then a Marine Corps spokesperson, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/23/dougan-russian-disinformation-harris/">told</a> <i>The Washington Post</i> that Dougan’s service apparently did not meet his commanders’ expectations, leading him to leave before his contract ended.</p><p>From 2003 to 2009, Dougan worked first as a patrol officer and then as a sheriff’s deputy in Palm Beach County, Florida, which at the time was the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070918153741/http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/content/state/funanswers.html">wealthiest</a> county in the state. Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate is located there (Dougan and his sister <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131011210606/http://www.mdintlholdings.com/news">visited</a> it in 2011), as was Jeffrey Epstein’s mansion. In 2009, Dougan abruptly moved north — from Florida to Maine, where he joined the police department in Windham. He lasted less than a year but still managed to rack up seven harassment complaints from colleagues.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af396f5e4e6c7.78040935/jSKscl5YpuXqBwwvkPHiJ5YzGxS1NDGfrJLDs7ZS.png" alt="John Mark Dougan during his years with the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office"/><figcaption>John Mark Dougan during his years with the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office</figcaption></figure><p>After returning to Florida, Dougan ran into further trouble when a court ordered him to pay <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+VGhlIGNvdXJ0IHJ1bGluZyBhbmQgY2FzZSByZWNvcmRzIGFyZSBpbiB0aGUgcG9zc2Vzc2lvbiBvZiA8aT5UaGUgSW5zaWRlcjwvaT4uIEluY2x1ZGluZyBsZWdhbCBjb3N0cywgRG91Z2Fu4oCZcyB0b3RhbCBsaWFiaWxpdHkgaW4gdGhlIGNhc2UgY2FtZSB0byBuZWFybHkgJDUwMCwwMDAuPC9wPg==">$275,000</span> to former police officer Howard Howell. In June 2006, a Palm Beach resident had complained that a neighbor was playing loud music on his property after 11 p.m. One of the guests at the party — a child’s birthday celebration, was fellow sheriff’s deputy Howard Howell. Dougan was a member of one of the two police units that responded, and he began aggressively confronting the property owner as well as Howell. “You need to turn that fucking music off now,” he shouted at Howell. When Howell tried to explain that there was no reason for such conduct, telling Dougan that he was also a police officer, Dougan grabbed pepper spray and discharged the entire canister into Howell’s face before turning and walking away. Dougan later argued in court that he believed Howell had reached for a weapon (although Dougan acknowledged he had not actually seen Howell do so).</p><p>During the trial, it was noted that all the partygoers, including Officer Howell, were Black. Ten years later, after arriving in Russia, Dougan would tell stories about police colleagues who mistreated Black residents in Palm Beach County, saying that this had inspired him to become a fighter against injustice. In his book, however, Dougan emphasized that he was “a man of modest stature, standing at five foot seven”, while Howell “was a hulking figure of over six feet and 240 pounds.”Dougan added that: “This horrifying incident was far from the typical noise complaint we were initially called for, painting a stark image of the level of dysfunction that had seeped into the Sheriff's Office.”</p><p>At the same time, he was facing the threat of another lawsuit — this one seeking $75,000 — from a former colleague in Maine who accused him of harassment. In his book, Dougan writes that the actions of Windham’s police chief cost him his house, though he does not explain in detail how he lost it.</p><p>Those problems clearly angered Dougan, and he <a href="https://eu.palmbeachpost.com/story/news/crime/2012/08/02/despite-criminal-probe-lawsuits-ex/7334009007/">launched a website</a> attacking his former colleague in Windham, posting her photograph with the caption “liar,” as well as another website publishing hostile material about Palm Beach County Sheriff Ric Bradshaw and his deputy. Around the same time, he launched PBSOTalk.com, a <a href="https://vid1.ria.ru/ig/infografika/kafidov/Sputnik/int/truth/page1635986.html">forum</a> where “individuals could leave anonymous tips on law enforcement corruption and misconduct in Florida.”</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Intoxicated by “Russian freedom”</h3><p>Dougan first traveled to Russia in February 2013, supposedly to see a woman he had met on Facebook. “She was no classic beauty, but she had an incisive intellect that sparked my intrigue - the quintessential embodiment of a woman, in my opinion. She enticed me with tales of Moscow's vibrancy and the potential for new business opportunities,” he wrote in his book.</p><p>Strangely enough, one of the first business meetings attended by the former police officer, who spoke no Russian, was with Pavel “Pal Palych” Borodin, who had served as the Kremlin’s “property manager” under Boris Yeltsin, a role that saw him give a job to none other than Vladimir Putin after the former KGB colonel's old boss, St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak, lost his bid for re-election in 1996. In the early 2010s, when Dougan arrived in the Russian capital, Borodin was working as the chair of the ethics committee of the Russian Football Union, later becoming chairman of the board of the Eurasian Economic Space Entrepreneurs’ Union, known as the Business Union of Eurasia. His associate, lobbyist Andrei Chukhlib, was still saved in Dougan’s contacts under the name “Pavel Borodin” as late as 2024.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af394b20de722.58989888/JjGFcYpYkeKdK6fhu0cBqENhSOhzf5aCcPXtixyk.jpg" alt="Dougan meeting Pavel Borodin in Moscow, February 2013"/><figcaption>Dougan meeting Pavel Borodin in Moscow, February 2013</figcaption></figure><p>The American spent a month in Moscow and, after returning home, immediately applied for a three-year visa. “I found a strange affinity for this beautiful chaos. My Russian comrades attributed this connection to my supposed 'Russian soul', and I was inclined to agree. The paradox of disorder and freedom in Russia was intoxicating,” Dougan wrote (before reflecting on how the idea of freedom back home was “fraught with caveats”).</p><p>A woman named Anna Gushchina had <a href="https://www.prlog.org/12114187-mark-dougan-of-md-international-holdings-meets-with-russian-secretary-pavel-borodin.html">attended</a> Dougan’s first meeting with Borodin. It is unclear whether she was the woman who prompted his trip to Russia, but in any event, a year later the two <a href="https://search.sunbiz.org/Inquiry/corporationsearch/SearchResultDetail?inquirytype=EntityName&directionType=Initial&searchNameOrder=LEGALSTORK%20P140000269680&aggregateId=domp-p14000026968-9c5659c2-121b-4779-885c-54889afab577&searchTerm=LEGAL%20STAFFING%20SOLUTIONS%2C%20INC.&listNameOrder=LEGALSTAFFINGSOLUTIONS%20P190000590730">founded</a> LegalStork Inc. in Palm Beach. “At its core, Legalstork offered an innovative search tool to its customers free of charge, allowing process servers to find people based on a variety of criteria sourced from public records. These records were primarily harvested from the Voter Registration databases of several states,” Dougan wrote in his book.</p><p>Dougan claimed that while working on the project, he discovered a bug in voter databases that eventually allowed him to compile a list containing names, addresses, and other personal information belonging to several thousand police officers, prosecutors, judges, and FBI agents. In February, the data were <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160215205320/https://photographyisnotacrime.com/2016/02/15/russian-hackers-post-confidential-property-records-of-more-than-4000-palm-beach-deputies-police-officers-prosecutors-judges-and-fbi-agents/">published</a> on <a href="http://pbsotalk.com">PBSOTalk.com</a>. Dougan says that, by then, he had already sold the site to his “Russian friends.” </p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af3971acd63c8.41947866/EFErZYerf3XAhdR3Nlj5MDfr9TBvKNhzi0fb8aMK.png" alt="Search warrant for Dougan’s home, 2016"/><figcaption>Search warrant for Dougan’s home, 2016</figcaption></figure><p>On March 13, 2016, a source used Tor to <a href="https://archive.is/5H3p8">send</a> Dougan files related to the Democratic National Committee. The two had already agreed that Dougan would launch an anonymous website to publish them. However, on March 14, FBI agents arrived to search Dougan’s home, after which the former police officer packed up a few belongings and headed for the Canadian border, ultimately flying to Moscow via Turkey. Along the way, he met the source, who gave him a flash drive containing a second copy of the files.</p><p>Portraying himself as a persecuted whistleblower, Dougan applied for asylum in Moscow. Within days, he said, he had registered DCLeaks.com — the same website that would later publish intercepted emails and documents belonging to U.S. politicians, military officials, and public figures. U.S. investigators <a href="https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1080281/dl">attributed</a> those hacks to Russian military intelligence officers from the GRU.</p><p>In the summer of 2016, links to DCLeaks.com were promoted by the Guccifer 2.0 account, which would also later be <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/27799">linked</a> to the GRU. Guccifer 2.0 claimed responsibility for attacks on the Democratic Party and said he was Romanian and had no connection to Russia. However, <i>The Insider</i> reported in 2016 that metadata from Guccifer 2.0’s emails indicated he was using a VPN whose interface was available only in Russian. When he was <a href="http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/289296-guccifer-20-used-russian-language-vpns-to-leak-documents">asked</a> to speak Romanian in an online chat, his responses were so awkward that native speakers said Romanian was clearly not his first language and that he was likely relying on an online translator.</p><p>In recent years, Dougan has repeatedly been asked in private conversations whether he knows who was behind Guccifer 2.0. He usually joked about the question or said he had no idea. At times, however, he hinted that he himself was Guccifer 2.0. “I’ve had many names over the years. Even BadVolf started as a Russian persona,” he wrote in a February 2025 exchange with an unfamiliar Reddit user.</p><p><i>The Insider</i>’s editorial team, however, doubts that John Dougan had the technical ability either to hack the Democratic Party’s servers himself, let alone to convincingly impersonate a Russian hacker. In March 2024, after all, Dougan asked the large language model Claude what an API was (in simple terms, it is a way for one computer program to request something from another, such as a weather app asking a server for a forecast). APIs are among the most basic concepts in software development.</p><p>Meanwhile, U.S. investigators concluded that professional hackers working with Russian military intelligence carried out the 2016 breach of Democratic Party systems, while eight years later, Dougan was still asking an AI chatbot what an API was.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">An angry citizen</h3><p>“My work schedule is unbearable. I’m doing the work of an entire technical team and earning less than a Yandex delivery man. I’m tired. Burned out. I don’t think I can keep this up much longer.”</p><p>On Feb. 24, 2026, Dougan and Khoroshenky were not marking the start of the fifth year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Khoroshenky found himself providing emotional support to the “disinformation impresario.” He advised Dougan to write to Valery Korovin, who “will take steps to improve the conditions.” Other messages included, “John, hang in there, brother. Russia really needs you,” and “John, we won’t leave you in trouble 🤝.”</p><p>Several days later, while John Mark Dougan was in the hospital following a scheduled operation, Russia was <a href="http://rbc.ru/technology_and_media/26/02/2026/69a059719a7947a5ece8f4e4">intensifying</a> its internet restrictions. “Whatever these stupid bastards in the Russian government are doing right now to block the internet, if they keep this up, it will shut us off completely. I’m almost ready to call citizens to action to rise up against this extreme censorship. It pisses me off so much. Over the past week, our ability to publish has dropped sharply. I’m going to start a campaign to turn the public against the Nazis running Roskomnadzor. Their policies are getting people killed,” Dougan wrote to Korovin directly from his hospital room. He had not yet heard that responsibility for tightening Russia’s internet restrictions had reportedly <a href="https://thebell.io/teper-oni-vse-reshayut-u-runeta-poyavilsya-novyy-kurator--sluzhba-fsb-otvechavshaya-za-otravlenie-navalnogo">shifted</a> to the FSB. Korovin advised Dougan against making such comments lest he “end up in prison — you could have done that in America.”</p><p>Meanwhile, Korovin was trying to arrange housing for his American friend, who after 10 years of moving between rented apartments was finally set to settle into a one-bedroom unit located about 2 miles from the Moscow Ring Road under a five-year rent-free lease (with an option to extend it).</p><p>Dougan never managed to earn enough to buy the house he wanted — one with a workshop and barbecue area. Instead, he planned to install servers in his new apartment, where he still spends much of his time handling basic technical tasks, including helping users set up VPN apps on their phones.</p><p style="text-align:right;"><i>A German-language version of this article about John Dougan will soon be available on the website of</i> <a href="https://correctiv.org/"><i>CORRECTIV</i></a><i>.</i></p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/281857">Kremlin-backed Matryoshka bots and Prigozhin-linked site target Moldova’s Maia Sandu in major disinfo smear campaign</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/293369">Fake foreigners, fugitive criminals, and Holocaust deniers: Who ended up in Moscow’s “international tribunal on crimes of Ukrainian Nazis”</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/287942">Not-so-useful idiots: How the International Russophile Movement consolidated the Kremlin’s European influence networks</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/291361">“Matryoshka” enters the fray: The Kremlin and the GRU are spreading disinformation in Hungary ahead of its pivotal parliamentary election</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/278159">Kremlin-backed disinformation campaign targets German parliamentary elections via hundreds of fake news sites</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/287767">EU imposes sanctions on hackers featured in The Insider’s investigations, along with figures from the International Russophile Movement</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/295621">A new Comintern: How the Kremlin lures Western “socialists” into the Russian army</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
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      <title><![CDATA[Two Ukrainians who photographed critical infrastructure facilities in Poland detained on suspicion of spying for Russia]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299416</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299416</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Officers of Poland’s Internal Security Agency detained two Ukrainian citizens in the town of Mińsk Mazowiecki on the suspicion that they were working on behalf of Russia to facilitate acts of sabotage. Tomasz Siemoniak, the country’s minister-coordinator of special services, <a href="https://x.com/TomaszSiemoniak/status/2120077546565906609">reported</a> their arrest on X.</p><p>According to Siemoniak, the two detained Ukrainians, aged 24 and 25, had been conducting reconnaissance, photographing Poland’s critical and military infrastructure facilities. In addition to conducting espionage on assignment from Russian security services, they were also charged with setting vehicles on fire. Siemoniak noted:</p><blockquote><p>“Officers from the Internal Security Agency established that they had previously changed the vehicles’ license plates to ones resembling those used on vehicles belonging to the Ukrainian army. This may have been intended to make it harder to establish the true circumstances of the incidents and, above all, to shift suspicion onto the Ukrainian side, which could be used to spread disinformation.”</p></blockquote><p>Siemoniak stressed that the suspects received payment for carrying out the assignments, including in cryptocurrency. Both have been placed in custody for three months.</p><p>Last week, Poland’s Internal Security Agency <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299240">detained</a> a Russian woman and five Polish nationals on suspicion of spying for Russia. According to the agency, members of the group were engaged in the illegal supply of “materials for military purposes” from Poland to Russia. The materials could be used, among other things, to produce ammunition and weapons.</p><p>At the end of October, Polish police also <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298979">detained</a> a 55-year-old Russian citizen, accusing him of spying for foreign intelligence. The man photographed trains and railway infrastructure, and his devices were found to contain photos of various transport facilities in Poland and other countries. As <i>The Insider </i><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299059">found</a>, the detainee turned out to be Moscow native Alexander Mashovets, an amateur photographer who for years has been fond of photographing trains, planes, and other transport, a hobby he began well before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299240">Poland detains six over suspected illegal shipments of weapons components to Russia</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299168">German police arrest Turkish man suspected of organizing arson attack on Starlink station in Poland</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299059">Poland arrests Russian trainspotter on charges of espionage, family says railway photography is his longtime hobby</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298979">Russian citizen detained in Poland on suspicion of spying after photographing trains and rail infrastructure</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298876">Turkey detains 85 gang members linked to Russian-ordered Starlink arson in Poland</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 20:36:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[The fall of Germany’s firewall: Mainstream parties are edging toward cooperation with political extremes]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/opinion/dmitry-stratievsky/299419</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/opinion/dmitry-stratievsky/299419</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dmitri Stratievski]]></dc:creator>
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      <description><![CDATA[<p>Germany’s centrist parties are moving away from the strict isolation of radical factions, a move that is deepening divisions within the Christian Democratic Union and Social Democratic Party. The shift threatens the country’s political stability as the far-right opposition reaches record levels of support nationwide, while the Left Party (Die Linke) wins in Berlin. Germany’s governing coalition is unlikely to risk an early election, but it could effectively split from within.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Until recently, Germany’s party system was widely regarded as one of the most stable and durable among parliamentary democracies. That is changing rapidly.</p><p>The right and left edges of the political spectrum are gaining support, while the position of Germany’s two moderate <i>Volksparteien</i> — the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which have historically competed for support across a broad middle section of society — continues to deteriorate.</p><p>Critically, while the Social Democrats are “opening to the left” by negotiating over a government led by Die Linke, some in the CDU call for their party to  “open to the right” by finding a rapprochement with the Alternative for Germany (AfD). In effect, Germany may be witnessing the end of the <i>Brandmauer</i> — the “firewall,” an informal commitment by mainstream parties not to cooperate with the far right. Such a decision would come at a price.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Disarray</h3><p>Since the spring 2026, the approval ratings of Chancellor Friedrich Merz have <a href="https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2026-09/beliebtheit-friedrich-merz-bevoelkerung-bundeskanzler-vergleich">fallen</a> from around 30% to between 10% and 18%, depending on the <a href="https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1614084/umfrage/bewertung-der-arbeit-von-bundeskanzler-friedrich-merz/">poll</a>.</p><p>Until recently, however, Merz could still play one important political card: resistance to the threat from the AfD. Although he failed to fulfill a longstanding promise to <a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article183831170/CDU-Friedrich-Merz-will-der-AfD-die-Haelfte-ihrer-Waehler-abjagen.html">cut</a> the far-right party’s support in half, he retained strong arguments within the CDU for maintaining the firewall. Those arguments are now weakening.</p><p>All three elections held in September 2026 ended in major defeats for the conservatives. In Saxony-Anhalt, the party won half as many votes as in the previous election, losing nearly two-thirds of its parliamentary seats while being driven from power. For the first time in the party’s history, the CDU failed to enter the state parliament in  Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. In Berlin, it lost half its constituency seats and is almost certain to lose the office of governing mayor.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af3b11db94095.88264006/C5ahQ5EoQqgYoLuKlAWJ0hL8hqenc2iYryShkHHF.jpg" alt="Alternative for Germany (AfD) co-leaders Tino Chrupalla (left) and Alice Weidel (right), alongside the party&#039;s top candidate for the Saxony-Anhalt state election, Ulrich Siegmund (center), during a press conference in Berlin on Sept. 7, 2026"/><figcaption>Alternative for Germany (AfD) co-leaders Tino Chrupalla (left) and Alice Weidel (right), alongside the party&#039;s top candidate for the Saxony-Anhalt state election, Ulrich Siegmund (center), during a press conference in Berlin on Sept. 7, 2026</figcaption></figure><p>That appears to be only the beginning. In the second half of October, nationwide support for the Christian Democrats finally <a href="https://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/landtage/nrw.htm">fell</a> below 20%, and it is also <a href="https://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/landtage/nrw.htm">declining</a> in North Rhine-Westphalia — Germany’s industrial heartland and most populous state — despite the personal popularity of Premier Hendrik Wüst. The pattern resembles Saxony-Anhalt, where Premier Sven Schulze also led personal approval ratings but was unable to overcome the party’s negative national trend. Against that backdrop, next April’s regional vote in North Rhine-Westphalia is already being dubbed a “mini federal election” because of its political significance.</p><p>What has left conservatives at a loss is that none of their strategies to counter the rise of the AfD has worked. Merz tried to project toughness while appropriating elements of the AfD’s agenda. His government introduced controls at Germany’s external borders, tightened migration and welfare laws, and stepped up deportations. The chancellor spoke of a “problem in the appearance of <a href="https://ostwest.tv/news/kancler-merc-schitaet-chto-migranty-v-germanii-portyat-pejzazh/">cities</a>” — a reference to people with immigrant backgrounds — and sought an agreement with the new authorities in Damascus on the return of <a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article69cb547fa986215913bc2234/migrationspolitik-befeuert-massendeportationsfantasien-der-afd-scharfe-kritik-nach-merz-aussage-zu-syrern.html">Syrians</a> living in Germany. At the same time, Merz sharply attacked the far right, at various points calling the AfD a “destructive <a href="https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c75049l2x39o">force</a>” and accusing it of seeking to <a href="https://www.cdu.de/aktuelles/zusammenhalt/merz-keine-gemeinsamkeiten-mit-der-afd/">divide</a> society by discriminating against large groups of people.</p><blockquote>What has left conservatives at a loss is that none of their strategies against the AfD has worked
</blockquote><p>Merz explicitly said that any cooperation with the AfD was <a href="https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/merz-junge-union-deutschlandtag-rentenreform-afd-linke-100.html">incompatible</a> with CDU membership. It did not help. The AfD is not only breaking records in eastern Germany but has crossed the 20% threshold in all key western states — from Lower Saxony and Baden-Württemberg to Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia. In Bavaria, where the conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) has dominated for decades, the AfD gained 4 percentage points in just six months, <a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article6ad61a1cde9d7a845942b8fc/umfrage-afd-gewinnt-in-bayern-hinzu-csu-stabil-mehrheit-fordert-ruecktritt-von-merz.html">reaching</a> 21% in the polls.</p><p>There is bad news on the far left as well. Sahra Wagenknecht’s party — renamed the Alliance for Social Justice and Sensible Economy — had served as a political lifeline for the CDU and SPD. Despite fundamental disagreements over foreign policy, the mainstream parties were willing at the state level to form coalitions with regional branches of Wagenknecht’s alliance that were prepared to govern pragmatically — as happened in Thuringia, where the CDU, SPD, and Wagenknecht’s alliance managed to form a functioning government, and in Brandenburg, where the Social Democrats initially governed with Wagenknecht’s supporters before defectors from the latter’s parliamentary group helped create a new majority that included the conservatives.</p><p>The situation has now changed fundamentally. The rebellious Thuringian members have left the party, while in other states Wagenknecht has reasserted control over local organizations. As a result, the party has gone from being a reluctant ally of the political center to an important supporter of its principal opponent on the far right.</p><p>In Saxony-Anhalt, votes from Wagenknecht’s alliance already helped elect an AfD politician as speaker of a state parliament for the first time, and the first AfD state premier could soon follow. In Brandenburg, the AfD and supporters of Wagenknecht who have reorganized their local structures now hold a <a href="https://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/landtage/brandenburg.htm">majority</a> in opinion polls. Both parliamentary groups have openly <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/regional/brandenburg/rbb-fraktionen-von-bsw-und-afd-im-brandenburger-landtag-offen-fuer-zusammenarbeit-100.html">said</a> they are willing to cooperate, meaning that if the fragile governing coalition collapses and new elections are held, Brandenburg could become another political flashpoint for the federal government to deal with.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">A precedent on the left</h3><p>Another taboo is now being challenged in the German capital. Die Linke won Berlin’s local election and is seeking to lead the state government, seeking potential partners among the Greens and the Social Democrats. The parties have held preliminary talks, adopted a joint statement setting out priorities for a possible coalition, and their leadership bodies have voted to begin formal final negotiations.</p><p>Cooperation between the SPD, the Greens, and Die Linke is not in itself new. Die Linke has already served in governments in five states, including Berlin and even the western city-state of Bremen, and some of its politicians have long been considered acceptable partners even in conservative circles.</p><p>Two factors fundamentally change the situation, however. First, regional branches of Die Linke differ sharply. In addition to moderate organizations that support an agenda resembling social democracy, there are also much more radical regional groups.</p><p>The Berlin branch is widely regarded as the party’s most radical. It has been accused of supporting left-wing extremism and anti-Israel Palestinian movements, and also of antisemitism and having ties to organized crime. In 2024, almost all of the party’s prominent Berlin politicians quit the party, accusing their colleagues of antisemitism rooted in anti-Zionism.</p><p>During the 2026 campaign, the party called for nationalizing housing owned by large private landlords, abolishing the German state’s domestic intelligence service, and imposing sweeping reforms in the spheres of law enforcement and education.</p><p>Second, Berlin Die Linke leader Elif Eralp is not seeking merely a ministerial post. She wants to become governing mayor of the German capital. </p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af3b1a1b1ffc5.03081474/N0mwad1YNM4j2ZqmCYhcVUfDIBwohhfi5nEQidBk.jpg" alt="Steffen Krach of the SPD, Elif Eralp of Die Linke, and Werner Graf of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen during coalition talks in October 2026 following Berlin&#039;s state elections"/><figcaption>Steffen Krach of the SPD, Elif Eralp of Die Linke, and Werner Graf of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen during coalition talks in October 2026 following Berlin&#039;s state elections</figcaption></figure><p>Merz <a href="https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/article/hoert-auf-damit-merz-will-linke-regierung-in-berlin-in-letzter-minute-stoppen-10504483">demanded</a> that the talks stop, <a href="https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/politik/rot-gruen-rot-in-berlin-rueckt-naeher-kritik-der-cdu/">saying</a>: “Anyone who wants to strengthen the political center cannot negotiate with left-wing radicals. We oppose anyone who questions Israel’s right to exist. Stop going down this path!”</p><p>The CDU’s youth organization <a href="https://www.zeit.de/news/2026-10/18/junge-union-fordert-aechtung-von-rot-gruen-rot-in-berlin">called</a> for the SPD and the Greens to face “public condemnation” over what it called a “breach of political tradition,” proposing that Berlin be cut off from national security information-sharing systems if Die Linke came to power.</p><p>Alexander Throm, the CDU/CSU parliamentary group’s domestic affairs spokesman in the Bundestag, <a href="https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/vollig-irrationaler-hysteriemodus-spd-politiker-bovenschulte-kritisiert-union-fur-gleichsetzung-von-linkspartei-und-afdd-16178269.html">made</a> the same proposal, saying the response should be “just as with the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt.” Berlin CDU leader Stefan Evers spoke of a <a href="https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/politik/rot-gruen-rot-in-berlin-rueckt-naeher-kritik-der-cdu/">“capitulation”</a> by the Greens and SPD. The premiers of Hesse and Bavaria, Boris Rhein and Markus Söder, proposed cutting funding to Berlin — Germany’s most heavily subsidized state — through the fiscal equalization system under which wealthier states support poorer ones. Rhein, normally regarded as a moderate, <a href="https://www.bz-berlin.de/berlin/boris-rhein-geldstopp-fuer-berlin-bei-linker-regierung-6ad60f7451e5094f7a571caf">did not hold back</a>, calling the SPD and Greens “former center-left parties” and accusing them of trying to stay in power at any cost. Notably, those remarks were directed at the CDU’s own federal coalition partners.</p><p>There is another dimension to the dispute. The Christian Democrats maintain the same prohibition on cooperation with Die Linke — which they view as a radical-left successor to the Socialist Unity Party, the ruling party of communist East Germany — as they do with the far right. Until now, the CDU generally did not try to impose that rule on other parties. But the prospect of two states moving toward more radical governments (and of gaining representation in the Bundesrat, Germany’s upper house representing the states), has enraged conservatives.</p><p>Some have drawn a conclusion: If the SPD is “allowed” to do it, why should the CDU not be? The CDU leadership in Berlin’s Reinickendorf district <a href="https://taz.de/Keine-Brandmauer-zur-AfD/!6221321/">decided</a> to “open itself to all parties,” including the AfD. Despite the possibility of forming a district majority with center-left parties, local conservatives chose cooperation with the far right. They appear to be counting on AfD votes to elect their candidate to the post of district mayor.</p><p>Mario Czaja, a former general secretary of the Berlin CDU and the head of its organization in the Marzahn district, <a href="https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/cdu-politiker-mario-czaja-will-gespraeche-mit-der-afd-harte-vorwuerfe-gegen-bundeskanzler-merz_047a3e3c-0bc9-49a1-a832-299bb2d50375.html">said</a> coalition talks with the AfD had begun, using the occasion to criticize Merz’s policies. In Saxony-Anhalt, CDU lawmakers are <a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/plus6acf922585ec8093bcfbe2f1/union-und-afd-die-brandmauer-ist-gescheitert-sagt-dieser-cdu-abgeordnete-in-sachsen-anhalt.html">saying</a> openly: “The firewall has failed!”</p><p>Similar statements are now coming from senior figures who until recently rejected any proposal to treat the AfD as a normal party. Rhein, who heads both the Hesse state government and the CDU organization there <a href="https://www.hessenschau.de/politik/afd-kritisiert-rhein-in-brandmauer-debatte-scharf-verhoehnung-der-waehler-v1,reaktionen-rhein-brandmauer-afd-100.html">suggested</a> abandoning the term “firewall,” calling it “un-Christian Democratic.” He also said lawmakers should stop blocking AfD candidates from leadership posts on Bundestag committees and commissions, justifying the call by reasoning that they had been elected and parliamentary tradition should be respected.</p><p>Manfred Weber, deputy leader of the CSU and president of the European People’s Party, <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/cdu-afd-brandmauer-klausur-100.html">declared</a> bluntly: “The firewall in the sense of ‘us or them’ must become a thing of the past.” His argument is that by entering endless coalitions with parties to its left, Christian democracy is losing its identity due to a compromise with the left that has not even stopped the party from losing support.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Fragmentation</h3><p>Weber’s words reflect the antagonism inside the CDU. A dispute over the party’s fundamental direction — and fears among some members that it is losing its identity — is creating tension, provoking conflict, and, in some cases, already producing a loss of control. The election of the speaker of Saxony-Anhalt’s state parliament demonstrated that clearly.</p><p>In principle, the combined votes of the AfD and Wagenknecht’s party would have been enough to elect the far-right candidate. But Tobias Rausch received four additional votes that could only have come from members of parties closer to the political center — almost certainly from CDU politicians, despite oral and written assurances from every member of its parliamentary group that they would abstain.</p><p>Simple arithmetic suggests that some CDU lawmakers decided to support the AfD after all, betting on the “new force.” Others voted against the candidate because they viewed neutrality as too weak a response to the far right.</p><p>A German newspaper surveyed conservative lawmakers about how they voted. Eight said they had <a href="https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Berichte-widerlegen-Aussagen-von-CDU-Abgeordneten-in-Sachsen-Anhalt-id31401974.html">abstained</a> as agreed. But only five abstentions were recorded in the chamber. That means at least three of those questioned gave inaccurate accounts.</p><p>Meanwhile, the SPD candidate for deputy speaker failed to secure enough votes, even though unified conservative support should have guaranteed his election. Concluding that it had completely lost control, the CDU parliamentary group <a href="https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/sachsen-anhalt/landtagswahl/cdu-fraktion-afd-beschluss-plenarsaal,landtag-wahl-ministerpraesident-cdu-100.html">decided</a> that it would simply leave the chamber during a future vote for the state’s new premier.</p><p>Similar developments emerged in Baden-Württemberg. The state election there was held back in March, but lawmakers are still filling various parliamentary positions and seats on supervisory boards of public institutions.</p><p>In mid-October, AfD candidates, breaking with years of firewall practice, <a href="https://www.kontextwochenzeitung.de/politik/811/tatsaechlich-ein-trauerspiel-11164.html">received</a> noticeably more votes than the total number of AfD lawmakers — and Wagenknecht’s party has no representatives in the four-party state parliament.</p><p>Personnel votes in German state parliaments are conducted by secret ballot. It is therefore formally impossible to establish how any individual lawmaker voted. But there is little doubt about which parliamentary group the defecting votes came from. Statements by CDU politicians themselves <a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/plus6acf922585ec8093bcfbe2f1/union-und-afd-die-brandmauer-ist-gescheitert-sagt-dieser-cdu-abgeordnete-in-sachsen-anhalt.html">show</a> that the situation is changing fundamentally and that a serious desire to break down the wall separating the CDU from the AfD is growing inside the party. Merz’s claim that the vote was a <a href="https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/sachsen-anhalt/landtagswahl/landtagspraesident-abweichler-debatte,cdu-wahl-rausch-100.html">provocation</a> by the conservatives’ opponents, as well as <a href="https://dserver.bundestag.de/btp/21/21100.pdf">claims</a> from his close Bundestag allies about “false assertions” and “unsubstantiated accusations,” sound unconvincing (to put it mildly).</p><blockquote>Statements from CDU politicians show that a serious desire is growing within the party to tear down the wall separating it from the AfD</blockquote><p>The Social Democrats are also going through a severe internal conflict. Disagreements are spilling out of party offices into public view. After Stefan Krach, leader of Berlin’s SPD, gave the green light for final coalition negotiations with Die Linke, opposition came both from district <a href="https://www.n-tv.de/politik/PD-in-Berlin-Reinickendorf-lehnt-Koalition-mit-Linken-ab-id31412032.html">party organizations</a> and from Krach’s own local <a href="https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/nicht-zu-einer-kaderpartei-werden-ortsverein-von-berlins-spd-chef-krach-gegen-koalition-mit-der-linken-16175794.html">branch</a>.</p><p>Breaking with unwritten convention, federal politicians also intervened. Matthias Miersch, leader of the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag, <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/berlin-spd-linke-gruene-100.html">expressed</a> “very serious doubts.” Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who has for years been Germany’s most popular <a href="https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/liveblog/antizionismus-als-erfolgsrezept-volker-beck-kritisiert-grune-und-spd-fur-sondierungsgesprache-mit-der-linken-16053722.html">politician</a>, <a href="https://www.rnd.de/politik/berlin-21-spd-bundestagsabgeordnete-gegen-koalition-mit-der-linken-SHBHIJS3FZCEVHWZRYEHQH7U7U.html">came out</a> openly against the coalition — as did 21 SPD lawmakers, who signed a joint letter titled “Our values have never been negotiable.”</p><p>In response, another group of lawmakers representing Berlin just as forcefully backed an alliance with Die Linke <a href="https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/berlin-spd-und-gruene-stimmen-fuer-verhandlungen-ueber-koalition-mit-der-linken/100263173.html">expressing</a> “incomprehension” at their colleagues’ statements. No planned state government involving the Social Democrats has provoked this level of emotion.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Future threats</h3><p>Germany’s political crisis is not simply deepening; it is taking on different and potentially more dangerous characteristics. Until recently, the mainstream parties shared a consensus: no cooperation with the AfD. Coalitions cobbled together on the principle “everyone against the far right” were treated with skepticism but were nevertheless broadly accepted as a workable model.</p><p>The assumption was that the AfD did not have enough electoral support to win an absolute majority. It was therefore unpleasant when the far-right party garnered notable support in elections, but those outcomes were still not politically decisive. Even as a large opposition force, it still had little hope of attaining executive executive power or even leadership positions on parliamentary committees. That old reality has already changed.</p><p>The chancellor is effectively caught in a vise between the right and the left. His party is losing its leading position in public opinion, and acceptable results are no longer guaranteed even in western Germany.</p><p>Some in Merz’s circle believe endless governments with center-left parties have significantly eroded the foundations of Christian democracy itself. They blame the chancellor for failing to deliver on his own promises — instead of a conservative shift to the right, they say, he has produced “Merkel 2.0.”</p><p>The mainstream conservative party’s more right-wing faction sees the emerging Berlin coalition as a fundamentally new precedent, one that justifies cooperation with the AfD in order to prevent any chance of a “communist comeback.” To them, that appears a greater threat than a far right that may be distasteful but, in their view, “perhaps not so frightening after all.”</p><p>Moderates, meanwhile, see no effective formula for resisting the AfD. In practice, the only thing protecting Merz is that no one has yet emerged who clearly wants to replace him.</p><p>The SPD faces an equally serious question over its direction. The Social Democrats are not merely losing popularity; they are suffering so many defeats that journalists have largely stopped describing each result as an “all-time low” or a “historic record.” The AfD is attracting support from former SPD voters who no longer see Germany’s oldest political party as representing their interests.</p><p>Some party officials and rank-and-file members are comfortable cooperating with the CDU — not an ideal arrangement, but a well-tested one. Others believe the party is moving in the wrong direction and that its only chance of survival is a sharp turn left and a future federal alliance with Die Linke with a Berlin government serving as the pilot project. They are prepared to “look past” certain problems with their partners because they see no other option.</p><p>Tensions within the coalition are continuing to rise. In the CDU, an alliance between center-left parties and Berlin’s radical left is viewed as a “betrayal of democracy,” while concessions to the Social Democrats are seen as excessive. In the SPD, there is deep dissatisfaction with the government’s latest reforms, which many Social Democrats regard as antisocial and inconsistent with the party’s ideology and core principles.</p><p>Still, even as coalition partners openly accuse each other of breaching political firewalls, the governing alliance is unlikely to collapse early. What holds it together is the determination to avoid a snap election at almost any cost given the fact that there is little doubt the AfD would finish first. Combined support for the CDU/CSU and SPD is barely above 30%, meaning any new governing majority would have to include the Greens (making the arrangement even more complicated). And even that broad coalition might fail to secure enough votes.</p><p>A hypothetical alliance of the SPD, the Greens, and Die Linke clearly lacks a majority, and it would in any case be unlikely to win full support from centrists. The current “marriage of convenience” between the CDU and SPD is therefore likely to continue.</p><blockquote>Combined support for the CDU/CSU and SPD is barely above 30%</blockquote><p>The “dissidents” will remain, however, and a coalition with a safety margin of only 12 votes is likely to struggle to muster support for unpopular legislation. In a worst-case scenario, if the government becomes deadlocked and Merz’s opponents gain the upper hand inside the conservative bloc, there could be a temptation to seek AfD votes for individual initiatives — without formally institutionalizing cooperation or coordinating votes as a bloc.</p><p>Formally, that would not mean the end of the government or new elections, but rather a “free search for majorities.” A coalition in Germany is not legally binding; it is primarily a practical instrument for governing. As such, seeking votes from the AfD on certain initiatives would amount to a test of whether the Social Democrats would really risk leaving the government and triggering elections over their partners’ limited cooperation with the far right.</p><p>Still, for Merz and his CDU to take such a step would be a political gamble — one that risks AfD’s gradual entry into positions of real power and influence in Berlin itself. Such a scenario can no longer be ruled out.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/dmitry-stratievsky/295699">No other alternative: Germany’s AfD is moving from the extremist fringe into the political establishment</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/dmitry-stratievsky/297870">Merz in the middle: Why Germany is on the brink of a political earthquake</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/dmitry-stratievsky/296486">A stab in the back: Why an AfD victory in Saxony could pose a national security threat to Germany</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 18:10:30 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russia-installed authorities plan demolition and redevelopment of Azovstal steel plant in occupied Mariupol]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299389</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299389</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299389/LrI3o3ADlK5VV1FqGf8QCNhWgU2t4bfsnxERklQf.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Denis Pushilin, the Russian-installed head of the Donetsk “People’s Republic” has signed an order creating a working group to coordinate the demolition and redevelopment of the Azovstal steel plant in Russian-occupied Mariupol. According to the document, which has been reviewed by <i>The Insider</i>, the group is intended to address issues “related to the implementation of investment and other projects” at the plant, which was largely destroyed during Russia’s assault on the city in the spring of 2022.</p><p>Pushilin’s order is dated Nov. 3. The group’s tasks include:</p><ul><li>preparing proposals to address problems related to development of the former Azovstal steel plant site;</li><li>coordinating cooperation between the regional administration and investors, utility providers, and other relevant figures;</li><li>organizing inspections of buildings, structures, and infrastructure at the plant and assessing their technical condition;</li><li>determining which buildings should be demolished and which should be preserved and restored.</li></ul><p>Before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Azovstal was one of Europe’s largest steel plants, employing thousands of people in the Ukrainian city of Mariupol. Built in the Soviet era, the plant included an extensive network of underground tunnels and shelters.</p><p>After Russian forces encircled Mariupol in early March 2022, Azovstal became the last major defensive stronghold held by Ukrainian troops in the city, simultaneously serving as a shelter for countless civilians. Russian forces besieged the site for around two months, subjecting it to sustained shelling and airstrikes that left the plant almost completely destroyed before the remaining Ukrainian defenders were <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2025/05/21/surviving-azovstal-ukrainian-soldiers-recall-mariupol-siege-three-years-on">ordered</a> to surrender in mid-May. The battle rendered Azovstal one of the most recognizable symbols of Ukrainian resistance during the early months of the invasion — and of the destructive force of the Russian invasion.</p><p>Between May 16 and 20, 2022, around 2,500 Ukrainian defenders left Azovstal and entered Russian captivity after being ordered to end their defense of the plant. Many were initially taken to a prison colony in Russian-occupied Olenivka, while seriously wounded troops were sent to a hospital in Novoazovsk. <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/exchanged-ukraine-pows-recount-stories-families-fight-more-releases-1765509" target="_blank">Former prisoners</a> and international rights monitors have documented torture and other abuse in Russian detention, including beatings, coercion, inadequate medical care, and forced confessions. Many Azovstal defenders have since returned to Ukraine in prisoner exchanges, while others remain in Russian custody.</p><p>After Russian forces captured the city, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin <a href="https://t.me/rbc_news/52127">announced</a> that Azovstal would be turned into a recreational area or an industrial park.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/254725">“The core of Azovstal&#039;s defenders were superheroes”: Confessions of Ukrainian POWs who made it back home</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/282074">Ghost of a city: The true story of life in Mariupol three years after occupation</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/293638">Released defenders of Mariupol report on torture and deaths of Ukrainian POWs at detention facility in Russia’s Kamyshin</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/289677">Schoolchildren in occupied Mariupol undergo symbolic induction ceremony into Russia’s National Guard </a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/270824">“Dying isn’t as bad as being a Russian POW”: Freed Ukrainian soldiers speak out about their time in Russian captivity</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/255306">Russia exchanges captive Azovstal defenders for Putin&#039;s pal Medvedchuk</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 11:41:09 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Making America democratic again: How Trump&#039;s poor performance led to a rout of his Republican party]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/politics/299356</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/politics/299356</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex  Kreyn]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299356/byXi7Nf7Z5hKSazgtvgylqiaA51m5OELmQT8u2xh.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>“We're going to ask you to pretend I'm on the ballot,” <a href="https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-tele-rally-south-carolina-gop-candidates-november-2-2026/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">Donald Trump urged</a> his supporters on the eve of America's midterm elections. The result was a crushing defeat for Republicans. Vice President JD Vance blamed the outcome largely on the war in Iran, stressing that he had opposed it from the outset. Yet polls showed that voters were most concerned about corruption (especially on the question of his son-in-law Jared Kushner) and rising prices driven by tariffs and crackdown on migrants.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3 class="outline-heading">The triumph of DEI</h3><p>After returning to the Oval Office just under two years ago, Donald Trump declared a war on DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) programs — meaning it is only fitting that in the mid-term elections, the victorious Democratic candidates included: Michigan's Abdul El-Sayed, who became the first Muslim senator in U.S. history; New Hampshire's Chris Pappas, who became the first openly gay man elected to the U.S. Senate; Peggy Flanagan, who became the first Native American Senator from Minnesota; and Keisha Lance Bottoms, who became the first African American woman to serve as a state's governor (in Georgia of all places).</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af1c98d5a3ee3.19896562/gPf8yZMjpIgodtG4pWJ5UzRG4Y6qM4iKprmARUVO.jpg" alt="Abdul El-Sayed, the first Muslim senator in US history"/><figcaption>Abdul El-Sayed, the first Muslim senator in US history</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://apnews.com/article/midterm-election-native-american-black-governor-senator-women-93d4d163acfd217521b5dce1ab7fc4a9?utm_source=chatgpt.com">At least 100</a> Democratic women won seats in the House of Representatives while spanning a broad ideological spectrum — from socialists to centrists and included candidates with some unusual life stories. In Kansas, for example, pastor Adam Hamilton won a Senate seat for the Democrats. </p><h3 class="outline-heading">Democrats win in a landslide</h3><p>The scale of the Democratic victory is striking, with many observers calling it the party's biggest win in half a century. Democrats secured at least <a href="https://www.cnn.com/politics/house-races-midterms-votes-vis">256 of the 435 seats</a> in the House of Representatives, with votes still being counted in dozens of districts.</p><p>In the Senate, Democrats needed to flip at least four Republican-held seats — they got seven (and possibly counting), with the Mississippi and Alaska Senate races that are still "too close to call" both tilting Democrat. At least six states elected Democratic senators for the first time in decades.</p><p>The geographical reach of the Democratic gains was equally impressive. They made inroads deep into territory long considered safely Republican, winning Senate races in Texas, Kansas, and South Carolina, and thus making its still very impressive wins in recently red Iowa, Maine, North Carolina, and Ohio feel routine by comparison. According to <i>Reuters</i>, the Republican share of the vote declined compared with 2024 in all but <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/seven-numbers-that-explain-democrats-us-midterm-rout-2026-11-04/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">1% of approximately 2,200 US electoral districts</a>.</p><blockquote>The geographical reach of the Democratic gains was equally impressive. They made inroads deep into territory long considered safely Republican</blockquote><p>Americans traditionally vote against the president's party in midterm elections, but this election was a powerful backlash against Trump's behavior and his policies alike, even if it is sometimes difficult to separate the two. For example, the list of voters' grievances against him included: shutting down government agencies, conducting mass raids against undocumented migrants, waging a seemingly pointless war in Iran, and driving up gas prices.</p><p>Shortly before the election, 70% of respondents in an Associated Press poll <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/11/04/trump-2026-midterms-voters-young-voters-hispanic-voters-democrats-congress/2ff6bd8c-d841-11f1-930a-e08f8086f5ac_story.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com">said</a> that Congress was not doing enough to rein in Trump — gaining the agreement of 40% of Republicans. In short, the result should be seen less as enthusiasm for the Democrats and more as a repudiation of Trump. In the same AP poll, only around half of respondents viewed the the Democrats favorably, while 20% of Democrats themselves had an unfavorable opinion of their own party.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Why the Republicans lost</h3><p>Immediately after the election, JD Vance blamed the Republicans' defeat on the war with Iran, and according to an AP poll, 34% of voters did indeed <a href="https://abcnews.com/Politics/vance-blames-iran-war-republicans-midterms-defeat-trump/story?id=137849295&utm_source=chatgpt.com">say</a> that the war was among the key factors influencing  their vote. However, 49% cited the cost of living, and 55% named government corruption. </p><p>Even more revealing were voters' answers when asked about the biggest problem facing the United States: around 40% said the economy, roughly 30% expressed concern about the state of American democracy, and immigration and health care each gained around 10% each.  Although the war with Iran was a concern, it was not the main issue that brought down the Republicans. </p><p>According to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/11/04/see-where-voters-shifted-toward-democrats?utm_source=chatgpt.com">an analysis</a> by <i>The Washington Post</i>, voting preferences shifted sharply toward the Democrats across a wide range of demographic groups. The shift amounted to 28 percentage points in districts with a Hispanic majority and 21 points in poorer districts with younger populations. Even in rural areas, the GOP lost 15 points from its showing in 2024. A <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/11/03/us/elections/results-house.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com#mapType=shiftMap"><i>New York Times</i> infographic</a> shows that voting preferences shifted almost everywhere.</p><p>The <i>Washington Post </i>analysis also provides a breakdown of the shifts among individual voter groups. Among white men, Trump won 55% of the vote in 2024 but received only 43% this year, while Democratic support among women rose from 52% to 56%. </p><p>In addition, more than 60% of Hispanic voters backed the Democrats, a 28-point swing compared with 2024. The age breakdown was equally striking: two-thirds of voters under 24 supported the Democrats, while those aged 25–29 gave them around 60% of the vote, with similar results among older age groups. Even retirees voted Democratic by a six-point margin. Republicans failed to win a single age group, including the traditionally pro-Trump category of voters without college degrees — Trump had won this group by 12 points in 2024; this time, the Democrats were ahead by two.</p><p>The shift was also striking among independent voters. The Democrats <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/11/04/ten-key-factors-behind-americans-midterm-votes/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">won</a> this group by a margin of more than 20 points — in Kansas, nearly 70% of independent voters backed Democrat Adam Hamilton, and in Texas, two-thirds supported James Talarico. </p><blockquote>A New York Times infographic shows that voting preferences shifted almost everywhere</blockquote><h3 class="outline-heading">The fall of Republican strongholds</h3><p>Many Democratic victories came as a surprise, apparently even to the candidates themselves. Kansas elected its first Democratic Senator since 1932. Texas had not elected a Democrat in a general election since the late 1980s. Yet Talarico easily defeated state Attorney General Ken Paxton, even despite the Republican spending many times more on his campaign. Billionaire Elon Musk alone (who relocated to Texas from California) donated as much as $190 million to Paxton — this out of the approximately $400 he apparently spent on the campaign.</p><p>Trump backed Paxton, effectively sidelining incumbent Senator John Cornyn. The president justified his decision by pointing to Paxton's strong personal loyalty to him. The result was a crushing defeat for the Republicans.</p><p>Even more shocking to observers was Gina Hinojosa's victory in the Texas gubernatorial race. She denied Greg Abbott, one of the country's most powerful Republicans, a fourth term as governor.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af1ca4d037b22.60843899/FiBQdUz7ihVHWX7HLzJ39RlvuwgZZihNT2hVs7Xq.jpg" alt="Gina Hinojosa and James Talarico, the Democrats who won the Texas gubernatorial and Senate races"/><figcaption>Gina Hinojosa and James Talarico, the Democrats who won the Texas gubernatorial and Senate races</figcaption></figure><p>Across the country, Republicans fielded candidates personally endorsed by Trump who lost traditionally Republican seats. In South Carolina, for example, political newcomer Darlene Graham lost the Senate seat that her brother, Lindsey, who died earlier this year, had held for a quarter century. During a debate, she <a href="https://apnews.com/article/darline-graham-taiwan-debate-national-security-5b045abd68cc4aa350177b5d1c6ee650?utm_source=chatgpt.com">admitted</a> that she knew little about national security. Voters may also have been put off by such an obvious, heavy-handed attempt to impose a candidate on them.</p><p>However, publicly distancing themselves from Trump did not guarantee Republicans victory either. Susan Collins lost her Senate seat in Maine to Democrat Troy Jackson. He stepped in after primary winner Graham Platner withdrew amid allegations of sexual harassment. Collins had served in the Senate since 1997.</p><p>Another example of changing voter sentiment was the comeback of Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown, who lost his seat in 2024 but has now made his triumphant return by defeating incumbent John Husted (who replaced JD Vance in 2025) by five points. </p><h3 class="outline-heading">Conceding defeat</h3><p>The main question on election night was how Trump would react. After all, when he lost the presidential election in 2020, he declared it “stolen” and (at the very least) did nothing to stop his supporters from trying to storm the Capitol and prevent Congress from certifying the results.</p><p>Before this year's election, too, both Trump and many of his supporters had made clear that they would vigorously challenge any results they found unacceptable. Federal authorities had been putting relentless pressure on state officials, who are responsible for administering elections, demanding that they carry out compulsory audits of voter rolls. </p><p>Nevertheless, this year Trump spent much of election night posting on Truth Social, claiming that Republicans were losing simply because his own name was not on the ballot. He also lashed out at Fox News, accusing the network of turning against him, and even <a href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117556320287218255?utm_source=chatgpt.com">promised</a> to become a political commentator and reveal the inside story of the election.</p><p>When it became clear that the Democrats had won both chambers of Congress, Trump posted a photo of a baseball cap bearing the word “VETO.”  Yet when the <i>New York Times</i> reached Trump by phone, he said he was “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/03/us/politics/trump-midterm-election-results.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com">absolutely willing</a>” to accept the results and hoped to work with the Democrats.</p><p>In recent days, Trump has been criticized for becoming increasingly detached from reality. His final <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/nov/02/trump-reflecting-pool-renovation-midterms?utm_source=chatgpt.com">campaign speech</a> before the election was devoted to his favorite project — renovating the Reflecting Pool on the National Mall . He was no less distracted on election night, giving journalists a brief tour of the construction site for the new White House ballroom. He talked <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/04/us/trump-midterms-ballroom.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com">about </a>everything from the new marble floors to the helipad, but not about his party's defeat.</p><blockquote>Republicans accuse Trump of losing touch with reality</blockquote><p>The biggest story of the election is not so much that Trump's party suffered a comprehensive defeat as that Trump himself has so far made no attempt to challenge the results (except perhaps in Alaska). As Trump enters his final two years in the White House, his party will have to reinvent itself if it is to hold on to the presidncy after the 2028 election. </p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/293567">The loyalty test: Trump’s purge of moderate Republicans is an electoral gift to the Democrats</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/296614">The lame duck’s swan song: Why Trump’s final two years in office could be his most chaotic period yet</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/299039">A gift to Democrats: Trump’s unpopularity looks set to hand his opponents majorities in both chambers of Congress</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 08:42:54 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Brother of former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán detained in human trafficking investigation]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299368</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299368</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Áron Orbán, the brother of former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has been detained as part of an investigation into human trafficking, current Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar <a href="https://www.facebook.com/peter.magyar.102/posts/pfbid0QP4CvEL1ZPnmcuowxUzkvU4ytrVBWff7xtbzfBynra7e8HyWwPrHqDW9HuG8wEFol">announced</a> on Facebook earlier today. The investigation is being conducted by Hungary’s National Asset Recovery Office (NVVH) and the National Bureau of Investigation (KR NNI).</p><p>Viktor Orbán <a href="https://x.com/PM_ViktorOrban/status/2119740115505311967">confirmed</a> his brother’s detention on X.</p><blockquote><p>“What is happening in Hungary is not accountability. It is a political witch hunt. Whenever the government finds itself in an embarrassing situation, it resorts to the tactics of the communist-era secret police. The aim of this dirty political game is to eliminate opponents and establish a one-party state. I am the real target. My younger brother is simply being used to get to me,” he wrote.</p></blockquote><p>Hungarian news outlet <i>Telex </i>previously <a href="https://telex.hu/belfold/2026/11/09/orban-aronhoz-kotheto-ingatlanhoz-vonult-ki-hetfo-reggel-a-tek">reported</a> that a building linked to Áron Orbán’s company was searched on the morning of Nov. 9. Hungarian police <a href="https://www.police.hu/hu/hirek-es-informaciok/legfrissebb-hireink/bunugyek/az-nni-es-az-nvvh-kozos-akcioban">said</a> that searches and arrests had been carried out at several addresses in Budapest and Pest County as part of a human trafficking investigation. The KR NNI is part of the Hungarian police. Authorities did not publicly name those who had been detained.</p><p>According to <i>Telex</i>, an alleged associate of Áron Orbán’s was arrested after the April elections that saw Viktor Orbán and his party lose power, but was recently released. The outlet also found that investigators had questioned a Budapest-based Vietnamese interpreter who had accompanied the younger Orbán to a business meeting. <i>Telex </i>reported that those involved had ties to a business centered on selling visas.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299177">Hungary to give up Russian gas by fall 2027 after years of Orbán government’s reliance on Moscow, foreign minister says</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/291223">“A medal for the city of Budapest”: Who at the Russian Embassy in Hungary is helping “Kremlin ally” Viktor Orbán in the upcoming elections?</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/290911">Kremlin hotline: Hungary colluded with Russia to delist sanctioned oligarchs, companies and banks</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/291172">“I delivered bags of money from Mogilevich to the police chief, and more for Orbán&quot;: Former Budapest gang member László Kovács tells all</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/291299">Gas, nuclear power, and organized crime: How Viktor Orbán went from a critic of Russia to a champion of the Kremlin’s interests</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 19:52:23 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Remains of six sailors found aboard tanker that was struck by Russian drones off the coast of Romania in mid-October]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299367</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299367</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Human remains believed to belong to six sailors have been found aboard the <i>Wine Trader</i> tanker (<span class="termin" data-description="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">IMO</span> 8808707), which was attacked by Russian drones off the coast of Romania in the Black Sea on Oct. 15. Bulgarian broadcaster <i>NOVA</i> <a href="https://nova.bg/news/view/2026/11/07/558454/%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%85%D0%B0-%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D1%88%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B0-%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%8F%D1%86%D0%B8-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B1%D0%B0-wine-trader/">reported</a> that the remains were discovered during repair work at the port of Varna, where the damaged vessel was brought in early November. Seven of the 12 crew members had been listed as missing after the attack; five were rescued.</p><p>The Varna prosecutor’s office <a href="https://prb.bg/bg/news/80197-okrazhna-prokuratura-varna-rakovodi-razsledvane-vav-vrazka-s-korab%2C-udaren-ot-dr">confirmed</a> that severely damaged human remains had been found, ordering DNA testing to be conducted to confirm the identities of the dead. The official death toll has not yet been established. A Bulgarian law enforcement source told <i>AFP</i> that the remains most likely belonged to six people, but the condition of the remains made it impossible to determine the exact number of victims, according to Singaporean newspaper <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/human-bodies-found-on-ship-struck-by-a-drone-in-black-sea">The Straits Times</a>.</p><p>The San Marino-flagged <i>Wine Trader</i> was attacked on the morning of Oct. 15 around 24 kilometers from the Romanian port of Sulina, near the mouth of the Danube River, not far from the Ukrainian border. The ship was located approximately one nautical mile outside Romania’s territorial waters, within the country’s exclusive economic zone. A fire broke out aboard the tanker after it was struck by drones. <i>Reuters</i> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/two-ships-ablaze-romanian-black-sea-waters-8-sailors-missing-2026-10-15/">reported</a> that a NATO military source said the drones that attacked the <i>Wine Trader</i> and another tanker in the area were of Russian origin. Romanian President Nicușor Dan confirmed that the attacks had taken place but did not identify the responsible party.</p><p>However, additional evidence pointing to Russian involvement was <a href="https://www.maritime.bg/156372/">identified</a> by the Bulgarian maritime publication Maritime.bg. On Oct. 18, Russia’s Defense Ministry <a href="https://t.me/mod_russia/68315">published</a> video of a strike on a merchant vessel that it claimed was carrying military cargo destined for Ukraine. Maritime.bg compared the footage with photographs of the <i>Wine Trader</i> and found similarities in the hull shape, silhouette, and placement of the ship’s superstructure.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af21f4461fe84.05570372/zhwVHQKfMYZFaCZ7qKUvmHhgHo9Z82SboZ8dLsni.jpg" alt="Screenshot from a Russian Defense Ministry video and a photograph of the Wine Trader tanker"/><figcaption>Screenshot from a Russian Defense Ministry video and a photograph of the Wine Trader tanker</figcaption></figure><p>The Russian footage also shows a red-hulled rescue vessel. Maritime.bg compared the video with Sentinel-2 satellite imagery from Oct. 15 and found that the Romanian rescue ship <i>Apollo</i>, which has similar coloring, was near the tanker at the time of the attack. The cloud cover and damage visible on the tanker also matched images documented by Romanian rescue services.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4275</div><p>Salvatore Adorno, a representative of the company managing the <i>Wine Trader</i>, later <a href="https://www.maritime.bg/156457/">confirmed</a> to Maritime.bg that the ship shown in the Russian Defense Ministry footage was the tanker in question. He said three drones attacked the vessel: two struck the accommodation superstructure, and a third hit the deck. Adorno said he was convinced Russia was responsible for the attack. He also said one of the seven missing sailors was a Russian citizen, while the other six were citizens of Benin.</p><p>There is no evidence that the tanker had any connection to the Ukrainian military. According to a <a href="https://www.capital.gr/english/4024378/drone-attack-on-the-wine-trader-in-the-black-sea-search-and-rescue-operations-underway/">statement</a> from the San Marino Ship Register, <i>Wine Trader</i> was bound for Moldova in order to load vegetable oil. The vessel was empty at the time of the attack. The Russian Defense Ministry’s claim that it struck a ship carrying military cargo for Ukraine therefore does not match the known circumstances of <i>Wine Trader</i>’s voyage.</p><p>Another cargo ship, <i>Khoryv</i>, <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298674" target="_blank">sank</a> off the Romanian coast on Oct. 23. Romanian authorities said it had also been attacked by a drone. Of the 13 people were aboard, nine were rescued, one was killed, and three were reported missing. Romanian President Dan characterized the incident as “an example of the tragic consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.”</p><p>According to <i>The Insider</i>’s count, at least nine civilian vessels were attacked off the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria over the first four weeks of October. In response, Romania <a href="https://www.facebook.com/miruta.ro/posts/pfbid024aG2NPGDuEoyA1SqYD72wK1mDv9REF9N1BRghtWDBFZBzfWeXVusTiYj7zNGsxN2l?rdid=m1fc3Tmm5P1SGJyu">proposed</a> creating a joint command among NATO’s Black Sea members in order to protect against drones. NATO also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/nato-send-planes-drones-black-sea-after-attacks-shipping-2026-10-20/">announced</a> that it would reinforce its deployment of maritime patrol aircraft and drones in the Black Sea.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298873">Merchant ship attacked off the coast of Bulgaria was the ninth civilian vessel to be struck near NATO coasts this month</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298674">Cargo ship sinks off the coast of Romania, local authorities blame Russia</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 19:31:15 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Moldova opens new power line to Romania bypassing breakaway Transnistria, Maia Sandu says Russia can no longer use energy as leverage]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299366</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299366</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On Nov. 8, Moldova activated the Vulcănești-Chișinău power line, allowing the country to import electricity from Romania and other European countries without routing supplies through the breakaway region of Transnistria. Moldova’s Energy Ministry <a href="https://www.energie.gov.md/ro/content/linia-electrica-vulcanesti-chisinau-fost-pusa-sub-tensiune">said</a> the new 400-kilovolt line was energized in the presence of President Maia Sandu and EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos. Sandu said the new supply route means Russia will no longer be able to use Moldova’s energy dependence as a tool of political pressure.</p><p>“No one will be able to blackmail us anymore, turn off our lights, or cut off our heating,” Sandu <a href="https://www.moldova1.md/p/89698/linia-vulcanesti-chisinau-pusa-sub-tensiune-maia-sandu--nimeni-nu-ne-mai-poate-santaja-stinge-lumina-si-inchide-caldura-">said</a> at the ceremony. She said Moscow had previously threatened to cut off Moldova’s energy supplies any time the authorities in Chișinău made decisions that ran counter to Kremlin interests. Kos, who also attended the event, <a href="https://tv8.md/2026/11/08/video-linia-electrica-vulcanesti-chisinau-inaugurata-in-prezenta-martei-kos-maia-sandu-nimeni-nu-ne-mai-poate-santaja/312228">said</a> Moldova’s energy dependence on Russia was now a thing of the past.</p><p>The new 158-kilometer transmission line connects the Moldovan capital to the Vulcănești substation in the south of the country. Its capacity reaches 630 megavolt-amperes, which authorities say is enough to transmit electricity sufficient to cover more than half of the country’s peak-hour consumption. The key difference is that the new route does not pass through the Kuchurgan energy hub in Transnistria, a Russian-backed breakaway territory that is not under Chișinău’s control. Previously, a significant share of electricity imported from Romania reached Chișinău through that hub. Moldova now has an alternative route that does not depend on Transnistrian infrastructure.</p><p>Until 2025, Moldova also depended heavily on the Moldavskaya GRES power plant in Transnistria, which is owned by Russian energy company Inter RAO. The plant ran mainly on Russian gas and supplied most of the electricity consumed by the part of Moldova controlled by the government in Chișinău. Moldova had already <a href="https://www.energie.gov.md/ro/content/piata-gazelor-de-la-monopolul-gazprom-la-gaze-aduse-din-diferite-surse-si-regiuni-ale">stopped</a> buying Russian gas for consumers in government-controlled territory in December 2022, switching instead to purchases on the European market.</p><p>On Jan. 1, 2025, Russian energy giant Gazprom halted gas deliveries to Transnistria after an agreement allowing Russian gas to transit through Ukraine expired. As a result, the Moldavskaya GRES plant stopped supplying electricity to the parts of Moldova outside of Transnistria, forcing Chișinău to increase imports from Romania. Before the cutoff, the plant had supplied as much as 80% of the energy needs of Moldova’s government-controlled territory, <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-01-08/moldova-russias-gas-crisis-game-transnistria">according</a> to the Polish Center for Eastern Studies (OSW).</p><p>Construction of the new transmission line had initially been scheduled for completion in August 2024, but the deadline was repeatedly pushed back. Sandu said the delays were caused in part by Russia’s war against Ukraine, which disrupted equipment deliveries, as well as technical problems at a substation in Chișinău. The project cost approximately 61 million euros and was carried out with support from the World Bank.</p><p>Moldovan energy experts <a href="https://moldova1.md/p/89704/experti-linia-vulcanesti-chisinau-reduce-o-parte-din-vulnerabilitatea-energetica-a-r-moldova-dar-securitatea-deplina-cere-si-interconexiunile-balti">say</a> the launch of the Vulcănești-Chișinău line removes one of the country’s key energy vulnerabilities but does not fully protect it from supply disruptions. The country also plans to build two additional connections linking its grid with Romania — the Bălți-Suceava and Strășeni-Gutinaș lines.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/270544">Shor-ing up support: Russia fights with West for influence over Moldova</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/278231">The Gas Man Cometh: Moscow risks losing Transnistria by creating energy problems for Moldova</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299225">Moldova hits Transnistria leader Vadim Krasnoselsky with 5-year travel ban the day after he received the Order of Honor from Putin</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/292718">Moldova’s Maia Sandu links Putin’s decree on Russian citizenship for residents of Transnistria to recruitment effort for the war in Ukraine</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/291837">Kremlin-linked Moldovan billionaire Vladimir Plahotniuc handed 19-year prison term in Chisinau</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/285429">Moldova to focus on aligning national laws with EU standards after Maia Sandu’s party wins election despite Russian interference</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 19:27:13 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Putin awards 17 employees of state TV network sanctioned for spreading Kremlin propaganda in occupied Ukraine]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299363</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299363</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Vladimir Putin has awarded 17 employees of the Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network (RTRS), listing the names of the honorees in his <a href="https://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202611090003">decree</a> of Nov. 9, 2026. The European Union had earlier imposed sanctions on RTRS for spreading Russian propaganda in the occupied territories of Ukraine.</p><p>The Order of Honor went to Andrey Khromov, director of the RTRS treasury; Mikhail Nebolsin, deputy CEO; and Dmitry Nazarov, director of the Moscow Regional Center. Viktor Potanin, director of the information support department, was awarded the Order of Friendship. Ten more employees received medals of the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, First and Second Class, and three were given honorary titles. Among them are Almaz Suleimanov, director of the department for mobilization training and civil defense, Tatyana Manets, chief accountant, and Margarita Sukhanova, deputy CEO.</p><p>In addition to <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32025R1444">sanctions</a> against RTRS, the EU also previously imposed personal restrictions on its CEO, Andrey Romanchenko, and on Vladimir Naidenov, who heads the department for coordinating the development of communications infrastructure in the occupied territories of Ukraine. As stated in the sanctions document, RTRS played a key role in replacing Ukrainian television broadcasting systems in the occupied territories, installing in their place a network that transmits content approved by the Russian authorities. In the EU’s assessment, Russian authorities are seeking to suppress dissent, spread Russian narratives, and restrict residents’ access to independent sources of information. RTRS employees directly contributed to setting up Russian television broadcasting in the occupied territories of Ukraine.</p><p>This is not the first time Putin has rewarded RTRS employees for their efforts. In August 2020, 300 team members — including Khromov, Nebolsin, and Sukhanova — were <a href="http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202008230001">commended</a> for facilitating Russia’s transition to digital television broadcasting. In August 2026, on the occasion of RTRS’s 25th anniversary, Putin <a href="https://vrf.tass.ru/brianskaia-oblast/riastrela-ru/12666521-putin-nagradil-ordenom-pocheta-rtrs">awarded</a> the Order of Honor to the entire staff of the enterprise.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297281">Putin gives Order of Merit to longtime friend and “wallet” Sergei Roldugin, hands out state honors to 27 propagandists from Channel One</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297724">Putin hands out state honors to 51 Channel One employees, including sanctioned propagandists and authors of fake news reports</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/259576">Putin awards honorary Guards title to anti-aircraft missile brigade that supplied the Buk that shot down Flight MH-17</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/255282">Former Channel One anchorwoman Zhanna Agalakova returned her state awards to Putin</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 18:33:49 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Operation Migrant: Inside the Russian smuggling scheme moving Middle Easterners and Africans into the EU]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/inv/299252</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/inv/299252</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexei  Remizov]]></dc:creator>
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      <description><![CDATA[<p>From January through the end of July 2026, the Latvian State Border Guard prevented&nbsp;<a href="https://www.rs.gov.lv/en/article/26th-july-2026-border-and-within-country">8,814</a> attempts by illegal immigrants to enter the country. Still, despite the best efforts of European border services, routes for the illegal movement of people across the Belarusian border continue to operate. As&nbsp;<i>The Insider</i> found, up to 20 illegal immigrants at a time slip into the European Union with the aim of reaching the German border. Most importantly, however, is the fact that their movements are being coordinated by Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB).&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Iraqi citizen Obeid Mohaymen flew to Moscow in May 2025 at the invitation of Rus Gateway LLC, a Moscow-based company that operates under the brands Middle East Group and MiG LLC. Officially, the company helps migrants obtain invitations to Russia while also running the Cassandra hotel in Balashikha, outside Moscow. Unofficially, it is part of a scheme to smuggle people from Arab countries into the European Union. </p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeda04b0e9d84.65418431/adFG52MV9UD9XrZagDOIcgC4uetDc6rH5E8mnFAU.jpg" alt="A Russian visa"/><figcaption>A Russian visa</figcaption></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeda04b0591a8.76435231/NtmTTzNf7mjd9etqXdTqcxJBSl8baKdRTsCssDHw.jpg" alt="A work invitation"/><figcaption>A work invitation</figcaption></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeda04b0724e2.40756003/qDxFwa9O8qKTylDDnkJtqGBq7KnrQCPejd7Bx4PG.jpg" alt="A work invitation"/><figcaption>A work invitation</figcaption></figure><p>Participants — like Mohaymen —  meet through Telegram groups and ads, or in comments under TikTok and Facebook videos advertising illegal routes. Most coordination takes place in closed WhatsApp chats. <br><br>In TikTok and Telegram videos, people who illegally entered the EU state their names and thank a certain man, addressing him as “Abu Radad,” “Abu Redad,” or “Abu Harbi” (“father of war”). Apparently, they are referring to one and the same person.</p><p><i>The Insider</i> established that this network is run by Yemeni smuggler Abu Radad. According to a <a href="https://csd.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/publications_library/files/2025_07/Shadow_Fusions_EN.pdf">report</a> by the Center for the Study of Democracy, since at least 2021 Radad has specialized in organizing <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij5JbnN0cnVtZW50YWxpemVkIGluZmx1eCBvZiBtaWdyYW50cyAoYWxzbyByZWZlcnJlZCB0byBhcyBpbnN0cnVtZW50YWxpemF0aW9uLCBvciB3ZWFwb25pemF0aW9uLCBvZiBtaWdyYXRpb24pIGlzIGEgc3RhdGUgcG9saWN5IGluIHdoaWNoIGEgdGhpcmQgY291bnRyeSBhcnRpZmljaWFsbHkgY3JlYXRlcywgZW5jb3VyYWdlcywgYW5kIGRpcmVjdHMgZmxvd3Mgb2YgcmVmdWdlZXMgYW5kIGlsbGVnYWwgbWlncmFudHMgdG93YXJkIHRoZSBib3JkZXJzIG9mIGEgdGFyZ2V0IHN0YXRlLjwvcD4=">instrumentalized influxes</span> of Arab and African refugees to the borders of EU countries and the United Kingdom, using messenger apps and social media channels to attract prospective clients.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeda0a7056154.71723680/bOVrB1MasXzrFzxhxsJeI4f4iUyYcxgEPqhOIhDp.jpg" alt="Migrants in the forest after crossing the border"/><figcaption>Migrants in the forest after crossing the border</figcaption></figure><p>Abu Radad’s phone number also turned out to be linked to channels where migrants are gathered, <i>The Insider </i>confirmed.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Dark Logistic: 10,000 euros per trip</h3><p>Organized groups of illegal migrants from Africa and the Middle East often enter the European Union through the Baltic states using thoroughly organized routes. First, people from a range of countries — Syria, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Chad, Uganda, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Morocco — are invited to Russia under the pretext of work or tourism. Moscow’s Foreign Ministry issues them visas, and then, under the control of FSB officers, they are transferred through Belarus to the EU border.</p><p><i>The Insider </i>identified several drivers who transported migrants from Moscow and St. Petersburg through Belarus to the edge of Europe. One of them, Tajikistan-born Buned Bakhtiyerov, goes by the name of Ali. Another driver, who uses the pseudonym Max Paron, turned out to be Russian national Vyacheslav Borisov; his contact information was saved in the phone of an Arab illegal migrant as “Andrey Minsk” or “Max Moscow–Minsk.” </p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeda0ef6c0a59.61371204/4un2jppGmgxUU1UWYUpi3gWRbxkhEY3DEH8FlV7T.jpg" alt=""/></figure><p>Inside the EU, Russian-speaking drivers are recruited in Telegram groups with names like Work in the EU, Work in Poland, International Transportation, Drivers in the EU, Black taxi, Transportation Europe, Dark logistic, and DarkDrive, and also through ads posted in general-purpose aggregator groups on behalf of Abu Bakh, Abu Sakhr, Raji, Ali, Takata, Kalak, and other seemingly Arabic names.</p><p>First, the driver talks to a contact. Then, after some brief questioning, he is redirected to a “manager” for a more detailed interview involving a discussion of “business trip” options.</p><p>Ads are published every day. If a driver does not have a car, a rental is booked. On average, drivers are promised 1,000 to 10,000 euros per trip, depending on the number of illegal migrants being moved. Possible routes include going through the forest to Riga, transit to the Polish–German border, and to Finland by ferry via Estonia. </p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6ae/6aeda5babcefc9.25071603/XDB7FJfvg7aLPQqtWes1qcbtI0s7IOyGznTmbiXp.png" alt=""/></figure><p>Upon reaching their destination, the illegal migrants are recorded on video, and the driver is paid a fee in cryptocurrency once a report is made to the organizers. Moldovan resident Mikhail Demidenko received money via just such an arrangement in 2024 after renting a car and transporting migrants from clients in the Black Taxi group. Syrian-born Ramadan Mahruz, who had himself arrived in Germany as a refugee, was among those who paid drivers including Demidenko for transporting other illegal migrants. </p><h3 class="outline-heading">Forest, fence, airBaltic  </h3><p><i>The Insider</i>’s sources say that Russian and Belarusian border guards show no interest in groups of people from Africa and the Middle East moving toward the European Union border, allowing guides to bring the migrants to the border crossing point without much trouble. The smugglers forbid them from using mobile phones, knowing that EU border services can locate them via GSM signals. </p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aedaa5771fcf8.00858962/5gOCfd4VXZcu1PFK9uI7hkMnyQ93jQNISyKtFvEJ.jpg" alt="Crossing the border "/><figcaption>Crossing the border </figcaption></figure><p>The fences on the border with Latvia are crossed differently each time — “guides” might cut the barbed wire, dig a tunnel, or set up ladders. In Latvia, another guide either walks the group through the forest or has a hired driver take them to Riga, and from there to the border crossing between Poland and Germany.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aedaa7c17a410.52025104/sVPHmeWTVMoO3bpNEdFTwbJ57KKJqzl8JXjZUW6J.jpg" alt="Guide with illegal migrants in a forest camp"/><figcaption>Guide with illegal migrants in a forest camp</figcaption></figure><p>In the Baltic states and Poland, smugglers rent apartments for illegal migrants to use as temporary stops. For example, the smuggler Abu Harbi promises participants a house in Warsaw and Lithuania.</p><p>One of the routes identified by Latvian border guards led to Germany. Materials from the smugglers’ internal chat, obtained by <i>The Insider,</i> show that they got there via the road bridge between Polish Zgorzelec and German Görlitz. A scout reconnoitered the route beforehand; if police had been on the road, the group had a second option via a pedestrian bridge.  </p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6ae/6aedb4447940b0.05869463/4OJSG93JeTU5a5KxsH5QgLWe6jCQublDOzLZLrRs.png" alt="An exchange between guides"/><figcaption>An exchange between guides</figcaption></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6ae/6aedb444792b71.03179853/nmsYFNcLtxDhfQi9fF5SZK9cvZ7fyQ8jmozZHx0i.png" alt=""/></figure><p>Of course, infiltration does not always succeed. According to a <a href="https://www.strazgraniczna.pl/pl/aktualnosci/15748,Zatrymania-na-granicy-polsko-litewskiej.html">report</a> from the Polish Border Guard, on June 9 a group of 22 illegal migrants from Somalia, Sudan, Morocco, and Ethiopia was detained on the border between Lithuania and Poland.</p><p>Notably, since late 2025 many smugglers and guides have been using new schemes with Finland as the final destination. In 2023, Helsinki closed checkpoints on the border with Russia after an obviously organized influx of migrants from the Russian side. After that, the Finns increased the number of border guards, strengthening their control along the entire perimeter. However, the groups could still enter the country through the more accessible Baltic states.<br><br>As before, illegal migrants fly to Russia and travel through Belarus to Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia. From there, they might fly from Riga to Finland on airBaltic, or hide in a vehicle at the port of Tallinn as a driver takes them by ferry to Helsinki. That’s how, on Sept. 6, citizens of Eritrea and Morocco were <a href="https://raja.fi/en/-/the-finnish-border-guard-found-six-people-who-had-entered-the-country-illegally-concealed-in-a-vehicle-at-the-port-of-helsinki">detained</a> in the port of the Finnish capital, and on the night of Sept. 25, Finland’s border guard service <a href="https://www.epressi.com/tiedotteet/turvallisuus/helsingin-satamassa-paljastettiin-jalleen-epailty-laittoman-maahantulon-jarjestaminen-schengen-alueen-sisarajalla-kaksi-henkiloa-piiloutuneena-ajoneuvoon.html">detained</a> another vehicle with two illegal migrants inside.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Smuggler with a certificate of honor from the FSB</h3><p>On the Russian side, waves of illegal migration are coordinated by FSB officers themselves. <i>The Insider</i> discovered and identified a member of the FSB Border Service in the Republic of Karelia — Magdeburg native <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij5NYXhpbSBZdXJ5ZXZpY2ggS2F6eWR1YiwgYm9ybiBNYXJjaCAyMiwgMTk4ODwvcD4=">Maxim Kazydub</span> — who was a participant in closed <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij5BYnUgSGFyYmkgKEJlbGFydXMtJmd0O0dlcm1hbnkpLCBMdWZmeSwg4oCcTWlncmFudHMgaW4gQmVsYXJ1c+KAnSAodHJhbnNsYXRlZCBmcm9tIEFyYWJpYyksIOKAnEdyb3VwIGZvciBtaWdyYXRpb24gZnJvbSBCZWxhcnVzIHRvIEdlcm1hbnnigJ0gKHRyYW5zbGF0ZWQgZnJvbSBBcmFiaWMpLCDigJxGaW5sYW5kIGdyb3Vw4oCdICh0cmFuc2xhdGVkIGZyb20gQXJhYmljKSwg4oCcQWJ1IEFzaXIsIEJlbGFydXMsIEdlcm1hbnnigJ0gKHRyYW5zbGF0ZWQgZnJvbSBBcmFiaWMpLCDigJxGaW5sYW5kIGdyb3Vw4oCdICh0cmFuc2xhdGVkIGZyb20gQXJhYmljKTwvcD4=">communication channels and groups</span> involved in smuggling illegal migrants into the European Union, one of which had been part of the effort that prompted Finland to strengthen its border in 2023. On social media, Kazydub appears as “Dmitry Titov,” “Max Koza,” “Sanek Orlov,” and “Max Karelsky.”</p><p>For example, under the “Dmitry Titov” pseudonym, Kazydub monitored the activity of participants in the Telegram group Kovcheg Finlandia (Ark of Finland), where anti-war Russians and legal asylum seekers from Russia discuss pressing issues, such as how to arrange for relatives to get into Europe.</p><p>After Finland fully closed its border with Russia, the same FSB officer turned up in closed WhatsApp groups tied to Abu Radad and Abu Harbi — chats that can only be joined via an invitation link. Inside, members can coordinate the movement of migrants in the border zone on the Russian and Belarusian side.</p><p>Kadzydub’s actions cannot be a secret to his superiors. In 2024, he was awarded a certificate of honor from the government of the Republic of Karelia for services in ensuring border protection — the same border he indirectly helped close off after Finland actively responded to the FSB’s instrumental influx in late 2023. </p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/295302">Serfdom for migrants: Why Russia’s new migration policy is so ineffective</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/287697">The price of belonging: How Europe’s war on illegal migration traps legal immigrants</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/287028">Bees against honey: Why many immigrants oppose new waves of migration</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/286986">No place of refuge: Germany’s tougher migration policy hits Russian and Belarusian dissidents</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 11:13:28 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[“He said he was against violence, but he lunged at me and started hitting me on the head”: Israeli tourists face hostility around the world]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/society/299293</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/society/299293</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Diana Fishman, Anna  Rudnitskaya]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299293/EjNW9nEtDHYXBUM38nuxpa1IpAWmZkzTq8Q139nj.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Over the past year, Israel’s Foreign Ministry received a record number of complaints from Israeli citizens who suffered physical violence, harassment, and discrimination while abroad. Three years after the October 7 massacre and the start of the devastating war in Gaza that followed, anti-Israeli sentiment around the world has not subsided. “Collective responsibility” for the government’s policy extends even to Jews from other countries as well. Public organizations, in response, speak ever more loudly about a return to “yellow stars” and a “hunt for Jews,” while Israeli developers create startups to help compatriots abroad.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the second half of October, Hen and Adar Berti of Ashkelon, Israel, flew to Vienna for a vacation. They booked an Airbnb apartment in the Leopoldstadt district, next to a synagogue.</p><p>One evening there was a loud knock on the door. The Bertis were not expecting anyone and did not answer, but the stranger kept pounding and ringing furiously. When the couple decided to find out what he wanted, the man asked whether they were Zionists.</p><p>“I got nervous and pretended not to understand him, which made him even angrier,” Hen Berti <a href="https://www.mako.co.il/travel-news/Article-2a63e3b698851a1027.htm">said</a> in an interview. The man outside the door shouted, <a href="https://www.diepresse.com/41374290/israelisches-paar-in-wien-angepoebelt">calling</a> the Israelis “Zionist occupiers,” and then went downstairs and loitered near the building for another hour or so.</p><p>The police officers who were called to the scene <a href="https://www.heute.at/s/zionistische-besetzer-israelis-in-wien-beschimpft-120269524">did not see fit</a> to intervene given that the incident was “only” an issue of insults, not threats. Nor did they seem alarmed by the fact that the harasser knew in advance who was staying at the address. According to the victims, the police officers were not trying to hide their irritation.</p><p>Hen and Adar were afraid to stay in that apartment, and members of a local online community for Israelis helped the couple find alternative housing (and even provided them an escort).</p><h3 class="outline-heading">“Unprecedented scale”</h3><p>A 2025 <a href="https://cst.tau.ac.il/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/AntisemitismWorldwide_2025_FINAL.pdf">report</a> from Tel Aviv University’s Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry shows that, despite the end of large-scale hostilities in Gaza last October, the number of antisemitic incidents in the world is still well above prewar levels. In a number of countries — including Canada, the United Kingdom, and Italy — more incidents were recorded in 2025 than the year before.</p><p>The trend continues. In the first half of 2026, the British <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij5BIGNoYXJpdHkgdGhhdCBlbnN1cmVzIHRoZSBzZWN1cml0eSBvZiB0aGUgQnJpdGlzaCBKZXdpc2ggY29tbXVuaXR5IG1vbml0b3JzIGFuZCBjb21iYXRzIGFudGlzZW1pdGlzbS48L3A+">Community Security Trust</span> <a href="https://cst.org.uk/research/cst-publications/antisemitic-incidents-january-june-2026">counted</a> <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij5UaGUgc2Vjb25kLWhpZ2hlc3QgaGFsZi15ZWFyIGZpZ3VyZSBpbiB0aGUgZW50aXJlIGhpc3Rvcnkgb2YgbW9uaXRvcmluZzsgaXQgd2FzIGhpZ2hlciBvbmx5IGluIHRoZSBmaXJzdCBoYWxmIG9mIDIwMjQsIHdpdGggMiwwMTkgaW5jaWRlbnRzLjwvcD4=">1,926 antisemitic incidents</span> — 21% more than in the same period a year before. “This raises concerns that, rather than a backlash to a specific geopolitical crisis, high levels of antisemitism have become a normalized feature in societies with large Jewish minorities,” the Tel Aviv University report says.</p><p>At the same time, even in countries where the overall number of incidents is declining, cases of physical violence against Jews have become more frequent. France saw 106 physical attacks motivated by antisemitism in 2024, and 126 in 2025. In the U.S., according to <a href="https://go.adl.org/resources/report/audit-antisemitic-incidents-2025">data</a> from the Anti-Defamation League, the number reached 203 — the highest figure since monitoring began in 1979.</p><p>Nearly half of the antisemitic acts recorded in the U.S. last year showed a motivation “related to Israel or Zionism,” Rachel Sass, of the Anti-Defamation League’s Center on Extremism, told <i>The Insider</i>. Attackers target Israelis and Jews abroad because of their national identity, seeking to hold them responsible for the actions of the Israeli authorities.</p><blockquote><p>“Someone wearing a kippah, speaking Hebrew, or saying they're visiting from Israel can be enough to trigger antisemitic hate in public spaces. While criticizing Israeli policy or the government is legitimate, targeting individuals simply for being Israeli or Jewish is antisemitism,” Sass stresses.</p></blockquote><blockquote>Someone wearing a kippah, speaking Hebrew, or saying they're visiting from Israel can be enough to trigger antisemitic hate
</blockquote><p>Tourists from Israel have faced aggression before. In 2014, in Argentina’s Patagonia region, the “Committee of Solidarity with Palestine” launched a campaign against <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij5BZnRlciBmaW5pc2hpbmcgc2VydmljZSBpbiB0aGUgSXNyYWVsIERlZmVuc2UgRm9yY2VzLCBtYW55IHlvdW5nIElzcmFlbGlzIGdvIG9uIGxvbmcgdHJpcHMgYWJyb2FkLiBTb3V0aCBBbWVyaWNhIGlzIG9uZSBvZiB0aGUgcG9wdWxhciBkZXN0aW5hdGlvbnMgZm9yIHN1Y2ggdHJpcHM7IElzcmFlbGkgYmFja3BhY2tlcnMgdHJhZGl0aW9uYWxseSBtYWtlIHVwIGEgbm90aWNlYWJsZSBzaGFyZSBvZiB0b3VyaXN0IHRyYWZmaWMgdG8gUGF0YWdvbmlhLjwvcD4=">Israeli backpackers</span>. Activists posted leaflets calling for an end to “Israeli military tourism” and for a boycott of businesses that supposedly serve it.</p><p>In January 2015, a group of locals <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/21/israeli-backpackers-antisemitic-campaign-patagonia">staged a pogrom</a> at a hostel popular with Israelis. The attackers threw stones, smashed windows, and shouted antisemitic insults, accusing Jews of “seizing Patagonia.” The hostel owner and several other people were injured.</p><p>Another high-profile incident <a href="https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/skpc00rtr2">occurred</a> in Budapest on Sept. 7, 2023, one month before the Hamas terrorist attack. Two men who introduced themselves as ticket inspectors demanded that two Israeli women, a mother and daughter, pay a fine as they exited the subway. The women refused, after which one of them was punched and the other was knocked to the ground. According to the victims, the scammers also made a “long Jewish nose” gesture with their hands and told them to “get out to your Israel.” The tourists went to the police, who confirmed that the demand to pay a fine was illegal, as was the attack, but did not open a case.</p><p>The start of the war in the Gaza Strip saw <a href="https://theins.ru/obshestvo/279342">antisemitic sentiment</a> around the world reach an “unprecedented scale,” <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/travel/article/bjp1crkvfe">according to</a> officials at Israel’s Foreign Ministry, which reported having received a record 45 appeals from travelers who needed help in connection with hostile treatment between July 2025 and 2026. Among the reported incidents are cases of physical violence, verbal threats and insults, and refusal of service or expulsion from hotels and restaurants.</p><p>At the same time, <a href="https://www.makorrishon.co.il/news/world-news/article/358712">officials</a> and experts alike stress that the statistics do not reflect the full picture, since far from all victims decide to report what happened.</p><blockquote><p>“Underreporting is a well-known problem in documenting antisemitism and hate crimes,” explains Dr. Liram Koblentz-Stenzler, Senior Researcher and Head of the Extremism and Antisemitism Desk at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University. “There is also a wider circle that numbers like these do not capture: people who are already changing their behavior because they believe they could become targets.”</p></blockquote><p>According to an ICT <a href="https://www.runi.ac.il/media/pv2j44cq/%D7%A0%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A0%D7%91%D7%97%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%90%D7%A8-2026.pdf">survey</a> conducted in January 2026, more than 50% of Israelis take antisemitism into account when deciding on a trip abroad, and 86% of respondents are sure that the level of Jew-hatred in the world is rising. Almost half attribute this trend not only to hostility toward Jews as such but also to criticism of Israel’s policy. Among the countries considered to be “dangerous” for Israelis, respondents most often <a href="https://www.runi.ac.il/en/research-institutes/government/libres/research/public-opinion/israelis-fear-rising-antisemitism-abroad-and-act-accordingly">name</a> France, the United Kingdom, and Spain.</p><p>Alla (name changed), who accompanies Russian-speaking Israelis on tours of Europe, told <i>The Insider</i> that many of her clients have changed their approach to planning trips. Some now prefer to fly to Eastern European countries, where there are fewer migrants and less anti-Israeli activity, while others try to keep a low profile:</p><blockquote><p>“They avoid mentioning their place of residence, ask their children not to speak Hebrew in public, pay in cash, and sometimes even check into hotels using a different passport — a Russian one, for example. All this secrecy is unpleasant and humiliating, but it is even worse to run into rudeness and aggression. Paradoxically, for Russian speakers with a Russian passport, the chance of running into trouble is many times lower than for a tourist from Israel.”</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>“We are not calling on Israelis to give up traveling or to hide their identity wherever they go,” <a href="https://www.makorrishon.co.il/news/world-news/article/358712">explains</a> Eli Yifrah, the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s deputy director general for consular affairs. “But we strongly advise that before a trip you familiarize yourself with the recommendations for travelers that the ministry publishes and periodically updates, and use common sense.”</p></blockquote><p>Yifrah warns against displaying Israeli symbols during mass events and “in troubled neighborhoods,” cautions tourists not to get into arguments with foreigners on political topics, and advises them to avoid posting information about their accommodation and itinerary on social media in real time.</p><blockquote><p>“Even in a friendly country, an aggressive protest can take place, and even in a country with a significant Muslim population, most citizens may pose no danger at all,” he adds.</p></blockquote><h3 class="outline-heading">“Jews are not welcome”</h3><p>Not every incident involving Israeli tourists has an antisemitic or “anti-Zionist” motive. Sometimes a conflict flares up because of their own inappropriate behavior. However, increasingly the trigger is merely their Israeli origin.</p><p>Thus, six Israelis traveling in motorhomes were attacked at a campground in Mongolia. Locals (of Kazakh origin, according to <a href="https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/global/1078113/">media reports</a>), armed with knives and an ax, shouted antisemitic slogans and demanded that the Israelis leave. The tourists managed to fight back, but one of them suffered a serious facial injury.</p><p>On the Thai island of Phangan, a 62-year-old Israeli woman and her 23-year-old daughter were beaten up by a French citizen whom they had met on the way to a waterfall. Upon learning what country they were from, the man said that he “does not like what Israel is doing in Gaza.” <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rktadk2ume">Ynet</a> cites the victim’s account:  </p><blockquote><p>“I told him we were on vacation and didn’t want to talk about that issue. He said, ‘I’m against violence,’ and the conversation ended. Suddenly, he called us from above, came down toward us, and then started beating me brutally. My daughter tried to protect me and was beaten as well. I never thought that something like this would happen to me here in Thailand, where people are so friendly toward Israelis. I’m always careful and don’t say that I’m from Israel. But here in Thailand, I thought it was safe. He had a French accent, but he didn’t look French. We could never have imagined he would do something like this...”</p></blockquote><p>The tourists were hospitalized with severe head injuries, and both required surgery. The attacker fled the scene on a motorcycle and a few days later was detained in connection with another incident. It later <a href="https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/3302242/israeli-mother-and-daughter-badly-beaten-on-koh-phangan">surfaced</a> that he had been released on bail.</p><p>Another case concerns a group of Israelis who <a href="https://www.mako.co.il/news-specials/n12_english_edition/Article-4772d9687473f91027.htm">suffered</a> from harassment in the town of Plav, Montenegro. Upon hearing them speak Hebrew, locals began accusing the tourists of war crimes: “Baby killers, shame on you! Taking a break from genocide? So, how is it going... the killing of civilians?”</p><p>In a video that reached the media, the Israelis can be heard trying to defuse the conflict: “Keep walking, do not talk to us. I did not speak to you. I do not know you, you do not know me.” In response they hear remarks: “I know, you are all killers, killing kids! Assholes! You should not go anywhere. Stay in your shithole you call Israel!”</p><p>Notably, Jews from other countries have been victims of similar aggression. In the summer of 2026, a group of tourists from France was subjected to harassment and pursuit after visiting a synagogue in Barcelona. As one of them <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/jewish-world/article/hkzookkpgg">recalls</a>, it all began with a woman carrying pro-Palestinian symbols who saw that they were Jewish and began shouting slogans like, “Free Palestine!” Soon, other passers-by joined in, and dozens of people ended up pursuing the tourists for upwards of 40 minutes as they rushed to their hotel. The crowd spat on them along the way, insulting them and chanting “Jews are not welcome here,” “Baby killers!” and “Death to Israel!”</p><blockquote>Dozens of people pursued the tourists for about forty minutes to their hotel, spitting at them and chanting “Jews are not welcome here” and “Death to Israel!”
</blockquote><p>Wide publicity was given to an <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/france-arrests-irish-man-who-allegedly-told-jews-he-wished-hitler-had-finished-the-job/">incident</a> at a supermarket near Avignon, France, where a Jewish married couple from Australia got into a conflict with an Irish citizen. An innocent conversation about association football grew into an argument about politics, during which the Irishman expressed regret that Hitler “didn’t finish the job.” When the Australian woman began filming the scene on her phone, the man threatened her: “You get away from me, before I put a f*cking bullet in your head.”</p><p>After the video from the supermarket went viral, French Commerce and Tourism Minister Serge Papin and Minister for Equality and Combating Discrimination Aurore Bergé issued a <a href="https://presse.economie.gouv.fr/serge-papin-et-aurore-berge-condamnent-avec-la-plus-grande-fermete-les-menaces-antisemites-visant-un-couple-de-touristes-juifs-en-france">joint statement</a> condemning what had happened:</p><p>“No antisemitic act, threat, or statement should go unanswered… No tourist should be subjected to threats or discrimination because of their identity or beliefs.”</p><p>Later, the Irishman was detained by French police and charged with justifying crimes against humanity and making hate-motivated death threats. At the end of October, a court <a href="https://www.thejournal.ie/irishman-threatened-jewish-woman-french-supermarket-suspended-sentence-7206303-Oct2026">sentenced</a> him to six months in prison, suspended, and a fine of 1,600 euros.</p><p>Another incident occurred last summer at the Cypriot resort of Ayia Napa. Roman (name changed), a resident of Israel, took his wife on a five-hour boat trip:</p><p>“My wife took an Israeli flag with her to take photos with on the boat — we had planned such a photo shoot in advance. At some point she took out the flag, and I took several pictures on my phone. Then the boat stopped in a lagoon, and several people, including us, went swimming. When I came back, I discovered that my phone was missing.”</p><p>After searching everywhere, Roman reported the loss to the captain, who asked over the loudspeaker for the phone to be returned in the event that someone had taken it by mistake. About an hour later, one of the passengers told Roman that he had found someone’s phone in the men’s restroom:</p><p>“I immediately went down to the restroom, where I had not been before — and indeed, my wet phone was lying behind the toilet lid. Fortunately, it is waterproof and was not damaged at all. I had no doubts — it had been taken and then left in a conspicuous place.”</p><p>Before returning to the port, an elderly fellow passenger asked Roman what country he was from. He answered that he was from Israel. A young woman nearby remarked sarcastically: “Israel does not exist, it is Palestine,” and asked what had happened to his phone. After that, a verbal altercation broke out between them.</p><p>Roman does not know which of the passengers took his phone, but he is sure the reason behind its temporary disappearance was the photo shoot involving the Israeli flag.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">“No entry for Zionists”</h3><p>This past July, Italy’s <i>La Repubblica</i> <a href="https://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2026/07/18/news/segnala_turisti_sionisti_questionario_chat_proteste_comunita_ebraica-425479386/amp/">reported</a> on an anonymous Google form that circulated on social networks and messenger apps calling on users to report the whereabouts of Jews and Israelis — in hotels, rented housing, restaurants, and other establishments. Based on the information collected, it was supposedly intended to compile a map of “Zionist tourism” and “Zionist neocolonization” in Italy.</p><p>The description indicated that the data would be passed to the Global Sumud Movement (linked to the <a href="https://theins.ru/reports/293639">Freedom Flotilla</a> to Gaza) and used to coordinate further actions. However, representatives of the movement denied involvement in the initiative.</p><p>News of the announced “hunt for Jews” provoked an immediate backlash from Jewish community figures and Italian politicians, and fairly quickly the form disappeared from the web.</p><p>A separate category of incidents recorded by Israel’s Foreign Ministry and researchers of antisemitism is indeed related to discrimination against tourists based on nationality. In such cases, the source of aggression is not ordinary passersby but those who provide services to visitors — from <a href="https://www.ynet.co.il/judaism/article/rjeaqdnvgx?utm_source=chatgpt.com">taxi drivers</a> to <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/are-you-a-baby-killer-israeli-couple-harassed-by-employee-at-california-hotel/">hotel</a> and <a href="https://combatantisemitism.org/cam-news/jewish-passenger-served-kosher-meal-labeled-free-palestine-on-iberia-airlines-flight/">airline</a> staff.</p><p>In September 2025, a restaurant in the Bavarian city of Fürth <a href="https://www.nordbayern.de/news-in-english/that-s-blatant-anti-semitism-the-furor-over-pizza-zulu-in-furth-has-wide-repercussions-1.14847515">put out</a> a sign at the entrance, warning that Israelis were “not welcome” at the establishment. The text said that the staff “love all people” regardless of origin, but do not intend, “like the rest of the world, to stand aside” and simply watch what is happening in Gaza: “Our protest is not political and even less racist. Israeli citizens are not welcome here. Of course, they will be welcome here again as soon as they decide to open their eyes, ears, and hearts.”</p><p>A few hours later the notice was removed, but it <a href="https://www.nordbayern.de/news-in-english/that-s-blatant-anti-semitism-the-furor-over-pizza-zulu-in-furth-has-wide-repercussions-1.14847515">managed to cause</a> outrage among civic organizations. In a special statement, the Alliance Against Right-Wing Extremism called it a manifestation of “pure antisemitism,” reminiscent of the “darkest times in the history” of the country. The organization expressed solidarity with Israeli citizens and the Jewish community: “Since when is a citizen of a state responsible for the actions of its government? We repeat once more: ‘Never again is now!’”</p><p>Several complaints against the restaurant owners were filed with the prosecutor’s office. However, the investigation was soon closed given that no signs of incitement to hatred were found in the text. According to an <a href="https://www.nordbayern.de/fuerth/israelische-burger-nicht-willkommen-ermittlungen-nach-anzeigen-gegen-pizza-zulu-eingestellt-1.14958907">assessment</a> by lawyers, “the criticized statement — taking into account the right to freedom of expression — did not reach the threshold beyond which criminal liability begins.”</p><p>On some occasions, Israeli tourists have faced actual expulsion. This past August, a family with two small children was <a href="https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/byqpc8iife">denied entry</a> to a zoo on the Thai island of Koh Samui. Upon learning where they were from, an employee declared that Israelis were forbidden to enter. Then another employee joined in, allegedly cursing at the Israeli family and striking the father in the neck.</p><p>After the story gained traction, the zoo owner posted anti-Israeli messages on social media. In one of the posts, a “No Entry” sign was superimposed over the Israeli flag with a target next to it. As established by the anonymous X account <a href="https://x.com/SwordOfSalomon">SwordOfSalomon</a>, which is devoted to monitoring antisemitism, the zoo is co-owned by a French national who had earlier called Jews a “dirty race” and his employees “team Khomeini,” <i>Ynet</i> <a href="https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/byqpc8iife" target="_blank">writes</a>.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6ae/6aeef328acf273.63836751/MzmzGfnOu7CsTwjzgdybwNs7mZBAIduCp8IUPHeA.jpg" alt="The owner of a zoo in Thailand posted material with anti-Israeli messages on social media"/><figcaption>The owner of a zoo in Thailand posted material with anti-Israeli messages on social media</figcaption></figure><p>A similar incident occurred in Athens in September when a pair of tourists were <a href="https://www.mako.co.il/travel-news/international/Article-cf7e8efd4ce90a1026.htm">thrown out</a> of a bar just for being Israeli. The manager shouted in front of other patrons: “Get out of here and do not even come near again!”</p><p>The victims shared the details of the incident in a travelers’ group, prompting their compatriots to begin leaving negative reviews of the establishment on Google. In response, a post appeared on the bar’s Facebook page with screenshots of reviews by “Zionists and their supporters” and an explanation that the establishment “does not accept those who commit genocide in Palestine or support it.” After some time the post was deleted.</p><p>Problems for Israeli tourists can also arise when checking into a hotel or rented apartment. A whole series of such episodes is linked to the popular service Booking.com. This past April, Margarita, a resident of Israel, reserved an apartment in Bologna, Italy:</p><blockquote><p>“Literally right before check-in, when I was already on the bus, the owner called and told me to cancel the booking [to avoid triggering a <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij5VbmRlciBCb29raW5nLmNvbSBydWxlcywgYW4gb3duZXIgY2FuIGNhbmNlbCBhIHJlc2VydmF0aW9uIG9ubHkgaW4gZW1lcmdlbmNpZXMuIFdpdGhvdXQgYSB2YWxpZCByZWFzb24sIHRoZSBvd25lciBmYWNlcyBwZW5hbHRpZXMgYXMgd2VsbCBhcyBhIGRyb3AgaW4gc2VhcmNoIHJhbmtpbmdzLjwvcD4=">platform penalty</span>], and he would refund my money. Of course, I refused: finding other accommodation on such short notice was unrealistic. Then he canceled the booking himself, losing money, and even had the stupidity to leave me a message on Booking saying ‘F**k you, free Gaza’. I wonder if he'd have felt the same way had I been Arab or Druze.”</p></blockquote><p>As compensation, Booking sent Margarita a voucher worth 22 euros. She left a negative review, but it was soon deleted, supposedly because of complaints from other users. “I called support repeatedly, but I was told to mind my own business — it's up to them which reviews to keep,” she says.</p><p>A similar case occurred in early October. Israeli national Simcha Goldstein <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/travel/article/sk2zsvjfze?utm_source=chatgpt.com">booked</a> an apartment in Naples through Booking.com, and after the order was confirmed, he received a message from the owner asking him to cancel it, with the explanation: “I do not accept citizens from countries guilty of genocide.”</p><p>On Goldstein’s behalf, a request was sent to the platform to remove this property over discrimination against a customer on the basis of nationality. However, no sanctions followed. Instead, the company issued a warning to the owner and promised to consider further measures if something similar happened again.</p><p>Noa Sabar Dvoskin, who immigrated from the U.S. after the October 7 terrorist attack, also failed to hold the offender to account. This past August, she was returning to Israel from Seattle with her children. The family flew with Alaska Airlines to Los Angeles, and there transferred to a flight to Tel Aviv. While unpacking a suitcase after arriving, the woman found inside a handwritten note saying “F**k Israel.”</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6ae/6aeef390629408.00600531/yjNGpZaMAK3HDLFZDC2zvihyDUNtJKFsengwaYs9.jpg" alt="The note that Noa Sabar Dvoskin found in her suitcase"/><figcaption>The note that Noa Sabar Dvoskin found in her suitcase</figcaption></figure><p>Noa filed complaints not only with the airline but also with the Seattle and Los Angeles airports and the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA). As Sabar-Dvoskin told <i>The Insider</i>, Alaska Airlines informed her that it had carried out a check, interviewed employees who worked that day, and reviewed surveillance camera footage — and found nothing suspicious.</p><p>The appeal to TSA also did not help establish who put the note in the luggage or when. No one apologized to the passenger, who explained: “It could become indirect evidence that everything happened through the fault of someone among the airline’s or airport’s employees, and that is fraught with serious problems.”</p><h3 class="outline-heading">God helps those who help themselves</h3><p>While officials limit themselves to issuing recommendations and warnings for tourists, Israeli IT specialists are designing digital services to help their compatriots plan a comfortable and safe trip abroad.</p><p>Last year saw the launch of <a href="http://safeforjews.org/">SafeforJews.org</a>, a platform that uses AI tools to assess tourist destinations based on the level of threat to Jews. The service analyzes information from multiple sources — news about antisemitic incidents, protests and government measures, official recommendations of Israel’s National Security Council, and user reports — and <a href="https://safeforjews.org/en/map">ranks</a> cities and countries by level of safety.</p><p>There are five safety levels. Most countries are currently in the “Caution” category. The “Warning” category includes Russia, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy, among others. At the time of writing, countries listed as “Safe” included the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Albania, South Korea, and Singapore.</p><blockquote>Most countries of the world are placed in the “Caution” category when it comes to the safety of Israeli tourists
</blockquote><p>The startup’s founder, Shai Yaish, explained the project to <i>The Insider:</i></p><blockquote><p>“Ideally, I would like to create something like Google Maps for Jewish and Israeli users so they can quickly find Jewish communities and consulates and figure out whether it is safe for them to be in a particular area and which places they should avoid. As our community grows, members will be able to find each other in different locations, meet up, and spend time together — for example, to organize shared Sabbath meals. That is how I imagine the platform’s development after the situation with antisemitism in the world calms down.”</p></blockquote><p>The startup <a href="https://onebayit.org/onboarding/host">OneBayit</a> (from the Hebrew “bayit,” meaning “home”) is also designed to connect Israelis with local communities. The essence of the project is reflected in its slogan: “Where strangers become family.” Registered users leave their contact details and indicate how they can be useful to travelers (options range from “give recommendations” to “invite to Shabbat dinner” or “offer a place to stay”).</p><p>According to the service’s founder — Joshua Buchalter, an immigrant to Israel from South Africa — the need for a safe space for Israelis and Jews abroad has grown noticeably over the past three years:</p><blockquote><p>“This is especially important now, when many tourists are reluctant to speak openly about their connection to Israel for fear of other people’s reactions. At the same time, there are quite a few Jews in the world who love Israel and are ready to support Israelis. Our platform helps find such people and connect with them.”</p></blockquote><p><i>The Insider’s</i> interviewees have no illusions about the idea that anti-Israeli sentiment in the world will subside any time soon.</p><blockquote><p>“Of course, I do not like that the number of our users is growing in parallel with antisemitism. I would like the situation we found ourselves in October 2023 to end,” says Shai Yaish. “But I have no particular expectations; I do not count on sudden change. I just hope that I can feel safe traveling the world, even if it has to be with the help of my own service.”</p></blockquote><p>It is obvious that after October 7, “the threshold for justifying hostility, and in some cases violence, toward Israelis and Jews has become lower,” notes Liram Koblentz-Stenzler of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. The key question is what behavior people driven by this hostility consider acceptable for themselves. When refusing service to an Israeli is presented as a legitimate political act, and the use of violence is justified as a response to Israel’s policy, the boundaries of the permissible begin to shift. People have been repeatedly exposed to the idea that Israelis and Jews can be held collectively responsible, and in some cases, behavior targeting them has already been given political or moral justification. The next crisis in the Middle East will not start from zero. It can reactivate and intensify patterns that have already become more normalized,” Koblentz-Stenzler warns.</p><p>Whether this becomes a “new normal” will also depend on the larger response to such behaviors. When denial of service, harassment, or violence against someone on the basis of their Israeli citizenship or Jewish identity is met with clear condemnation and real consequences, it sends a clear message that political anger does not justify targeting someone based on their passport or their religion. </p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/279768">Pogroms, beatings, threats: A wave of antisemitism unseen since World War II sweeps Europe</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/284760">“Even if the war in Gaza ends, this hatred isn’t going anywhere”: Soviet-born émigré Jews speak out on the rise of antisemitism in the U.S.</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/297996">“They were smiling as they shot at us”: The Insider speaks with Israelis whose lives were turned upside down on October 7, 2023</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 09:50:57 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[From incels to rioters: How economic insecurity and psychological alienation have fueled a surge in youth extremism across Europe]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/politics/299189</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/politics/299189</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrey Smolyakov]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299189/MhjIzblQqyH8dHnZgnvfMzlvI3lWdG97yrdu7tLF.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The radical youth protests now taking place in several European countries are part of broader social shifts that experts have been observing for years. The sharpest rise has been in far-right extremism, which increased by approximately 250% between 2014 and 2020, even if the pace of growth has slowed. Meanwhile, the 2025 Global Terrorism Index shows that the number of politically motivated terrorist attacks has risen by 20% since 2024, with children and teenagers carrying out half of them. The radicalization of young people across Europe is taking many different forms, and research suggests that ideology is secondary to socioeconomic factors.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3 class="outline-heading">Types of extremism</h3><p>In the public mind, extremism in Western countries is most commonly associated with Islamic fundamentalism, but the scale of that particular problem is often exaggerated. The Muslim population of the EU <a href="https://econtent.hogrefe.com/doi/10.1027/1016-9040/a000314?utm_source=chatgpt.com">numbers</a> 19 million, and according to various estimates — including <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/64192.htm?utm_source=chatgpt.com">conservative ones</a> — fewer than 1% of Muslims in Western Europe have any real connection to radical organizations (and even within this tiny subgroup, the overwhelming majority have not <a href="https://www.justitsministeriet.dk/sites/default/files/media/Arbejdsomraader/Forskning/Forskningspuljen/2011/2007/Home_grown_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe_-_an_assessment_of_influencing_factors__2_.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">committed</a> acts of violence). </p><p>Researchers distinguish between two types of radicalization: cognitive radicalization, or the adoption of fundamentalist or exclusionary beliefs, and behavioral radicalization, which involves violence (whether as a participant or merely as a supporter). The two are not clearly correlated, and in the overwhelming majority of cases, ideological radicalization does not lead to illegal action.</p><p>A 2021 survey of 8,000 young people in Switzerland (aged around 17) <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0252851&utm_source=chatgpt.com">found</a> that agreement with statements by Islamic extremists was lower than agreement with those made by secular radicals of the far-right and far-left. The authors concluded that youth radicalization is primarily cognitive in nature and that cognitive radicalization alone cannot predict actual terrorist behavior.</p><p>Although jihadist attacks <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2025?utm_source=chatgpt.com">remain</a> a threat in both Europe and the United States, the fastest-growing <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/news/secretary-general%E2%80%99s-new-report-highlights-new-emerging-form-%E2%80%9Cfar-right%E2%80%9D-terrorism?utm_source=chatgpt.com">form</a> of extremism is far-right extremism. According to the Global Terrorism Index, published by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), far-right extremism among young people in the West <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2020-measuring-impact-terrorism?utm_source=chatgpt.com">increased</a> by 250% between 2014 and 2020.</p><blockquote>Far-right extremism among young people in the West increased by 250% between 2014 and 2020</blockquote><p>One striking feature of this trend is that the radicals who do cross over into the behavorial camp are increasingly young people acting alone: nearly 92% of terrorist attacks over the past five years were so-called "lone wolf" incidents. In 2025, children and teenagers <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Global-Terrorism-Index-2026-Report.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">were suspected</a> in nearly half (42%) of all terrorism-related investigations in Western countries, and in the United Kingdom, Home Office statistics show a record rise in the proportion of teenagers arrested for terrorism-related offenses — from 3% in 2002–03 to 19% in 2023. In France, minors prosecuted for terrorist offenses accounted for one-fifth of all such cases.</p><p>Such trends can be observed around the world. Young people are indeed much more likely than before to attempt acts of violence and terrorism (even if most of these attempts fail). In the United Kingdom, official <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7613/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">Home Office statistics</a> show an increase in the proportion of children and teenagers arrested for terrorism-related offenses: from 3% of all arrests (eight people) in 2002–03 to 19% (42 people) in 2023, a <a href="https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/news/number-of-young-people-arrested-for-terrorism-offences-hits-record-high/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">record</a> for the country. In France, the number of minors prosecuted for terrorist offenses rose from two in 2022 to 15 in 2023 and 18 in 2024, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/home/items/880571?utm_source=chatgpt.com">accounting</a> for one-fifth of all such cases there.  According to the latest Europol <a href="https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/new-report-major-developments-and-trends-terrorism-in-europe-in-2024?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank">figures</a>, in the EU as a whole almost one in three people arrested for terrorism-related offenses in 2024 was a minor or young adult.</p><p>This trend extends beyond lone, ideologically motivated attacks to include organized terrorist activity as well. For example, whereas jihadist groups almost never recruited minors in the early 2000s, since 2015 at least one plot involving children and teenagers has been <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Global-Terrorism-Index-2026-Report.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">identified</a> almost every year.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">From insecurity to intolerance</h3><p>The mechanisms terrorist groups use to recruit members differ fundamentally from those inspiring nonviolent, cognitive radicalization. The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at the US Military Academy at West Point <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-state-long-game-a-tripartite-analysis-of-youth-radicalization-and-indoctrination/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">describes</a> the three-stage strategy that the Islamic State used to recruit young people at the height of its military power in the mid 2010s.</p><p>First, the Islamic State involved mothers in radicalizing their own children. Second, its propaganda portrayed militants as both brutal and tender, creating an appealing image of masculinity. Third, the group's media efforts presented extreme violence as “entertainment” through livestreams, execution videos, and combat footage.</p><blockquote>The Islamic State involved mothers in radicalizing their own children</blockquote><p>CTC analysts note that the educational curricula the Islamic State developed for children and teenagers were “professionally prepared, with pedagogical approaches similar to those used in the West.” At the same time, themes of violence and the apocalypse were deliberately woven into ordinary school subjects.</p><p>However, the Islamic State's recruitment methods (and those of other terrorist organizations) are unlikely to have affected the vast majority of young Muslims in the West. In fact, the mechanism at work here more closely resembles the ordinary process of adolescent identity formation under stress.</p><p>Singaporean terrorism researcher Kumar Ramakrishna <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2016/02/11/understanding-youth-radicalization-in-the-age-of-isis-a-psychosocial-analysis/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">points out</a> that the emotional center of the brain matures faster than the prefrontal cortex, which is responsible for impulse control and rational judgment. Adolescents go through a period of “seeking absolute certainty” — something extremist ideologies can provide, even if the answers they offer are highly dubious from a factual standpoint.</p><p>Technological developments have also had a significant impact on how people get attached to radical ideologies. A 2025 review by the U.S.-based Soufan Center, which studies terrorism and armed conflicts, <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-september-9/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">notes</a> that radicalization processes that once could previously take “months or years” now occur in “days or even hours” as a result of social media algorithms, the spread of emotionally charged content, and the isolating effects of online communities. According to the latest figures from the Global Terrorism Index, the average time between first exposure to extremist material and full radicalization <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2026?utm_source=chatgpt.com">has fallen</a> dramatically — from around 18 months in 2005 to just a few weeks as of 2026.</p><p>It is important to note that the review describes this as a general feature of contemporary radicalization, not one specific to Islamism, noting that: “Far-right, far-left, nihilist, and Islamist extremists all use social media to influence and radicalize young people.” In fact, the underlying factors pushing young people towards radicalization are are virtually identical, regardless of whether the ideology in question is Islamist, Christianist, left-wing, or right-wing.</p><p>In 2013, a group of researchers from the Netherlands <a href="https://spssi.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/josi.12030?utm_source=chatgpt.com">published</a> a study based on surveys of young Dutch Muslims. They identified three key factors driving radicalization: personal uncertainty, a sense of injustice, and the perception that one's social group is under threat. These factors contribute to the development of a sense of one's own group's superiority or exceptionalism, distrust of authority, and social alienation. Together, they predict a tolerance of violence committed by members of one's own group, followed by a willingness to engage in violence oneself.</p><p>This helps explain the strong correlation between adverse childhood experiences and radicalization identified in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index. According to the report, 87% of radicalized minors had a history of parental neglect or psychological abuse, while 77% had experienced some degree of neglect or lack of parental supervision. Economic pessimism also plays a significant role, as growing social inequality fuels a sense of injustice even when it does not affect a radicalized individual directly.</p><p>Another Dutch researcher, Maykel Verkuyten, <a href="https://dspace.library.uu.nl/server/api/core/bitstreams/bd5a5583-2f4a-49ac-be5b-55d566d25381/content?utm_source=chatgpt.com">argues</a> in a 2018 paper that in-group and intergroup dynamics, including those on social media, have a greater influence on radicalization than religion. He also notes that radicalized people's religious backgrounds look nothing like indoctrination — many supporters of Islamist movements received their education in secular schools, while some were even <a href="https://www.pennpress.org/9780812238082/understanding-terror-networks/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">raised</a> in the <a href="https://www.meforum.org/middle-east-quarterly/european-converts-to-terrorism?utm_source=chatgpt.com">Christian faith</a>. In other words, religious fundamentalism is often a symptom of radicalization rather than its cause.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">The vicious cycle of Islamophobia</h3><p>A sense of injustice and perceptions of hostility from society are among the key factors in the formation of extremist beliefs. As a result, the rise of xenophobic and anti-Muslim rhetoric in the West can be seen not only as a reaction to the radicalization of young Muslims, but also as one of its causes.</p><p>Turkish sociologist Ayhan Kaya made just such an argument in 2021 after <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/3877?utm_source=chatgpt.com">conducting</a> 160 in-depth interviews with young Muslims and members of far-right movements in Belgium, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. Kaya concluded that radicalization in both groups was driven not by “civilizational, cultural, and religious differences,” but by a shared sense of socioeconomic, political, and psychological alienation. Kaya <a href="https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/media/document/2022/06/08/the-crisis-of-civilizational-paradigm.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">described</a> the dynamic as co-radicalization: intergroup conflict, he argues, develops “through cycles of mutual threats and violence.”</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aec5a22147a84.01123489/3LpFk6OY169hc4MnuVsm9Ek3IxzLhFuu4FJcIm8G.jpg" alt="Anti-immigrant riots in the United Kingdom"/><figcaption>Anti-immigrant riots in the United Kingdom</figcaption></figure><p>Another study — this one co-authored by Kaya in 2023 — <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14782804.2023.2193734?utm_source=chatgpt.com">identifies</a> factors that contribute to the development of fundamentalist views among Muslims. These include alienation from the dominant culture and society, as well as dissatisfaction with political policies and institutions. The interviewees — young Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan descent living in Paris and Lyon — pointed to xenophobia among conservative politicians and in the press, describing it as an artificially imposed anti-Islamic agenda. The researchers characterize the Islamic radicalism that emerges under these conditions as a “response to nationalism” rather than an independent religious phenomenon.</p><p>Increasingly, young people in Western countries blame “outsiders” — mainly immigrants — for their economic problems, viewing newcomers as competitors in the struggle for rapidly dwindling resources. However, this hostility from the majority only <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ejsp.2174?utm_source=chatgpt.com">strengthens</a> solidarity within the Muslim community, which the wider public, in turn, interprets as evidence of radicalism.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Socioeconomic shocks</h3><p>Young people today increasingly <a href="https://cgscholar.com/publishers/articles/youth-agency-and-structural-precarity-in-european-labor-markets?utm_source=chatgpt.com">find themselves</a> living in the <a href="https://www.hse.ru/data/2013/01/28/1304836059/Standing.%20The_Precariat__The_New_Dangerous_Class__-Bloomsbury_USA(2011).pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">precariat</a> — a social class <a href="https://www.youthforum.org/files/2605-M-Ending-Precarity.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">characterized</a> not only by low wages, but also by the constant stress of live on chronically unstable incomes. Among employed 15–24-year-olds in the <a href="https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/onze-diensten/methods/definitions/eu-15" target="_blank">EU-15</a>, the share working on temporary contracts <a href="https://aei.pitt.edu/40813/1/social_2009.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">rose</a> from 25% in 1990 to 40% in 2008 before reashing <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/european-statistics-learning-hub/statistics-for-beginners/labour-market-employment?utm_source=chatgpt.com">47.6% in 2024</a>. The problem also affects the slightly older 15–29 age group: 33.3% of employees in this category were working on fixed-term contracts according to the most recent available data.</p><p>Housing is another major challenge. Between 2005 and 2018, the share of young families who owned their homes <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/8/6906?utm_source=chatgpt.com">fell</a> by 21%. Even among households in which young people were in full-time employment, the rate dropped from 52.6% to 41.5%, even as homeownership across the population as a whole remained virtually unchanged.</p><p>Between 2010 and 2024, housing prices in the EU <a href="https://assets.eurofound.europa.eu/f/279033/x/90266aeaab/ef25052en-1.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">increased</a> by 55.4%, while rents rose by 26.7% — a <a href="https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/housing-european-union-market-developments-underlying-drivers-and-policies_en?utm_source=chatgpt.com#:~:text=House%20prices%20in,reduced%20purchase%20affordability.">faster pace</a> than in previous decades. This increase has <a href="https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/housing-european-union-market-developments-underlying-drivers-and-policies_en?utm_source=chatgpt.com">hit particularly hard</a> among young workers with low incomes and less secure employment.</p><p>Feelings of instability, insecurity, and injustice stemming from precarious economic circumstances often <a href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10100481/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">make people</a> more susceptible to conspiracy theories and more likely to vote for far-right parties, among other social ills.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Muhammad, Jesus, and... Hitler?!</h3><p>The factors described above — personal uncertainty, a sense of injustice, and the perception that one's social group is under threat — <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1750-4716.2012.00099.x?utm_source=chatgpt.com">also apply</a> to other radical groups, including Christian ones. In 2021, a group of Swiss researchers <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0252851&utm_source=chatgpt.com">concluded</a> that Christian affiliation contributes to the development of far-right views (albeit to a limited extent).</p><blockquote>Christian affiliation contributes to the development of far-right extremist views</blockquote><p>The authors link this phenomenon to the postwar European narrative of a “Christian West” as a marker of <a href="https://www.illiberalism.org/religion-and-the-radical-right-in-west-european-democracies-christian-and-para-christian-identities/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">national identity</a>. Parties such as Alternative for Germany (AfD) <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Right-wing-populism-and-religion-in-Germany%3A-and-Althoff/40307a300e463aeaae9bbf3ceabc2eb6e092247b?utm_source=chatgpt.com">draw on</a> similar narratives, calling for the “defense of Christian civilization against Islam.”</p><p>In the rhetoric of the U.S. far right, demographic and cultural changes are likewise portrayed as a threat to national identity, according to a 2017 study on <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414017720705?utm_source=chatgpt.com">“nostalgic deprivation.”</a> The term describes a sense of loss triggered by the disappearance of a remembered — often entirely imagined — former social order. Similar mechanisms foster a sense of religious exceptionalism among young Muslims, who seek to establish their identity by “reviving” an idealized “purified” version of their own community amid growing dissatisfaction with their present circumstances.</p><p>Why is this surge happening now? Over the past decade, a significant number of young people in Europe's deindustrialized cities have experienced declining social status and the identity crisis that results. This has coincided with the widespread adoption of smartphones and algorithmically curated content. At the same time, rhetoric centered on exceptional victimhood and civilizational threats has entered the political mainstream. The convergence of these forces within a single generation has fueled rapid radicalization.</p><p>The Islamic State's educational programs, along with specific attacks carried out by radicalized young people, are indisputably real. However, the psychological path to radical beliefs — through feelings of uncertainty, injustice, and threats to one's social group — is virtually identical, regardless of whether a young person quotes the Quran, the Bible, incel ideology, or the “Great Replacement” theory.</p><p>Some grievances are treated as legitimate political concerns, while others are seen as security threats. In Ayhan Kaya's research, a Rotterdam resident angry that refugees are given priority access to housing and a Parisian woman upset that the press portrays her hijab as a threat are describing, in essence, parallel experiences.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/282269">The hate algorithm: How social media fuels radicalization</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/286010">TikTok Nazis: Why European youth are embracing far-right ideologies</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 20:15:40 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russian Investigative Committee representative speaks at UN meeting in Vienna despite sanctions against her boss]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299275</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299275</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Anna Starzhinskaya, a department head in the Main Investigative Directorate of Russia’s Investigative Committee, spoke at a UN working group meeting on asset recovery held earlier this week in Vienna. The Investigative Committee <a href="https://sledcom.ru/news/item/2139740/">said</a> its representative discussed Russia’s experience fighting corruption and called for greater international cooperation. The agency’s chairman, Alexander Bastrykin, has been under European Union sanctions since 2021 for malign activities including his role in the prosecution of the late Alexei Navalny, whose Anti-Corruption Foundation <a href="https://youtu.be/8R7k-dUZ7hM?si=8E8W4CXZyzGtROhc&t=410">investigated</a> the inexplicable wealth of the Putin regime’s most prominent figures.</p><p>Starzhinskaya took part in the 20th session of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Asset Recovery, which <a href="https://indico.un.org/event/1025477/">was held</a> Nov. 3-5 at the Vienna International Centre. The group is a subsidiary body of the Conference of the States Parties to the UN Convention against Corruption. According to organizers, the meeting was open to representatives of governments and international organizations, but not to nongovernmental observers.</p><p>In her remarks, Starzhinskaya said Russia follows a policy of “zero tolerance” toward corruption. According to the Investigative Committee, Russian authorities identified and seized more than $486 million in assets belonging to people accused of corruption in 2026. She also described the Investigative Committee's cooperation with Russian federal financial intelligence agency Rosfinmonitoring, its tools for tracing cryptocurrency transactions, and its efforts to handle more than 6,000 requests for international legal assistance over the course of four years. </p><p>The European Union <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/02/global-human-rights-sanctions-regime-eu-sanctions-four-people-responsible-for-serious-human-rights-violations-in-russia/">imposed</a> sanctions on Investigative Committee Chairman Alexander Bastrykin on March 2, 2021. The Council of the EU held him responsible for arbitrary detentions, the prosecution of Alexei Navalny, and the suppression of peaceful protests. In an <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/2721/oj/eng">updated</a> sanctions justification issued in 2023, the EU also cited what it described as systematic repression of Russia’s opposition by the Investigative Committee.</p><p>The sanctions have also targeted other officials at the agency. In May 2025, the EU <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/20/human-rights-violations-in-russia-eu-lists-further-28-individuals/">added</a> Investigative Committee officials to its sanctions list who the Council of the EU accused of taking part in fabricating criminal cases against activists, including people associated with Navalny. In practice, Russia’s Investigative Committee has become one of the main institutions carrying out systematic political repression in the country.</p><p>Starzhinskaya has regularly attended international events abroad. In March 2026, she <a href="https://vk.ru/wall146109172_2314">wrote</a> on VKontakte about an official trip to New York, where she said she helped draft a new UТ convention. “Everything came together on this trip, and it brought only positive emotions, valuable experience, and a chance to practice legal English!” she wrote. In January, she <a href="https://vk.ru/wall146109172_2313">recalled</a> a December 2025 trip to Vienna that included a visit to the Vienna State Opera. In July 2026, she again <a href="https://vk.ru/wall146109172_2323">posted</a> photographs from the Austrian capital.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6ae/6aedfbf5e08ba6.73079701/rMEQXanFarz5uxMmOvaeW6EjytVNbv2hNYzf9yAb.jpg" alt="Anna Starzhinskaya in front of St. Stephen’s Cathedral in Vienna"/><figcaption>Anna Starzhinskaya in front of St. Stephen’s Cathedral in Vienna</figcaption></figure><p>Russia’s participation in the UN working group meeting does not formally violate the organization’s rules. Moscow ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in 2006 and remains a party to it. The meeting nevertheless took place at an international venue in Austria despite EU sanctions against the head of the Russian agency whose representative had been invited to speak. </p><p>In September 2026, UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Russia Mariana Katzarova <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/ru/press-releases/2026/09/nowhere-safe-un-special-rapporteur-exposes-russias-global-transnational">reported</a> that Russian authorities had developed a system of transnational repression targeting its citizens around the world. She said documented cases of Kremlin critics being targeted abroad had increased eightfold since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Katzarova also said the Russian authorities use international legal assistance channels and Interpol notices to pursue critics outside the country.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/288135">Banking on repression: How Russia weaponized its “terrorist” list against political dissidents</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/ivan-astashin/292126">Wrong side of the law: The Russian state is institutionalizing abductions, torture, and other repressive practices</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/282442">Adding insult to injury: Russia is fabricating new cases against political prisoners</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 16:12:57 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[The Georgian Dream is fading: Two years of protest have not stopped Tbilisi&#039;s authoritarian drift]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/politics/299146</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/politics/299146</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Arthur Belansky]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299146/ExJFfwZyVqTiMY5AeTX5LI32Qiar2tfizx38qhah.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The Constitutional Court in Tbilisi has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/georgia-opposition-crackdown-dissent-georgian-dream-adf95f567c9025a8b3e657474d97960d?utm_source=chatgpt.com">begun hearing</a> a case brought by the ruling Georgian Dream party, which seeks to ban the country’s five main opposition parties. Just a few years ago, Georgia was considered a model of democratic development in the region. Now, the authorities have not only halted the EU integration process, they have also stepped up political repression. Censorship of the media has intensified, human rights organizations face economic sanctions, and at least 90 political prisoners sit in jail. Georgia has even developed its own version of Russia's politically motivated online monitoring agency Roskomnadzor, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/ru/latest/news/2026/07/georgia-journalist-jailed-and-comedian-attacked-for-political-satire/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">arresting</a> citizens for their comments posted to social media. Nevertheless, civil society continues to resist the government’s authoritarian course, maintaining a mass protest movement that is still going strong after two years of uninterrupted demonstrations.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3 class="outline-heading">How Georgia changed course</h3><p>On Oct. 29, Georgia’s Constitutional Court held another hearing in a case brought by the ruling Georgian Dream party, which seeks to ban the activities of the country's most prominent opposition parties. The lawsuit is radical even by the standards of established autocracies, and it is all the more shocking given the fact that as little as a decade ago Georgia was still considered a democratic success story. And yet, while society staggers under each new assault against normality, the government strikes harder.</p><p>The weakening of democratic institutions, restrictions imposed on citizens'  fundamental rights, and the  shrinking space for civil society in Georgia are all interconnected, according to the EU’s <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/2026-07-EEAS_annual_Report_HR-2025-on-line.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">2025 human rights report</a>, published in August. According to the EU, some cases of police brutality against protesters amounted to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. And no one in power is held accountable. </p><p>Independent media are facing increasingly notably severe restrictions. Amendments to the Law on Broadcasting and the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence prohibit foreign funding for media outlets, but in the hands of Georgian Dream, they function less as safeguards and more as a convenient justification for punishing journalists who violate the principles of “fairness and confidentiality” in their content.</p><p>Sometimes, it really does feel like all of this happened overnight. As recently as 2018, when neighboring Armenia carried out a series of democratic reforms, Georgia was still regarded as the leading democracy in the South Caucasus. As Tigran Amiryan, founder of Armenia's Cultural and Social Narratives Laboratory, wrote in a 2024 <a href="https://ge.boell.org/en/2024/08/01/spring-will-end-october-armenias-reaction-russian-law-georgia?utm_source=chatgpt.com">article</a> : “For many years, Georgia was a leader in democratic transformation in the South Caucasus. The country’s aspiration to become part of Europe — or at least Eastern Europe — was not merely an ambition of Georgian civil society; it was reflected in a clearly articulated action plan.”</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6ae/6aeb1fee1c9f35.50697769/TTrM5Ns5nQDQhycJmpL1YVr6I2zkY28yIilwJ9h3.jpg" alt="Bidzina Ivanishvili is widely regarded as Georgia’s de facto ruler"/><figcaption>Bidzina Ivanishvili is widely regarded as Georgia’s de facto ruler</figcaption></figure><p>The Georgian Dream party, which came to power in 2012, was suspected from the outset of harboring ties to Moscow. Its founder and leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili, amassed a fortune in Russia through <a href="https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/chto-skryvaet-dosje-ivanishvili-/33037339.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com">business deals</a> with oligarchs close to Vladimir Putin. According to <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/scoop/family-of-georgian-oligarch-bidzina-ivanishvili-has-unreported-real-estate-in-russia?utm_source=chatgpt.com">OCCRP</a>, his family still owns high-value real estate in the Russian capital and holds accounts with Sberbank. The extent to which these connections influence Ivanishvili’s policies remains unclear, however, as the Georgian government continues to formally distance itself from the Kremlin. Georgia, for instance, has yet to restore full diplomatic relations with Russia, which were severed after the 2008 war. There have been worrying signs, however, including the expulsion of Russian opposition activists and journalists. Ivanishvili evidently does not want a falling-out with Moscow. Since 2022, numerous anti-war rallies have been held in Tbilisi and other Georgian cities, but the authorities have consistently refrained from taking a position on the Russia-Ukraine war.</p><p>The crackdown has been underway for several years. In October 2021, former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili (who had indeed entered the country illegally after a stint in Ukraine) was arrested in a highly publicized move. In late 2023, Georgia was granted EU candidate status, but by then it was already clear that the government was shifting the country’s political course in the opposite direction. In March of that year, the ruling Georgian Dream party introduced its Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence in parliament. It was immediately dubbed the “Russian law” because of its similarity to Russia’s legislation on “foreign agents.”</p><p>Although parliament passed the bill in a first reading, mass protests persuaded the government to withdraw it. Georgia was granted EU candidate status largely thanks to the efforts of civil society — not the actions of the government — European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen <a href="https://neweasterneurope.eu/2023/11/30/the-eu-bet-on-the-georgian-people-with-its-candidacy-decision/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">said</a> in November 2023.</p><p>The following year, Georgian Dream was better prepared to weather its citizenry's resistance. Despite promising not to revive the “Russian law,” it was pushed through parliament. Police responded to the resulting wave of protests with much greater aggression, <a href="https://civil.ge/archives/602765?utm_source=chatgpt.com">using special equipment</a> against demonstrators and carrying out mass arrests. For the first time, the authorities also <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-tbilisi-foreign-agents-law-protest/32939363.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com">deployed "titushki"</a> — groups of plain clothes hired thugs who attacked activists, journalists, and opposition figures.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Repression intensifies</h3><p>In the October 2024 parliamentary elections, Georgian Dream won an official 53.93% of the vote, securing 89 of the 150 seats in parliament. However, the election was marked by the the <a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/277539" target="_blank">blatant abuse </a>of democratic norms. The authorities mobilized public-sector employees and pensioners, warning them that an opposition victory would lead to the legalization of same-sex marriage and Georgia's entry into the war in Ukraine. Anticipating opposition protests, the authorities brought busloads of government workers and pensioners from across the country to Tbilisi for a counter-rally. Marching down Rustaveli Avenue with EU flags, the participants genuinely believed they were demonstrating against war and gay people while supporting European integration.</p><p>Opposition protests did indeed erupt, but not immediately after the election results were announced. Instead, they began a month later when the ruling party announced that it was suspending Georgia’s EU accession process until the end of 2028. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze made the announcement on Nov. 28 in response to a <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-10-2024-0179_EN.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com">European Parliament resolution</a> condemning “the worsening democratic crisis in Georgia following the parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud.” The European Parliament called for new free elections to be held within a year and proposed targeted sanctions.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeb20525faa75.04434576/kCATK8DlEhBMXDGMIldcgXThC0UtFJm4gWfmWp1k.jpg" alt=""/></figure><p>In late November 2024, during the first days of the renewed protests, demonstrators erected barricades and threw firecrackers at police, who responded with unrestrained force — attacking protesters with water cannons and tear gas and carrying out mass arrests. Opposition leaders and media workers were also subjected to raids and arrests.</p><p>According to <a href="https://reform.news/protiv-372-uchastnikov-protestov-v-gruzii-vozbuzhdeny-ugolovnye-dela-mvd/amp/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">journalists’ estimates</a>, the authorities arrested nearly 400 people during the first 10 days of the winter protests. Transparency International Georgia now <a href="https://jam-news.net/ru/%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BA-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BB%D1%8E%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85-%D0%B2-%D0%B3%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B7%D0%B8%D0%B8/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">counts</a> 90 political prisoners in the country of 3.8 million. They include journalist Mzia Amaglobeli, sentenced to two years in prison for slapping a police chief, and poet Zviad Ratiani, who received a two-year sentence for “insulting a police officer.” During the mass protests, demonstrators received support from many <a href="https://civil.ge/archives/640162?utm_source=chatgpt.com">diplomats</a> and <a href="https://civil.ge/archives/647053?utm_source=chatgpt.com">major businesses</a>, but the authorities were prepared for this too — some officials were dismissed, while assistance funds set up by businesspeople to help protesters pay their fines were <a href="https://civil.ge/archives/669696?utm_source=chatgpt.com">frozen</a>.</p><p>A turning point came on Dec. 14, 2024, when Georgia held its presidential election. Pro-European incumbent Salome Zourabichvili, who had refused to recognize the results of the parliamentary election, was replaced by former footballer Mikheil Kavelashvili, a Georgian Dream loyalist. Zourabichvili initially refused to leave the Presidential Palace but eventually did so on Dec. 29, the day of Kavelashvili’s inauguration.</p><p>That same day, Kavelashvili fast-tracked a series of laws targeting protesters. These included a ban on covering one’s face and sharply increased fines for blocking roads and defacing property with graffiti. The Prosecutor General’s Office subsequently launched criminal cases against three organizations providing legal assistance to detained protesters — the Tbilisi Human Rights House, Sapari, and the Social Justice Center — charging them with “sabotage” and “hostile activities on behalf of a foreign power” and freezing their bank accounts.</p><blockquote>On the day of his inauguration, the new president banned protesters from covering their faces and sharply increased fines for blocking roads and defacing property with graffiti. The Prosecutor General’s Office also opened criminal cases against human rights organizations over alleged “hostile activities on behalf of a foreign power”</blockquote><p>In September 2025, a Georgian court handed down its first high-profile sentences against a group of activists in a case that became known as the “Trial of the Eleven.” All 11 protesters were sentenced to two years in prison under the provision criminalizing group actions that violate public order.</p><p>The largest wave of arrests came on Oct. 4, 2025, the day of the municipal elections, when a crowd of demonstrators toppled the metal barriers at the entrance to the Orbeliani Presidential Palace and broke into its courtyard. The authorities immediately branded the incident an “attempted coup,” while Zourabichvili (who was still president at the time) called the storming “a staged incident and a provocation by the regime aimed at discrediting peaceful protest.”</p><p>More than 60 protesters were charged with inciting the violent overthrow of the constitutional order, group violence, and seizing or blocking a strategic facility. Fifteen received prison sentences.</p><p>President Mikheil Kavelashvili later pardoned three of those arrested to mark the religious holiday of Mariamoba. Pardons on religious holidays are a longstanding practice among the Georgian authorities. For example, in late August 2026, they pardoned Russian national Denis Kulanin, who had also been arrested during the protests, on charges of damaging a police vehicle.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeb20c2249a19.91744963/0BGSPzCFqb0fHgJ0tVwTXx81u5EbK47R9mYQb9we.jpg" alt=""/></figure><p>The attempted storming of the Presidential Palace exposed the Georgian opposition’s disorganization and lack of a clear strategy. As human rights activist Marina Meskhi recounted: “I simply couldn’t understand the opposition figures, Paata Burchuladze, for example, who called for the storming. Suppose they had entered the palace. What then? It was unclear what they were trying to achieve. They are now in prison, unable to communicate with anyone, so we cannot even know what they themselves think about what happened.”</p><p>One of the political prisoners in the Oct. 4 case is Nana Sander, a Georgian citizen who had lived in Germany for 16 years. She returned to Georgia to join the protests and, as she <a href="https://www.interpressnews.ge/en/article/148212-nana-sander-there-is-no-footage-showing-that-i-used-violence-against-anyone-i-consider-myself-innocent-not-for-a-single-moment-have-i-felt-remorse-what-troubles-me-is-inhumane-treatment-my-torture-has-not-end?utm_source=chatgpt.com">put it</a>, to “defend the Georgian people’s right to have a voice.” Unlike most other defendants, Sander was charged with more than simply participating in the unrest. She received a seven-year prison sentence for organizing group violence and publicly calling for the violent alteration of the constitutional order or the overthrow of the government. </p><p>The same sentence was handed down to the rally’s actual organizers: opera singer and opposition figure Paata Burchuladze, and politicians Murtaz Zodelava and Irakli Nadiradze. Sander <a href="https://www.interpressnews.ge/en/article/145175-nana-sanders-a-criminal-offense-was-committed-against-me-in-prison-degrading-treatment-sexual-harassment-and-a-demand-to-strip-in-which-at-least-5-people-were-involved/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">said</a> that she had been beaten in prison, ordered to strip in front of five staff members (including the prison director), and subjected to sexual harassment.</p><blockquote>Georgian national Nana Sander, who had emigrated to Germany and was arrested at a protest, was beaten in prison, ordered to strip in front of five staff members, including the prison director, and subjected to sexual harassment</blockquote><p>Daily protests continued after the October events. On Jan. 1, 2026, the continuous protest movement <a href="https://civil.ge/archives/716137/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">reached</a> its 400th day, even if the demonstrations had become much smaller. The last rally to draw thousands of people took place on May 26, 2026, Georgia’s Independence Day. One reason for the decline in attendance was growing exhaustion in the absence of any visible change. “It is very difficult for some people to keep going. We have our own lives, jobs, and children,” one protester <a href="https://eurasianet.org/tbilisi-protests-pass-500-days-with-no-end-in-sight-what-choice-do-we-have?utm_source=chatgpt.com">said</a>.</p><p>Another important factor was the tightening of legislation. The new restrictions go beyond higher fines for wearing masks, using pyrotechnics, and blocking roads: organizing large demonstrations has also become more difficult in practical terms. Under the new laws, organizers of demonstrations “on roadways or in pedestrian zones” must notify the Interior Ministry at least five days in advance. The police then have three days to reschedule or relocate a protest if they believe it could obstruct the movement of “vehicles or pedestrians.”</p><p>Nevertheless, protests are still taking place in Georgia, and a large-scale demonstration is expected in late November to mark the second anniversary of the start of the protest movement.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">A divided opposition</h3><p>Following the 2024 elections, all four opposition blocs that cleared the 5% threshold — the Unity National Movement, Coalition for Change, Strong Georgia, and Gakharia for Georgia — refused to recognize the results or take part in the new parliament’s work. In October 2025, however, Gakharia for Georgia reversed course and had 11 of its deputies take their seats in parliament.</p><p>The party’s leader, former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, went into exile after <a href="https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/prokuratura-vozbudila-ugolovnoe-delo-v-otnoshenii-eks-premjera-georgiya-gahariya-/33588256.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com">two criminal cases</a> were opened against him in November 2025. Party representative Giorgi Sharashidze <a href="https://civil.ge/archives/707513?utm_source=chatgpt.com">explained</a> the decision to return to parliament by saying that a boycott as a form of protest “had failed to stop Georgian Dream’s machine of evil or prevent the authorities from making decisions that harm the country.”</p><p>The other opposition parties, however, continue to boycott parliament. In March 2026, nine of them <a href="https://civil.ge/archives/723230?utm_source=chatgpt.com">announced</a> the formation of a united alliance, issuing a joint declaration stating that they would neither recognize the Ivanishvili regime nor participate in institutions that lend it legitimacy. However, six months later, Akhali party secretary Tengo Tevzadze <a href="https://1tv.ge/lang/en/news/ahalis-tengo-tevzadze-opposition-alliance-in-its-initial-format-is-dysfunctional-and-defunct-yet-we-maintain-active-coordination-with-member-parties/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">said</a> that the alliance had become dysfunctional, effectively ceasing to exist because of internal disagreements.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeb213d2454e1.64903574/5iCzYoZYWHKRDhPhl94zmLCZwCShufBuCThY0InQ.jpg" alt="Georgian parliament meets without some opposition parties"/><figcaption>Georgian parliament meets without some opposition parties</figcaption></figure><p>One factor undermining the opposition is the sweeping crackdown on its leaders launched by the authorities after Georgian Dream’s victory in the 2024 elections. Nika Melia, a member of the Coalition for Change, was <a href="https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/nika-meliya-prigovoren-k-polutora-godam-lisheniya-svobody/33606072.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com">sentenced</a> to 18 months in prison for splashing water on a judge during a preliminary hearing in a case in which he was accused of insulting a police officer. Elene Khoshtaria, leader of the Droa party, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/ru/latest/news/2026/03/georgia-opposition-politician-elene-khoshtaria-given-politically-motivated-prison-sentence-for-graffiti/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">received</a> the same sentence for writing “Russian Dream” on an election poster featuring Tbilisi’s mayor. Levan Khabeishvili, chairman of the United National Movement, was <a href="https://bm.ge/ru/news/levan-xabeisvili-prigovoren-k-25-godam-tiurmy?utm_source=chatgpt.com">sentenced</a> to two years and six months in prison on charges of promising a bribe to a public official and publicly calling for the overthrow of the government.</p><p>In September 2026, former Defense Minister and United National Movement leader Giorgi Baramidze was arrested on <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297074?utm_source=chatgpt.com">charges</a> of “treason against the homeland, namely sabotage,” over his remarks about the Georgian-Abkhaz war. Eight other opposition politicians are facing charges in the <a href="https://civil.ge/archives/745540?utm_source=chatgpt.com">“sabotage case”</a> — accused of passing information to foreign states, receiving funding for subversive activities from “hostile forces” (prosecution witnesses have <a href="https://jam-news.net/georgia-sabotage-trial-us-usaid-and-cia-branded-hostile-forces/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">named</a> the CIA and USAID), and “radicalizing political protests.” Three of the defendants — Khoshtaria, Melia, and Mikheil Saakashvili himself — are already serving prison sentences in other cases.</p><p>These charges echo the government’s public rhetoric about its opponents. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has <a href="https://www.interpressnews.ge/en/article/148612-irakli-kobakhidze-on-the-opposition-in-2012-bidzina-ivanishvili-played-a-chess-game-for-the-opposition-and-if-they-thought-they-were-good-enough-he-showed-who-the-real-grandmaster-was-after-2012-they-received?utm_source=chatgpt.com">called</a> the opposition “foreign agents,” while Georgian Dream deputy chairman Levan Machavariani has <a href="https://imedi.ge/en/politika/476357/georgias-ruling-party-official-eu-will-have-to-face-reality-and-engage-with-georgia?utm_source=chatgpt.com">claimed</a> that the EU is funding a “network of agents” inside the country to foment a revolution.</p><blockquote>The prime minister has called the opposition “foreign agents,” while Georgian Dream’s deputy chairman claims that the EU is funding a “network of agents” inside the country to foment a revolution</blockquote><p>Machavariani has also accused the EU's “ruling class” of having lost touch with its fundamental values and failing to serve the interests of the European people. He claims that European voters did not give their representatives a mandate to pursue what he described as “far-left, pseudo-liberal ideology,” “LGBT propaganda,” “uncontrolled illegal migration,” or “funding the Russia-Ukraine war until the last Ukrainian.”</p><p>Against this backdrop, Georgian Dream has filed a petition with Georgia’s Constitutional Court seeking to ban opposition parties. On Oct. 6, a panel of judges <a href="https://www.interpressnews.ge/en/article/150010-constitutional-lawsuit-seeking-ban-on-opposition-parties-referred-to-the-constitutional-courts-plenum?utm_source=chatgpt.com">referred</a> the petition to the court’s Plenum for consideration.</p><p>Even so, the opposition has failed to agree on a common protest strategy. The Lelo–Strong Georgia bloc <a href="https://1tv.ge/lang/en/news/lelos-irakli-kupradze-opposition-must-end-the-feuding-culture-whose-sole-purpose-is-rubbing-other-parties?utm_source=chatgpt.com">is calling</a> for closer cooperation between opposition parties and a renewed campaign in the regions. Tengo Tevzadze, secretary of the Akhali party <a href="https://1tv.ge/lang/en/news/ahalis-tengo-tevzadze-opposition-alliance-in-its-initial-format-is-dysfunctional-and-defunct-yet-we-maintain-active-coordination-with-member-parties/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">insists</a> that the opposition needs to mobilize for mass rallies. The United National Movement, meanwhile, is holding smaller <a href="https://1tv.ge/lang/en/news/unm-stages-rally-in-rike-park-demanding-ex-president-saakashvilis-release-photos/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">demonstrations</a> demanding the release of Mikheil Saakashvili and other political prisoners; they are also urging the United States to pass the MEGOBARI Act, a bill aimed at reassessing U.S. relations with the Georgian authorities.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Foreign nationals face intimidation</h3><p>Among those sentenced for taking part in the protests are several Russian nationals: Denis Kulanin (who was later pardoned), Anastasia Zinovkina, Artyom Gribul, and Anton Chechin. Although Zinovkina, Gribul, and Chechin are officially serving sentences for drug possession, Transparency International Georgia has included them on its list of political prisoners.</p><p>Police arrested Chechin on Dec. 3, 2025, following a protest against the suspension of Georgia’s EU integration process. His lawyer, Giorgi Chkheidze, said that Chechin had also been detained after a protest on Nov. 18, with police officers <a href="https://vot-tak.tv/84468470/chechin-narkotiki-advokat?utm_source=chatgpt.com">warning</a> him at that time to “stop and keep quiet.” In September 2025, a Tbilisi court sentenced Chechin to eight years and six months in prison on drug possession charges.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeb21b73aa683.39969444/zzFu7bART6PQmgrNuAlSlkgZajgJHzGyRCwCIxkR.jpg" alt="Foreign nationals arrested on drug charges"/><figcaption>Foreign nationals arrested on drug charges</figcaption></figure><p>Anastasia Zinovkina and Artyom Gribul were searched and arrested in December of the same year. The prosecution claimed that, according to “operational information from a confidential source,” the two Russians had been distributing drugs at protest rallies.</p><p>The police say they found a total of 16 grams of the psychostimulant α-PVP in their pockets. At trial, Gribul said that after being detained, he was put into a car, where police officers took his jacket and slipped a packet of drugs into one of its pockets. Like other detainees, Gribul and Zinovkina had attended protests against the suspension of Georgia’s EU integration process. Before that, they had also <a href="https://graniru.org/Politics/Russia/Politzeki/m.214559.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com">taken part</a> in protests in Russia.</p><p>During Anastasia Zinovkina’s closing statement, Judge Nino Galustashvili repeatedly interrupted her, preventing her from finishing her speech. However, human rights activists and journalists <a href="https://posledneeslovo.com/2025/09/18/zinovkina-anastasiya/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">recorded</a> its key passages, which included Zinovkina's call for mercy toward political prisoners and her vow to continue the political struggle:</p><blockquote><p>“I have always been a brave person. Now I know that mercy exists. I call on you to make a revolution. Love is a revolution, mercy is a revolution — mercy for people whose lives, freedom, health, money, and future are being taken away by these terrorists... They have turned us into martyrs, but I promise I will not give up. I will fight with all my strength, and I am not afraid.”</p></blockquote><p>Georgian nationals were also arrested on drug possession charges following their participation in protests. They included: journalist and Coalition for Change member Nikoloz Katsia, who was detained on his way to a rally on Rustaveli Avenue; Tedo Abramov, who was likewise arrested while heading to a protest; and doctor Giorgi Akhobadze, who had actively participated in the demonstrations and provided medical assistance to people injured by police. Yet while the Georgian activists were acquitted and released, the Russian nationals were convicted.</p><blockquote>Georgian activists were acquitted and released, while the Russian nationals were convicted</blockquote><p>Marina Meskhi attributes the difference to procedural factors: “The Russians supposedly had neutral witnesses — the interpreters. Drug planting has a long history in Georgia; it happened even under the previous government. Eight people convicted in such cases won at the European Court of Human Rights. Following those rulings, Georgia’s Constitutional Court ruled that arrests in drug-related cases must be video-recorded to prevent evidence from being planted and that neutral witnesses must be present. By using female interpreters as supposedly neutral witnesses, the police circumvented the Constitutional Court’s ruling.”</p><p>Besides the Russians, two Ukrainians — Sergey Kukharchuk and Ruslan Sivakov — also became victims of state repression during the protests. Both were sentenced to two years in prison for violating public order.</p><p>Stanislav Dmitrievsky, a Russian human rights activist living in Georgia, believes that Zinovkina, Gribul, and Chechin were targeted because of their outspoken political views. “The prosecutor’s office is still offering them the chance to admit guilt and reach a plea deal in exchange for their release. But the young men say they are unwilling to confess to something they did not do and insist that these cases are politically motivated,” he told <i>The Insider</i>. “This is a form of terrorism: choosing a victim simply because they are a convenient target for intimidating everyone else. You no longer see the Russian anti-war community at protests in Georgia. Everyone is intimidated, and everyone understands that their position here is precarious. This case has been a very effective way of targeting Russians and Ukrainians.”</p><p>The human rights activist also linked the harsh sentence handed down to Nana Sander to the authorities’ desire to send a message to Georgians living abroad that they should not interfere in the country’s domestic affairs.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">“No care, no medication”</h3><p>Political prisoners in Georgia frequently complain about their conditions of detention. “The women in the prison are living in terrible conditions,” Zinovkina said. “We don't even dream of freedom — all we want is conditions like those in the men's prison in Gldani. We want to see doctors, to be able to buy medication, and to have fresh food available in the prison shop. The cells in the women's prison are about nine square meters — with four beds, a table, a bench, and a bedside cabinet. There is barely any room for the women to move around.”</p><p>Marina Meskhi adds that Zinovkina’s back problems prevent her from sleeping on a standard prison mattress: “She has been diagnosed with bulging and herniated discs. Her request for an orthopedic mattress has gone nowhere. It has to be prescribed by a prison doctor, but he refuses to do so. The standard mattresses there are so bad that even someone with a healthy back could develop problems.”</p><p>Nana Sander, who is serving her sentence in the same prison, has also <a href="https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/ya-prohozhu-cherez-pytki---zaderzhannaya-gruzinskaya-aktivistka-ob-usloviyah-soderzhaniya-pod-strazhey/33646823.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com">spoken</a> about her health problems: “I have heart failure and back pain... They haven't even done an ECG. My jaw was swollen, but they did no X-ray, nothing. They prescribed antibiotics and said the X-ray machine was broken... No care, no examinations, no medication.”</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeb2263dc84c7.43927569/fhmfZj0iLt4NbfTHRx0U67Hz58NlqmsRmARBYOFC.jpg" alt="A prison in Georgia"/><figcaption>A prison in Georgia</figcaption></figure><p>Meskhi also recounts how she tried to send Alexei Navalny’s autobiography to Zinovkina: “I had sent the same book to Denis Kulanin, and it was accepted. But the rules for parcels are much stricter in the women’s prison. In the end, they refused to accept the book because, they said, something had been handwritten in it. What they meant was the phrase ‘Russia will be free’ on the last page, written in Navalny’s own hand. I had to tear out that page.”</p><p>“This barrack-room mentality seems to have developed over many years,” Meskhi explains. “Prison staff are used to dealing with ordinary inmates, who generally try not to make demands or complain. Now they have political prisoners, who are more inclined to stand up for their rights. But if you protest, argue, and file complaints, you can get a lot of things moving.”</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Drug policy as a symbol of authoritarianism</h3><p>Drug policy has long been a politically sensitive issue in Georgia. In May 2018, Tbilisi saw the so-called Techno Protest in response to police raids on the city’s nightclubs. Thousands of young people and electronic music fans gathered outside parliament on Rustaveli Avenue, staging a two-day rave featuring DJs and dancing. Eventually, Interior Minister Giorgi Gakharia came out to meet the crowd, apologizing for the police actions and promising an investigation.</p><p>The protests did not lead to immediate changes in drug policy but highlighted the need for reform. In the following years, Georgia took steps toward liberalizing its drug laws, including permitting the personal use of marijuana.</p><p>However, the country’s shift toward authoritarianism and intensifying repression have been accompanied by a tougher approach. The acquisition and possession of marijuana, previously decriminalized, have once again <a href="https://nor.ge/266554/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">become</a> subject to harsh penalties. The <a href="https://www.parliament.ge/en/media/news/parlamentma-narkotikuli-sashualebebis-fsikotropuli-nivtierebebis-prekursorebisa-da-narkologiuri-dakhmarebis-shesakheb-kanonshi-tsvlilebas-mkhari-dauchira?utm_source=chatgpt.com">list of prohibited substances</a> has been expanded, and <a href="https://www.newsgeorgia.ge/antinarkoticheskoe-zakonodatelstvo-budet-uzhestocheno-v-gruzii/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">penalties</a> have been introduced for those refusing to take drug tests.</p><p>The crackdown goes beyond legislative changes, with police stepping up street searches. In July, Georgia’s Interior Ministry <a href="https://t.me/Tbilisi_life/47447?utm_source=chatgpt.com">reported</a> that around 5,000 people had been held liable for drug-related offenses in the first half of 2026, an 85% increase over the same period last year.</p><p>According to Davit Kiknadze, head of the Interior Ministry’s Central Criminal Police Department, those detained include both Georgian citizens and foreign nationals. Against this backdrop, reports <a href="https://t.me/NGnewsgeorgia/29009?utm_source=chatgpt.com">emerged</a> in August that all 14 prisons in Georgia had run out of space. A total of 1,830 foreign nationals are currently behind bars in the country, accounting for 14.8% of the overall prison population.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeb22f6285a05.11751121/oIF9sAsDYirwoAyROTPpM8WitjgKvAaDCojhFlwK.jpg" alt=""/></figure><p>Although the available statistics do not establish that law enforcement officers are specifically targeting foreigners, there are indications that this may be happening. In recent months, several have been arrested for carrying prescription medications containing substances banned in Georgia.</p><p>In June 2026, police at Tbilisi Airport arrested 22-year-old Canadian national Simon Rowenski. He had arrived in Georgia with a prescription bottle of Adderall, prescribed by his doctor in Canada to treat ADHD. After Rowenski spent two months in detention, his family paid a fine of 30,000 lari (approximately $11,000), and he was released under a plea agreement and allowed to return to Canada. </p><p>A similar case occurred in July 2026, when British national Matthew Roy Desmond entered Georgia carrying prescription painkillers for his back. After three months in custody, Desmond’s lawyers managed to reach a deal with the prosecution, and he was released from the courtroom after agreeing to pay a fine of 100,000 lari (approximately $37,000), followed by deportation from Georgia.</p><p>Russians living in Georgia have also reported an increase in police checks, an emigrant who wished to remain anonymous told <i>The Insider:</i></p><blockquote><p>“Previously, police mainly stopped people who looked unconventional, such as men with dyed hair. Now, it feels as though they stop just about everyone, although men still seem to be the main targets. I've been searched twice in the past few weeks.</p><p>The checks have become more intrusive. Police search your backpack, go through your phone, and look at your messages and photos. Presumably, they're looking for correspondence with drug dealers or pictures of drugs. For example, when they were going through my photo gallery, they took an interest in a picture of an avocado seedling. An acquaintance of mine had wanted to give it to someone before leaving the country and had taken a photo of it.”</p></blockquote><h3 class="outline-heading">Society wasn&#039;t ready for the crackdown</h3><p>The speed of the political transformation caught Georgian society off guard, human rights activist Stanislav Dmitrievsky explained:</p><blockquote><p>“After the civil war of the early 1990s, Georgia developed as a democratic state governed by the rule of law, and until 2024, Georgian Dream also stuck to that rhetoric. Then, suddenly, everything changed within a matter of months. In Russia, this process took many years. Until 2012, NGOs operated under relatively normal conditions, and Russian civil society had time to develop the tools it needed to resist and continue its work. Yes, people were harassed and repressed, but that work remained possible until 2022. In Georgia, however, everything collapsed almost overnight.</p><p>Working for an NGO had been prestigious in Georgia. It was a well-paid job that carried considerable social standing. There was extensive cooperation with the authorities and many worthwhile joint programs. And then, all of a sudden, the government says: ‘Stop. We're not going to Europe, and anyone who thinks otherwise is an enemy.’ Within a few months, laws were passed that stigmatized the entire independent sector as an enemy. Naturally, people were unprepared for this.</p><p>Human rights organizations suddenly faced a whole range of urgent problems — securing funding for organizations under pressure, and dealing with numerous criminal cases and state inspections. There were also administrative cases involving thousands of people. Georgia had grown accustomed to the idea that whenever large numbers of people took to the streets, the authorities had no choice but to respond. But the government behaved just as it does in Russia and Belarus. These are Russian-style rules: you can be hauled off to jail just for standing on the sidewalk. All of this came as a shock.</p><p>After the civil war and the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgian society had developed a deep aversion to violence. The authorities, however, proved ready to use it. Ukrainians managed to break this cycle during the second Maidan uprising. When the Verkhovna Rada was about to vote on all those copies of Russian laws, tens of thousands of people took to the Maidan and stopped them from being passed. Here, people don't want violence.”</p></blockquote><p>Even the close-knit personal ties characteristic of a small society have not shielded Georgia from the spike in repression. Marina Meskhi attributes this to the ideological indoctrination of the security forces:</p><blockquote><p>“It's the same system as in Russia: a repressive apparatus. The special forces who dispersed the demonstrations are thugs who have been thoroughly brainwashed and ideologically indoctrinated. They've been made to believe that we're all enemies, some kind of foreign agents funded from abroad. And they receive decent salaries and serve the authorities loyally.</p><p>Georgia has a poor population living in remote villages where there is no decent education or prospects. People from these communities choose to join the security forces. It's like Russians who go to fight in Ukraine — they do it to escape poverty.”</p></blockquote><h3 class="outline-heading">Who supports Georgian Dream, and why?</h3><p>Opinion polls conducted ahead of the 2024 elections suggest that, despite the ruling party’s sharp political turn, it still enjoys between <a href="https://crrc.ge/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/cb2024_presentation_2024.07.18_web.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">20%</a> and <a href="https://crrc.ge/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/election-pulse-of-georgia_report_crrc.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">30%</a> support — a figure well below the 54% it officially received in the elections. Researchers Tamara Khoshtaria of Ilia State University in Tbilisi and Veronika Pfeilstifter of the Institute for Caucasus Studies at the University of Jena analyzed opinion polls and <a href="https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/97822/ssoar-caucasusad-2024-139-khoshtaria-Protest_Attitudes_and_Protest_Behaviour.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">concluded</a> that “those most likely to support the protests are young people (aged 18–34), residents of the capital, supporters of Georgia’s EU accession, and those who distrust pro-government television channels.”</p><p>But geography does not tell the whole story. Tamara Khoshtaria <a href="https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/97822/ssoar-caucasusad-2024-139-khoshtaria-Protest_Attitudes_and_Protest_Behaviour.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">identifies</a> media consumption habits as “the most significant factor determining support for a particular party”: viewers of Imedi TV, Rustavi 2, and POSTV are considerably more likely to support Georgian Dream, while viewers of other channels tend to favor opposition parties.”</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeb23e4301f43.61241665/wqDqsTZCkeK1LH1darxxCrcSH8wA0696h10tQBlu.jpg" alt="A polling station in Georgia"/><figcaption>A polling station in Georgia</figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://crrc.ge/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/ned-report-25.02-final.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">study</a> by CRRC-Georgia helps explain why pro-government television coverage resonates with Georgian voters. According to the findings, nearly half of Georgian Dream supporters believe in the existence of a “Global War Party” — a fictional political entity invented by the authorities to describe an international coalition of forces allegedly seeking to drag Georgia into a war with Russia, undermine its sovereignty, and use its territory to advance their own geopolitical interests.</p><p>Georgian Dream made extensive use of fears that Georgia could be drawn into a war with Russia during its election campaign. <a href="http://www.reuters.com/world/europe/georgian-ruling-partys-ukraine-war-election-ad-enrages-opposition-2024-09-27?utm_source=chatgpt.com">Billboards</a> appeared across the country depicting devastated Ukrainian cities alongside slogans such as “Say no to war! Choose peace!”</p><p>Under this logic, the opposition is portrayed as serving foreign interests, while Georgian Dream casts itself as the party that keeps Georgia on its European path while preventing it from being drawn into another armed conflict. </p><h3 class="outline-heading">The façade of a multi-vector foreign policy and a shift toward Russia</h3><p>The Georgian authorities continue to voice support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Yet Georgia has refused to join most Western sanctions against Russia, and the United States has <a href="https://eprc.ge/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/state-of-affairs-georgia-november-2025__1.2.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">identified</a> Kremlin agents of influence among Georgian officials.</p><p>Back in 2021, Carnegie Europe Caucausus expert Thomas de Waal <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2021/09/georgian-democracy-is-dying-by-a-thousand-cuts?utm_source=chatgpt.com">observed</a> that Georgian Dream's approach to relations with the West followed the models of Azerbaijan and Turkey: control the media, courts, and elections, invoke “Georgian values,” yet maintain working relations with Washington and Brussels, as well as Moscow. After Georgian Dream came to power in 2012, Tbilisi resumed economic ties and some diplomatic contacts with Moscow, a move that researchers Bidzina Lebanidze and Kornely Kakachia <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367531969_Bandwagoning_by_stealth_Explaining_Georgia%27s_Appeasement_Policy_on_Russia?utm_source=chatgpt.com">attribute</a> to the Georgian elite's conviction that the country had to take Russia's interests into account, even if the rapprochement had to remain discreet due to civil society's opposition to fostering closer ties with the Kremlin.</p><p>The situation changed after 2022, when Georgian Dream began moving more openly away from its pro-European course. Erekle Gozalishvili, a researcher at the University of Regensburg, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02634937.2025.2604065?utm_source=chatgpt.com#d1e209">uses</a> the term “pseudo-hedging” to describe the appearance of a multi-vector foreign policy masking an actual shift toward Russia. This does not mean that the Kremlin is running the country, he notes. Rather, closer ties with Russia have proved useful to Georgian Dream as a means of consolidating its grip on power at home.</p><p>Per Ekman, a researcher at the Stockholm School of Economics, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21599165.2026.2627182?utm_source=chatgpt.com">argues</a> that the Georgian authorities have exploited Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine to manufacture an external enemy capable of justifying the repression of civil society at home. “Russia’s war against Ukraine allowed Georgian Dream to present itself as the party of peace and stability, while portraying anyone critical of the ruling party as seeking to drag Georgia into war,” he concludes.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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      <title><![CDATA[United Russia lawmaker moves to take over Russian Coca-Cola assets holding more than €1 billion in cash]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299266</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299266</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bochkari, an Altai Territory beverage producer owned by Vadim Smagin, a United Russia deputy in the regional parliament, asked Vladimir Putin to place Coca-Cola’s Russian business – Multon and Multon Partners, which produce the soft drinks Dobry, Rich, and Moya Semya – under its temporary management. The consolidated value of this business is estimated at 245 billion rubles ($3 billion). As <i>The Insider</i> found, as of July 2026, the accounts of the Russian subsidiaries of the international Coca-Cola HBC group, including Multon, held more than €1 billion.</p><p>According to the business outlet <i>Kommersant</i>, the appeal was <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/9080987">sent</a> to Putin in mid-October and was forwarded to the government for consideration. One of the publication’s sources claims that the proposal received partial support from the competent deputy prime ministers. Bochkari proposed appointing itself as temporary manager of the two companies, which until 2022 bottled Coca-Cola and other international brands in Russia. The authorities have not yet reported any decision regarding the matter.</p><p>The authors of the appeal claim that the foreign owner’s suspension of investment negatively affects the Russian economy and tax revenues. In addition, they cite the global parent company’s support for Ukraine and its sponsorship of sports competitions in which Russian athletes are not allowed to participate. If it receives management, Bochkari promises to invest, among other things, in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine and to fund charity programs.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">More than €1 billion in Russian accounts</h3><p>As <i>The Insider</i> discovered, the foreign owner’s financial documents show that the group’s Russian business continues to accumulate significant cash. According to Coca-Cola HBC’s <a href="https://www.coca-colahellenic.com/content/dam/cch/us/documents/investors-and-financial/2026-half-year-results/coca-cola-hbc-2026-half-year-results.pdf.downloadasset.pdf">report</a>, as of July 3, 2026, the group’s Russian subsidiaries, including Multon, held €1.04 billion in cash and cash equivalents – a growth of €190.3 million, or 22.4%, from €850.2 million at the end of 2025.In the same document, Coca-Cola HBC notes that sanctions and other restrictions make it difficult to repatriate profits from Russia.</p><p>It should be noted that the €1.04 billion is the combined funds of the group’s Russian subsidiaries, not exclusively of the two companies that Bochkari wants to manage.</p><p>Coca-Cola HBC’s latest reporting does not indicate that the Russian business has ceased operations. On Nov. 4, the company <a href="https://www.coca-colahellenic.com/content/dam/cch/us/documents/investors-and-financial/2026-q3-trading-update/Coca-Cola_HBC_%202026_Q3_4Nov2026.pdf.downloadasset.pdf">stated</a> that in the third quarter, beverage sales volume in Russia grew by a high single-digit percentage year-on-year, generally describing its Russian business as financially self-sufficient.</p><p>According to Coca-Cola HBC’s <a href="https://www.coca-colahellenic.com/content/dam/cch/us/documents/oar2025/Coca-Cola-HBC-Integrated-Annual-Report-2025.pdf">annual report</a>, the group’s revenue in Russia in 2025 amounted to €1.61 billion –  an increase of almost 19%, from €1.36 billion a year earlier. By comparison, Bochkari’s revenue for the same year was 8.64 billion rubles ($106 million). By <i>The Insider</i>’s estimates, the international group’s Russian subsidiaries received roughly 18 times as much revenue as the company claiming management of its assets. However, these are figures for different groups of legal entities.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">The lawmaker has already bought a foreign company’s assets after Putin’s intervention</h3><p>Businessman Vadim Smagin, who owns 97.9% of Bochkari, is also a sitting deputy of the Altai Territory Legislative Assembly from United Russia. According to his official <a href="https://www.akzs.ru/akzs/deputy/133/22966/">biography</a>, he has worked in the regional parliament since 2011 and in the previous convocation served as deputy chair of the committee on agrarian policy. In September 2026, Smagin again won a seat and <a href="https://www.akzs.ru/akzs/deputy/133/22966/">joined</a> the United Russia faction in the new parliament.</p><p>In September 2026, Smagin <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/business/10/09/2026/6aa2fd762437afab2cf68b82">acquired</a> the Russian plants of the international company Canpack, which produces aluminum beverage cans. On Dec. 31, 2025, Putin had placed Canpack’s Russian enterprises under the temporary management of another company, Stalelement. In August 2026, the temporary management was lifted, and on Sept. 10, Canpack completed the sale of its Russian assets.</p><p>According to Canpack’s official <a href="https://www.canpack.com/news/canpack-completes-exit-from-russia/">statement</a>, the company received $122 million for its stakes in the former Russian enterprises. It had earlier recognized damages of $354.7 million from the loss of control over them, stressing that this was significantly below its estimate of the assets’ fair market value at the time. As <i>RBC</i> <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/business/10/09/2026/6aa2fd762437afab2cf68b82">reported</a>, the buyer, Vadim Smagin, did not step in until after the temporary management had been lifted. The introduction of temporary management does not in itself mean a transfer of ownership to the state or to a company it appoints. However, the Canpack example shows that such a decision may be followed by foreign owners choosing to get rid of their Russian assets.</p><p>Analysts estimate Multon’s value at no less than 245 billion rubles ($3 billion). Of that, 150 billion rubles ($1.84 billion) is the business itself and 95 billion rubles ($1.16 billion) is cash.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Russian Coca-Cola continued to earn after 2022</h3><p>After the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Coca-Cola stopped producing its international brands in Russia, but its production facilities continued to operate under local brands; in particular, Dobry Cola went on sale to replace Coca-Cola.</p><p>In April 2024, <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.ru/news/270566">wrote</a> that Coca-Cola’s Russian subsidiary, Multon Partners, had quadrupled its net profit for 2023, to 10.25 billion rubles ($125.5 million), with revenue reaching 77.3 billion rubles ($946.5 million).</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297430">Auchan’s Russian business gets a CEO from the Kremlin two days after transfer to “temporary management”</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/285680">German building materials firm Knauf says sale of Russian business has fallen through after reports of supplies to nuclear sites</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/275608">French supermarket chain Auchan is reportedly close to selling its Russian business  — 2.5 years into the full-scale invasion of Ukraine</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 13:37:35 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Leading Russian medical university transferred to agency overseeing longevity research that reports directly to Vladimir Putin]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299243</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299243</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Russian government has transferred Pirogov Russian National Research Medical University, one of the country’s leading medical schools, from the Ministry of Health to the Federal Medical-Biological Agency (FMBA), which reports directly to Vladimir Putin. Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed the <a href="https://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202611050001">order</a> confirming the move on Nov. 3. In <a href="https://fmba.gov.ru/press-tsentr/novosti/detail/?ELEMENT_ID=90603">statements</a> from the FMBA and the university, the transfer was described as creating a “unified framework for the development of Russian biotechnology.”</p><p>The FMBA was placed under Putin’s direct authority in June 2024 by presidential <a href="https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_478811/">decree</a> No. 522. The agency, headed by former Health Minister Veronika Skvortsova, had previously reported to the Russian government. Among other responsibilities, the FMBA provides medical services for employees in Russia’s nuclear, space, and defense industries, as well as workers at organizations facing heightened radiation, chemical and biological risks.</p><p>Authorities said the university’s transfer was intended to consolidate scientific and educational resources. According to the FMBA, Pirogov University departments already operate at 12 of the agency’s research centers, while the institutions have jointly established 36 academic departments. Areas of cooperation include gene therapy, immunomedicine, neurotechnology, and bioinformatics. Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova said the consolidation would help develop educational programs in biomedical and genetic technologies. The FMBA said the university would not become a closed institution serving only the agency.</p><p>The transfer comes as Russia develops large-scale state programs in biotechnology and life extension. As <i>The Wall Street Journal </i><a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/putin-longevity-antiaging-92dee6e8">reported</a> in May 2026, Russian authorities are funding a $26 billion anti-aging program that includes organ bioprinting, gene therapy, and transplantation of organs from genetically modified animals. The newspaper said the program is overseen by Putin’s daughter Maria Vorontsova, along with Mikhail Kovalchuk, the head of Russia’s Kurchatov Institute, a major state nuclear and scientific research center,</p><p>Research in related fields is also underway within the FMBA. The agency’s medical genomics department, for example, <a href="https://www.cspfmba.ru/about/structure/isbge/or/mg/">studies</a> biological age and the genetic characteristics of aging, while its Center for Biomedical and Additive Technologies works on regenerative medicine and methods for bioprinting organs and tissues.</p><p>In September 2025, Putin <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/284612">discussed</a> the possibility of achieving immortality through biotechnology during a hot mic conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. ““With the development of biotechnology, human organs can be continuously transplanted, and people can live younger and younger, and even achieve immortality,” an interpreter was heard translating Putin as saying. “Predictions are, this century, there’s a chance of also living to 150,” Xi replied.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/286963">Xi and I are gonna live forever: Why Vladimir Putin’s quest to survive for 150 years is dead on arrival</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/284612">Xi, Putin, and Kim caught on hot mic in Beijing discussing organ transplants and living to 150</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/267167">Foundation run by Putin&#039;s daughter acquires stake in Russian drone manufacturer</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/297827">From snake oil to biohacking: The quackery and science of longevity</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 21:59:08 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Former co-owner of Rosatom-controlled plant seeks asylum in France as British judge questions prospect of fair trial in Russia]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299242</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299242</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Igor Pestrikov, a former co-owner of the Solikamsk Magnesium Plant who was sentenced in absentia to eight years in a Russian prison, has applied for political asylum in France, according to a <a href="https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/comm/2026/2472">ruling</a> by the High Court of England and Wales. <strong>As </strong><i><strong>The Insider</strong></i><strong> found</strong>, British judge Julia Dias, who heard the case, questioned whether the businessman could receive a fair trial in Russia.</p><p>Pestrikov brought a claim in a British court against Alexander Gutin, the former chairman of the Solikamsk Magnesium Plant’s board of directors. The businessman previously <a href="https://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/articles/2025/12/19/1164586-bivshii-vladelets-lovozerskogo-goka-trebuet">told</a> Vedomosti that he was seeking $1 billion in compensation for the loss of his stakes in the Solikamsk Magnesium Plant and the Lovozero Mining and Processing Plant. Both companies were nationalized in 2022 and later came under the control of Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation.</p><p>Court documents say Pestrikov accuses Gutin and other former co-owners of the businesses, including Pyotr Kondrashev, Sergei Kirpichev and Timur Starostin, of conspiring to remove him from the firm’s management and to arrange for the transfer of control over the plants to Rosatom. Pestrikov alleges that Gutin, who represented Cyprus-based Canemare Enterprises (the seller of the shares), deliberately structured the transactions in 2015 so that Russian authorities could later declare them unlawful and intervene in the companies’ management. Gutin denies the allegations.</p><p>According to the ruling, Pestrikov’s asylum application in France was still pending as of June 25, 2026. It is not known whether he has since been granted asylum.</p><h3>British judge questions prospect of a fair trial in Russia</h3><p>Gutin challenged the British court’s jurisdiction, arguing that by the time the legal documents were served on him in October 2025, he was already permanently living in Cyprus. The judge found that documents he provided, including boarding passes, banking records, and information relating to him renting a home, supported his claim that he had moved. The court therefore ruled that service was invalid and set aside the proceedings without considering the conspiracy allegations on their merits.</p><p><strong>In the ruling, </strong><i><strong>The Insider</strong></i><strong> found a notable observation by the judge about the Russian justice system.</strong> Dias said that although the core circumstances of the dispute were closely connected to Russia, there were serious grounds to believe Pestrikov would not be able to obtain a fair trial there. She described some of Gutin’s arguments to the contrary as weak.</p><p>Another detail <strong>identified by </strong><i><strong>The Insider</strong></i><strong> in the court records</strong> concerns the cost of the failed case. Gutin’s legal expenses exceeded 500,000 pounds. The judge expressed surprise at the size of the bill for what she described as a relatively straightforward procedural dispute and declined to approve the full amount without further review. Pestrikov was nevertheless ordered to make an interim payment of 100,000 pounds to the defendant.</p><h3>Russia hands Pestrikov eight years in prison in absentia</h3><p>In 2025, Igor Pestrikov acquired an approximate 25% of the shares in the Solikamsk Magnesium Plant. In May 2022, a court granted a prosecutor’s request to return to the state 89.5% of the plant’s shares that had been owned by four major shareholders. The court found that the plant’s privatization in the 1990s had been unlawful.</p><p>In April 2025, the Solikamsk City Court <a href="https://epp.genproc.gov.ru/ru/gprf/mass-media/news/archive/e5609583/">sentenced</a> Pestrikov in absentia to eight years in prison. Prosecutors alleged that he had embezzled 250 million rubles ($3.1 million) belonging to the company and later tried to obtain another 2.5 billion rubles ($30.7 million) under the guise of a buyout of his stake in an affiliated business. Pestrikov was outside Russia, and the criminal case proceeded without him.</p><p>The regional publication RBC Perm <a href="https://perm.rbc.ru/perm/freenews/6870a0a39a79474ef430b222">reported</a> in July 2025 that the criminal case included an Interpol document dated April 19, 2024, which characterized Pestrikov’s prosecution as political and aimed at depriving him of his property rights. A Russian appeals court rejected that assessment and upheld the eight-year sentence.</p><p>The nationalization of the Solikamsk Magnesium Plant affected more than its major shareholders. In March 2024, <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.ru/news/270166">reported</a> that a court had ordered the seizure of shares from private investors, many of whom had bought them on the stock exchange. The decision was criticized by Russian Central Bank Gov. Elvira Nabiullina and the Moscow Exchange, which warned that it could undermine investor confidence.</p><h3>The nationalized plant continues supplying raw materials to Europe</h3><p>After the nationalization, the Solikamsk Magnesium Plant and the Lovozero Mining and Processing Plant became part of Rosatom’s structure. The Lovozero plant mines rare-earth raw materials that are processed in Solikamsk. In October 2026, <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297999">reported</a> that the EU had removed the Solikamsk Magnesium Plant and its director, Ruslan Dimukhamedov, from a draft sanctions list at Estonia’s request because of European industry’s dependence on the company’s supplies.</p><p>According to the investigative project Sistema, between 2022 and 2024, the Solikamsk Magnesium Plant supplied Estonia’s NPM Silmet with more than $50 million worth of rare-earth raw materials. The company’s products are used in Europe’s automotive, electronics, and aviation industries, as well as in the production of wind turbines.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/293621">Russia included on EU list of countries whose citizens will face expedited review in asylum cases</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/288032">Generating pushback: Eastern European countries are turning away political asylum seekers from Russia and Belarus</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/263524">France grants political asylum to paratrooper who fled Russia after taking part in Ukraine invasion</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 21:33:58 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[U.S. allows Hungary’s MOL to prepare for purchase of Russian stake in Serbian oil company NIS]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299241</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299241</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued Hungary’s MOL Group and its subsidiary MOL Serbia Investment Kft. an additional license related to a possible acquisition of a stake in Serbian oil company NIS, MOL <a href="https://molgroup.info/en/investor-relations/investor-news/mol-received-ofac-license-to-execute-preparatory-transactions-in-relation-to-nis-acquisition-process">announced</a> on its website earlier today.</p><p>The license is valid through Feb. 28, 2027 and allows for the completion of a number of transactions that are required before Russian-origin securities can be transferred to MOL Serbia Investment Kft. MOL stated, however, that the license does not allow the deal itself to be completed:</p><blockquote><p>“The licence does not authorise the completion of the transaction resulting in the divestment of Russian ownership and control in NIS. Any such completion would require separate authorisation from OFAC.”</p></blockquote><p>On Nov. 4, Hungarian Foreign Minister Anita Orbán said Budapest expects an agreement on the purchase of the Russian stake in NIS to be made official by Dec. 11. She said all sides are seeking to complete the negotiations before the deadline expires.</p><p>On Oct. 21, Serbian First Deputy Prime Minister Siniša Mali <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298541">said</a> MOL had signed a contract to buy the Russian stake in NIS. Gazprom Neft and Gazprom together own 56.1% of the company, while the Serbian government is expected to increase its stake from 30% to 35% under a shareholder agreement with MOL.</p><p>NIS, which owns Serbia’s only oil refinery, was <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/285761">sanctioned</a> by the United States in January 2025. The measures took effect in October 2025 but have since been postponed multiple times.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/285761">U.S. sanctions hit Serbia’s Gazprom-owned oil giant NIS</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299177">Hungary to give up Russian gas by fall 2027 after years of Orbán government’s reliance on Moscow, foreign minister says</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/290908">Vučić says 3-month extension of Russian gas deal will keep Serbian prices among Europe’s lowest</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299179">Associates of former Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić reach Moscow on second attempt after first flight is turned back over Lithuania</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/yulia-petrovskaya/299175">After Vučić: Serbia’s student movement celebrates victory, but the country still faces deep divisions and pressure from Moscow</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/283370">New pipeline project to send Russian oil from Hungary to Serbia </a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 20:32:41 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Poland detains six over suspected illegal shipments of weapons components to Russia]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299240</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299240</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ABW) has detained six people suspected of carrying out espionage activities on behalf of Russia. They include five Polish citizens and one Russian woman, according to a <a href="https://x.com/TomaszSiemoniak/status/2118250536579244032">statement</a> from Polish official Tomasz Siemoniak, who is responsible for coordinating the country’s intelligence services.</p><p>The identities of those detained have not been disclosed, with authorities saying only that the Polish citizens are between the ages of 25 and 52 and that the Russian woman is 37. Four of the six have been placed under arrest.</p><p>Investigators say members of the group were involved in illegally supplying “military-use materials” that could be used in the production of ammunition and weapons. Polish prosecutors <a href="https://www.rp.pl/przestepczosc/art45448981-abw-zatrzymala-szesc-osob-polacy-i-rosjanka-podejrzani-o-szpiegostwo">said</a> the case involves the export of weapons components — including cartridge cases and bullets — from Poland to Russia without the required permits.</p><p>All six have been charged with participating in an organized criminal group. Four have also been charged with working for Russian intelligence.</p><p>Investigators believe the group operated from at least June 2023 through December 2025. Members purchased the necessary items, including through online stores, and transported the shipments across the border into Russia’s Kaliningrad Region. They were said to have fitted their vehicles with specially constructed hidden compartments for the smuggling. Border guards intercepted some of the shipments.</p><p>The value of the ammunition components illegally exported to Russia is estimated at 2 million zlotys, or about 455,000 euros.</p><p>Siemoniak said that since 2024, nearly 100 people have been named as suspects in espionage and sabotage investigations in Poland.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299059">Poland arrests Russian trainspotter on charges of espionage, family says railway photography is his longtime hobby</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298979">Russian citizen detained in Poland on suspicion of spying after photographing trains and rail infrastructure</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298466">Turkish crime group suspected in Starlink station arson in Poland, Der Spiegel reports</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298247">Germany detains two suspects in arson attack on Starlink station near Warsaw, Poland blames Russian intelligence</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/289729">Six people detained in Poland over attempt to supply drone components to Russia</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/289489">Poland charges 29-year-old with spying for Russia around objects including military facilities and chemical plants</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 20:28:12 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Latvian Putin supporter sent to the front in Ukraine after being jailed in Russia]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299237</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299237</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sergei Mulivanov, 59, who moved to Russia from Latvia, was taken from Moscow to the combat zone even though he refused to sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense, <i>Ostorozhno, Novosti</i> <a href="https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/56833">reports</a>, citing the man’s acquaintances and relatives. They have not heard from him for six days and have no information on his whereabouts.</p><p>Two years ago, Mulivanov, who was a member of the council of the Latvian Russian Union party, left his home country due to dissatisfaction with government policies. He opposed restrictions on the Russian language and was against the provision of aid to Ukraine. After moving to the Moscow Region, he obtained Russian citizenship and got a job as a courier. According to Mulivanov’s relatives, his employers turned out to be fraudsters, and he was unknowingly involved in transporting stolen money. In April, he was detained in a fraud case and refused to plead guilty.</p><p>Acquaintances claim that Mulivanov was tricked into filing an application and signing a contract with the Ministry of Defense around the time of his arrest last spring. His lawyer said:</p><blockquote><p>“Both documents are undated. The dates were put in only now, in October 2026. A signature that is half a year old was processed as if it had been made just the other day.”</p></blockquote><p>On Oct. 28, Mulivanov and his lawyer were told that he was being sent to war and that the fraud case against was being suspended. Both the accused and his defense responded by writing formal refusals.</p><p>After a hearing on Oct. 30, Mulivanov was taken to the Russian Investigative Committee, where officials again tried to get his signature. He refused to sign anything without a lawyer present but was apparently put on a bus to Rostov nevertheless. His relatives say he called them from the road.</p><p>Mulivanov has type 2 diabetes and suffers from polyneuropathy. According to his defense, he did not undergo an examination by a military medical commission.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297196">Russian regions are cutting back on bonus payments for contract soldiers signing up to fight in Ukraine</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 19:15:26 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Moldova hits Transnistria leader Vadim Krasnoselsky with 5-year travel ban the day after he received the Order of Honor from Putin]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299225</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299225</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Vadim Krasnoselsky, the leader of Moldova’s unrecognized breakaway Transnistria region, will be banned from leaving Moldova for the next five years, <i>Newsmaker</i> <a href="https://newsmaker.md/ru/kishinev-zapretit-krasnoselskomu-pokidat-moldovu-v-techenie-5-let-eto-reakcziya-na-nagrajdenie-putinym-v-moskve">reports</a>, citing the country’s Bureau for Reintegration Policies. The day before, Krasnoselsky <a href="http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/81175">received</a> the Order of Honor from Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin, where the Transnistrian leader closed his acceptance speech with the phrase “the Russian World is life.”</p><p>As the Moldovan Bureau for Reintegration Policies stated:</p><blockquote><p>“This is a Russian provocation aimed at hindering Moldova’s European integration. We condemn Russia’s actions and will consider possible responses without escalating the situation, given that Russia’s intentions to destabilize Moldova are of a permanent nature. Upon his return, we will apply restrictive measures to Krasnoselsky, including a five-year ban on leaving the country’s territory.”</p></blockquote><p>The Bureau also noted that Krasnoselsky had officially traveled to Russia as part of OSCE-facilitated discussions on supplying Transnistria with natural gas. The agency stressed:</p><blockquote><p>“The problems of gas supply for residents of the left bank of the Dniester and the efforts of the OSCE remain extremely important for the pragmatic management of the situation and the prevention of escalating tensions, as well as for increasing trust between the two banks of the Dniester in order to ensure a sustainable process of reintegration of the Transnistrian region.”</p></blockquote><p>In the awards ceremony video published by the Kremlin, Krasnoselsky is referred to as “president of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic,” even though Moscow does not officially recognize the region’s independence. After receiving the award, the Transnistrian leader expressed gratitude to Putin and Russia. Among other things, he thanked the Russian president on behalf of “the Transnistrian people for peace and for Russia’s peacekeeping mission on the Dniester,” saying:</p><blockquote><p>“On behalf of the people of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic and personally, I congratulate you on National Unity Day. Transnistria is undoubtedly part of the Russian World. When I speak of the Russian World, I speak and think of the Russian civilizational space. We are part of the great Motherland, and it is not our fault that we ended up far away, unfortunately. Nevertheless, we have fully harmonized our legislation with Russia, and all our education standards are entirely Russian. Thanks to your support, graduates of our schools and universities receive Russian certificates and diplomas. In addition, thanks to your support, all the books, specifically Russian books, for our schools have been printed in a timely way. Thank you very much. Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich, if you ask any citizen of Transnistria what the Russian World means to them, they will say quite simply: the Russian World is life.”</p></blockquote><p>As the Moldovan human rights association Promo-LEX has <a href="https://promolex.md/manuale-rusesti-de-istorie-care-justifica-razboiul-impotriva-ucrainei-vor-fi-introduse-in-2027-din-regiunea-transnistreana/">reported</a>, starting in 2027 the Transnistrian authorities intend to introduce the use of Russian history textbooks that were composed under the direction of Russian presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky. The measure will apply to schools in the region where Ukrainian is the language of instruction. Officials in Tiraspol have said that using Ukrainian textbooks is impossible “for ideological reasons.” In Russian history textbooks, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is called a “special military operation,” and the occupied territories are called “new regions.”</p><p><i>Newsmaker</i> writes that Krasnoselsky’s second term as president of Transnistria expires in December 2026. Among his possible successors is Vitaly Nyaga, head of the Tiraspol executive committee. His potential rival in the regional election race is local lawmaker Vadim Kravchuk, whom Moldovan President Maia Sandu earlier stripped of Moldovan citizenship.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/292718">Moldova’s Maia Sandu links Putin’s decree on Russian citizenship for residents of Transnistria to recruitment effort for the war in Ukraine</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/278231">The Gas Man Cometh: Moscow risks losing Transnistria by creating energy problems for Moldova</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/291837">Kremlin-linked Moldovan billionaire Vladimir Plahotniuc handed 19-year prison term in Chisinau</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/286533">Moldova to shut down Russian House in Chișinău</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 16:39:17 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Switzerland follows EU in lifting sanctions on billionaires Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman, but adds restrictions on 254 entities]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299224</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299224</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Switzerland has removed Russian billionaires Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman from its sanctions list, following a similar step by the European Union in late September. Switzerland also lifted sanctions from former Crimean Federal University rector Andrei Falaleyev and company Redbird Corporate Services Ltd., along with three people who have died — former Russian State Duma lawmaker Yuri Shvytkin, designer Alexander Leonov, and Iranian military official Alireza Tangsiri. The changes <a href="https://www.admin.ch/en/newnsb/KsmEWk4E-bHM">took effect</a> on Nov. 5.</p><p>At the same time, the Swiss government said it would align its measures with the EU’s 21st sanctions package against Russia and Belarus, extending restrictions to 254 additional individuals and organizations. Switzerland also banned transactions with 33 Russian banks, one bank in a third country, 17 financial institutions and cryptocurrency service providers, five companies in third countries, four Russian airports, and two ports. It also imposed restrictions on the purchase, sale, and servicing of 41 vessels linked to Russia’s so-called shadow fleet, which is used to circumvent sanctions on Russian oil and other cargo.</p><h3>Switzerland is not required to automatically follow the EU</h3><p>Unlike the EU’s member states, Switzerland decides independently which foreign sanctions to adopt. It is not a member of the European Union, and the legal basis for its restrictive measures is its own <a href="https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2002/564/en">Embargo Act</a>. The Federal Council, Switzerland’s executive branch, makes decisions separately after assessing whether proposed measures comply with Swiss law, foreign policy interests, and the country’s neutrality policy.</p><p>Since 1998, however, Switzerland has in most cases adopted EU sanctions either fully or in part. On Feb. 28, 2022, four days after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Federal Council decided to adopt the EU’s initial sanctions packages against Russia. Swiss authorities have separately <a href="https://www.eda.admin.ch/en/questions-and-answers-on-switzerlands-neutrality">stressed</a> that doing so did not amount to abandoning neutrality.</p><p>In the current case, the government explicitly <a href="https://www.admin.ch/en/newnsb/KsmEWk4E-bHM">said</a> that it had removed six people and one company from the sanctions list in line with the EU decision. Switzerland nevertheless retained the ability to adjust other measures independently and has so far declined to add two EU-sanctioned Russian citizens to its list and has declined to impose tighter export controls on 14 companies in third countries. Their names were not disclosed.</p><h3>What assets are frozen in Switzerland</h3><p>According to <a href="https://publications.swissbanking.ch/banking-barometer-2026-en/wealth-management">data</a> from the Swiss Bankers Association <strong>reviewed by </strong><i><strong>The Insider</strong></i>, Swiss banks managed 9.73 trillion Swiss francs in assets in 2025. Of that total, 2.36 trillion was held in international private wealth management. According to Switzerland’s State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (<a href="https://www.seco.admin.ch/de/faq-sanktionen-schweiz">SECO</a>), 8.5 billion francs in financial assets belonging to sanctioned individuals and entities were frozen in the country as of July 1, 2026. Fourteen properties, as well as cars, aircraft, works of art, and other valuables, were also blocked.</p><p>Removing Usmanov and Fridman from the list could provide grounds for unfreezing some previously restricted assets. Swiss authorities, however, did not disclose the value of the Russian billionaires’  assets that had been subject to such measures.</p><h3>Why the European Union lifted its restrictions</h3><p>On Sept. 14, the <i>Financial Times</i> published an article citing sources who <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297410">said</a> French authorities, under pressure from Azerbaijan, were lobbying for the EU to lift sanctions on Uzbek-Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov. According to the newspaper, removing the sanctions was part of a deal to secure the release of French citizens detained in Azerbaijan.</p><p>The European Union <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2160/oj/eng/pdf">removed</a> Usmanov and Fridman from its sanctions list on Sept. 22 <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2160/oj/eng/pdf">but</a> did not explain the specific reasons behind the decision. On Sept 23 Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwp84rrrymd0o">pardoned</a> French citizen Martin Ryan, who had been sentenced to 10 years in prison on espionage charges. Ryan was released and returned to France.</p><p>The French Foreign Ministry <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/presse-et-ressources/decouvrir-et-informer/actualites/azerbaidjan-grace-accordee-a-martin-ryan">characterized</a> the pardon as the result of “patient and constructive” dialogue with Azerbaijani authorities. Azerbaijan, for its part, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/azerbaijan-pardons-french-national-after-eu-drops-sanctions-usmanov-2026-09-23/">rejected</a> allegations that it had sought to pressure France.</p><p>According to the <i>FT’s</i> sources, Luxembourg had sought the lifting of sanctions on Fridman. The businessman is seeking around $16 billion in compensation from the country over a dispute pertaining to frozen assets.</p><h3>Ukraine’s reaction</h3><p>The European Union’s decision drew criticism in Ukraine, where President Volodymyr Zelensky <a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/volodimir-zelenskij-ta-ursula-fon-der-lyayen-obgovorili-fina-106497">called</a> the lifting of sanctions on individual Russian oligarchs “self-defeating and counterproductive,” saying pressure on Moscow should be increased rather than eased.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297445">EU extends Russia sanctions for three years, lifts restrictions on billionaires Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 16:29:44 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russia agreed to supply Iran with at least 90 missile launchers, Dallas Analytics reports]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299223</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299223</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russian companies took part in efforts to supply Iran with at least 90 launchers for multipurpose guided missiles, a modern weapon system that Moscow itself has widely used in its war against Ukraine. Analysts at Dallas Analytics, a Ukrainian private intelligence and research organization focused on Russia’s defense industry and wartime economy, <a href="https://dallas-analytics.com/russia-helping-iran-k10-documents/">cited</a> a 2024-2025 production plan from the Vympel Design Bureau that they said they had obtained.</p><p>The recipients were listed under the code K-10, which the analysts said is used to designate Iran. Tehran was to receive launch equipment for the missile known as Product 305, or Kh-39. The missiles are typically mounted on helicopters. Each carries a 25-kilogram warhead and an electro-optical seeker, and an operator can also guide the missile while it is in flight.</p><p>Export batches of the launchers were scheduled for delivery from late 2024 through December 2025, but it remains unclear whether they were actually shipped. The analysts said photographs allowed them to confirm deliveries of the Russian-supplied helicopters, but based on the images it could not be determined whether the missile launchers themselves had also been sent.</p><p>Russia has also shared intelligence with Iran, <i>The Washington Post</i> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/06/russia-iran-intelligence-us-targets/">reported</a> earlier this year. The information may have been used to help target American forces in the Middle East during the ongoing U.S.-Iran war.</p><p>Moscow has continued supplying weapons to foreign buyers despite the needs of its own military, as <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/19ec7782-9f22-4101-ba55-da88860310bc?syn-25a6b1a6=1">noted</a> by the <i>Financial Times</i>. The deliveries indicate that Russia and Iran have further strengthened their partnership over the course of the war in the Middle East.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/295579">Chinese entities supplying Russia with space militarization equipment operate in EU and U.S. markets, Dallas Analytics reports</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/292025">Russia secretly uses commercial airlines to move troops, weapons and materiel, Dallas Analytics investigation finds</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/293796">Russia’s Oreshnik missile uses Soviet-era gyroscopes that cause it to miss targets by dozens of kilometers, leaked correspondence shows</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299063">Iran says Russian Su-35 fighter jets will arrive only after war with U.S. ends — deliveries were promised in 2023</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/antonio-giustozzi/287381">The Ayatollah walks into a bazaar: Iran is shopping around to upgrade its armed forces, and China is the lead supplier</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 16:27:02 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Finnish court sentences captain and boatswain of ship that damaged underwater cables to prison]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299219</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299219</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A court in Helsinki has sentenced the captain and boatswain of the cargo ship <i>Fitburg</i> (IMO number 9250397) to unsuspended prison terms for damaging cables in the Gulf of Finland in December 2025, <i>Yle</i> <a href="https://yle.fi/a/74-20255260">reports</a>. The two men were detained — along with the vessel — on New Year’s Eve.</p><p>The ship’s captain, Russian national Andrei Maksimenko, was sentenced to three and a half years in prison. The boatswain, Azerbaijani citizen Vusal Mejidov, was sentenced to two years and 10 months.</p><p>Both were found guilty of aggravated criminal damage and will also be required to cover the cost of repairing the cables and the gas pipeline in the gulf, as well as the cost of the investigation into the damage.</p><p>The verdict has not yet entered into force and may be appealed, as Maksimenko and Mejidov pleaded not guilty.</p><p>The cargo ship <i>Fitburg</i> was detained on Dec. 31, 2025, on suspicion of severing a telecommunications cable between Helsinki and Tallinn. The <i>Fitburg</i> was found near the site of the incident with its anchor chain lowered into the water. About two weeks later, the authorities <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/finnish-police-release-russia-linked-ship-held-in-cable-sabotage-case-2026-01-12/">lifted the arrest</a> of the vessel, but the crew members, the boatswain, and the captain were ordered to be held in custody for the duration of the <a href="https://yle.fi/a/74-20231618">investigation</a> against them.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297796">Russian tug Sarmat spent nearly a week operating around critical underwater cables off the coast of Denmark with seabed-capable equipment</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297036">NATO allies disrupt Russian preparations to disable Arctic undersea cables near Svalbard, Reuters reports</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/291306">UK Defense Secretary reveals months-long Russian submarine operation over cables and pipelines in the Atlantic</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/279294">Finland lifts seizure of Eagle S tanker suspected in undersea cable damage, some crew members still under investigation</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/278399">Norway seizes Russian-crewed ship suspected of damaging Baltic Sea cable between Latvia and Sweden</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 15:16:14 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Sons of former Israeli defense minister Avigdor Lieberman owned Russian firm tied to contractor in Patriot Park bribery case]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299181</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299181</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 2021, a company that serviced facilities at the Russian Defense Ministry’s Patriot Park began signing and extending contracts with a Moscow firm co-owned by the sons of Avigdor Lieberman — who previously served as Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009-2012 and 2013-2015), Minister of Defense (2016-2018), and Minister of Finance (2021-2022), among other cabinet posts. Investigators believe the contracts — signed between Russian company <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij7QntCe0J4gwqvQk9C10YDQvNC10YHCuzwvcD4=">Hermes LLC</span> and the Lieberman sons’ <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij7QntCe0J4gwqvQm9Cw0LzQtdC0INCQLtCaLiDQpdC+0LvQtNC40L3Qs9GBINCg0LDRiNCwINCb0KLQlMK7PC9wPg==">Lamed A.K. Holdings Russia Ltd LLC</span> — were used in order to channel payments in exchange for assistance obtaining and renewing Defense Ministry contracts, while the work specified in the agreements was not actually performed. St. Petersburg-based outlet <i>Fontanka</i> estimates the total value of the contracts at 200 million rubles ($2.4 million). The outlet <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/11/04/76744151/">reported</a> the details, citing testimony from a businessman who was questioned in a separate case involving Patriot Park CEO Igor Vasilyev.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Who owned the Russian company</h3><p>Fontanka’s report mentions only Amos Lieberman. <strong>However, </strong><i><strong>The Insider</strong></i><strong> found that the Russian company was owned by both sons of the Israeli politician:</strong> Amos Mordechai Lieberman and his brother, Yaakov David Lieberman, known as Kobi. According to corporate registry records, each held a 50% stake in Lamed A.K., which was registered in Moscow on Jan. 24, 2019.</p><p>Pavel Kurilenko served as director general from the company’s founding. However, on April 12, 2023, both brothers withdrew as shareholders, leaving Kurilenko as the sole owner. On April 25, 2025, the company changed its name to <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+PHNwYW4gc3R5bGU9ImJhY2tncm91bmQtY29sb3I6cmdiKDI1NSwyNTUsMjU1KTtjb2xvcjpyZ2IoNTEsNTEsNTEpOyI+0J7QntCeIMKr0JLQtdC70LvRgtC+0LLCuzwvc3Bhbj48L3A+">Welltov LLC</span> while retaining the same registration numbers. Nevertheless, when Hermes began signing contracts with the company, both of Avigdor Lieberman’s sons were still co-owners.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">How the company became linked to Patriot Park</h3><p>Amos Lieberman knew Hermes CEO Yevgeny Mariyev and, investigators believe, helped him obtain and renew contracts to service Defense Ministry facilities in Moscow and Kronstadt, <i>Fontanka</i> reported. Hermes initially worked as a subcontractor, with the main contractor, management company UK BSM, assigning it part of the work. In 2021, Hermes received its first contract to clean the Main Naval Cathedral. The company then began servicing facilities in Moscow, and by 2023 it had gained access to sites in Kronstadt. In 2026, Hermes became a direct contractor, replacing UK BSM.</p><p>According to <i>Fontanka</i>, investigators allege that beginning in 2021, Hermes signed and renewed contracts with Welltov that were used to make payments in exchange for assistance securing and extending Defense Ministry contracts. Investigators say the work covered by the agreements was not actually carried out and that the money — the aforementioned 200 million rubles ($2.4 million) — was transferred abroad.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Other episodes in the Patriot Park corruption case</h3><p>The Patriot Park corruption case involves several episodes tied to senior officials and companies that serviced the Defense Ministry complex. In October 2025, Yevgeny Grigorkin, head of the Kronstadt branch of the ministry’s museum and cathedral complex, was arrested. Investigators said he accepted 15 million rubles ($183,000) in exchange for helping lease more than 2,500 square meters of a military pier to Archeda, a private company, and nearly 5 million rubles ($61,000) for approving maintenance work at branch facilities. In April 2026, a court <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/04/15/76367589/">sentenced</a> Grigorkin to six years in a maximum-security penal colony, fined him 32 million rubles ($391,000) and ordered the confiscation of about 19.8 million rubles ($242,000).</p><p>In April 2026, Patriot Park Deputy Director Vitaly Melimuk was detained. Investigators allege he received 18 million rubles ($220,000) from Hermes CEO Yevgeny Mariyev in exchange for assistance securing contracts and other considerations. Russia’s Investigative Committee <a href="https://t.me/sledcom_press/28917">said</a> that in December 2025, a state customer signed contracts with Hermes worth more than 1.4 billion rubles ($17.1 million) for comprehensive engineering, technical, and sanitation services at the park outside Moscow and at its branch in Kronstadt.</p><p>In October 2026, Hermes CEO Mariyev and Patriot Park head Igor Vasilyev were placed under house arrest in connection with the bribery case. According to <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/11/04/76744151/">Fontanka</a>, Vasilyev is accused of receiving 80 million rubles ($978,000) from the head of Hermes. Patriot Park deputy directors Sergei Fedosov and Alexei Pavlyukov were also detained, while Vladimir Naon, head of general contractor UK BSM, was placed under house arrest.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">What else is known about the Lieberman family’s business</h3><p>Amos and Kobi Lieberman had previously drawn scrutiny from Israeli journalists over their business dealings involving Russia. In February 2024, <i>TheMarker</i> <a href="https://www.themarker.com/news/2024-02-27/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/0000018d-e662-d7f4-a3dd-e66e48770000">published</a> an investigation by journalist Gur Megiddo into the business activities of Lieberman’s sons. Among other things, it examined the operations of the Russian company Lamed A.K. Holdings Russia Ltd, which acted as an intermediary in export deals from Israel to Russia.</p><p>According to the journalist, entities connected to the brothers supplied products from Israeli manufacturers to Russia, including equipment made by Elbit Systems. The investigation also cited a deal involving the delivery of ventilators to Russia during the coronavirus pandemic. The journalist alleged that some shipments continued after international sanctions were imposed on Russia. Elbit denied involvement in the transactions described.</p><p>Avigdor Lieberman <a href="https://x.com/AvigdorLiberman/status/1760297690116542569">called</a> the report baseless at the time and said he had never contacted anyone in Israel or abroad regarding his sons’ business activities. He added that he was proud of their entrepreneurial work.</p><p>Avigdor Lieberman is currently a member of the Israeli Knesset and the chairman of the Yisrael Beiteinu (“Israel Our Home”) party. He has served at various times as Israel’s foreign, defense, and finance minister. The party’s official website <a href="https://beytenu.org.il/ru/chairman/">lists</a> him as having three children: daughter Michal and sons Kobi and Amos.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">What does the commander of the Leningrad Naval Base have to do with it?</h3><p><i>Fontanka</i> linked the new testimony to the recent arrest of Alexei Suglobov, commander of the Baltic Fleet’s Leningrad Naval Base. Suglobov was detained on Oct. 21 in Kronstadt while allegedly accepting 1.5 million rubles ($18,000). Alexei Ionov, head of the Defense Ministry’s naval engineering service, is also a defendant in the bribery case.</p><p><i>Fontanka</i> noted that Patriot Park has not been mentioned in the case materials concerning Suglobov. The outlet said his position would have brought him into contact with managers at the Defense Ministry complex and that he may have information relevant to its operations. <i>Fontanka</i> also reported that Suglobov is prepared to enter into a pretrial cooperation agreement with investigators.</p><p><i>The Insider</i> previously <a href="https://theins.org/news/299005">found</a> that Suglobov had already been serving as acting commander of the Leningrad Naval Base in August 2023, more than two years before his permanent appointment. The case involving the alleged use of military land for sand extraction and the dumping of construction waste was already the second corruption investigation of its kind in Russia’s Leningrad region within a year.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/291341">Former Russian deputy defense minister Pavel Popov sentenced to 19 years in prison</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 21:51:23 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Pro-Ukraine hackers release files stolen from Russia’s Rosstat, revealing hidden wage debt and mortality in occupied Ukrainian territories]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299180</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299180</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Belarusian Cyber Partisans and hacker group Silent Crow have <a href="https://by.cpartisans.org/post/sekretnaja-statistika-rosstata">published</a> eight files they say are internal documents from Rosstat, Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service. <i><strong>The Insider</strong></i><strong> found</strong> that one spreadsheet showed that as of May 1, 2023, overdue wage arrears at organizations in the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DPR) totaled 3.13 billion rubles ($38.3 million). The figure for the rest of Russia on the same date was only 695.5 million rubles ($8.5 million), as was <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/business/903055">reported</a> by Rosstat at the time.</p><p>According to the spreadsheet, the debt more than doubled over four months, rising from 1.48 billion rubles ($18.1 million) in January to 3.13 billion rubles by May 1. Payments were overdue to 66,300 workers. Nearly 94% of that total was owed by organizations that lacked sufficient funds of their own to pay wages. Another 1.32 billion rubles ($16.1 million) consisted of debts dating back to before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeba5a32681d4.26787722/HdqgNHvf12bfPgzATB3DqbqeCFkugVRR4MeTEGi9.jpg" alt="Excerpt from a Rosstat statistical table showing socioeconomic indicators for the Russian-occupied Donetsk Region in 2023, including industrial production by sector"/><figcaption>Excerpt from a Rosstat statistical table showing socioeconomic indicators for the Russian-occupied Donetsk Region in 2023, including industrial production by sector</figcaption></figure><p>In another letter released by the hackers, Rosstat instructed officials to exclude data from the Russian-occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions from nationwide Russian statistics. Information from those territories was to be provided only to government bodies for official use and was not to be published or shared with third parties.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeba5730197b8.23674374/lfmx0kKxeemmsPloapLweCbuUrH1BGZMpkXgIOWT.jpg" alt="A purported Rosstat letter released by the hackers instructing officials to exclude data from the occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions of Ukraine from nationwide statistics and restrict the information to official use"/><figcaption>A purported Rosstat letter released by the hackers instructing officials to exclude data from the occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions of Ukraine from nationwide statistics and restrict the information to official use</figcaption></figure><p>Other released materials include industrial production statistics for the Donetsk Region for 2025, a table showing shipment volumes and average prices for Russian exports in October 2025, registered deaths in Krasnoyarsk Krai in June 2023, and estimates of the population in the Russian-occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia Region for 2024 and in the Donetsk Region for 2023. </p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeba5896a0784.36313036/es0jBvqeVbiW7bN55OzNOXW6V5COumemHItFTxX0.jpg" alt="A purported Rosstat table showing births, deaths, and natural population decline in the Russian-occupied Donetsk Region of Ukraine in 2023"/><figcaption>A purported Rosstat table showing births, deaths, and natural population decline in the Russian-occupied Donetsk Region of Ukraine in 2023</figcaption></figure><p>Another document shows that Donetskstat, the regional statistics agency operating under Russian control in occupied Donetsk, continued to provide nonpublic statistics to local authorities. In response to a request from the Donetsk city administration, the agency provided figures for April 2026: average monthly gross pay at organizations employing more than 15 people was 79,000 rubles ($965). A note at the end of the document specifically states that such information is provided to state and municipal authorities for official use only and may not be published or passed to third parties.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6ae/6aeba5bfd43ea1.84757314/lUaGlEFeUBSlGp4qzbihFOBBbTsiBVvKS2whu0Wy.png" alt="A purported Donetskstat document released by the hackers showing average monthly wages and employment figures for organizations in Russian-occupied Donetsk in April 2026"/><figcaption>A purported Donetskstat document released by the hackers showing average monthly wages and employment figures for organizations in Russian-occupied Donetsk in April 2026</figcaption></figure><p>The Cyber Partisans say that over the course of six months, they gained access to approximately 25,000 computers on Rosstat’s internal network and downloaded several terabytes’ worth of documents. They also say they obtained a database of deaths registered among Russian citizens since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (through August 2026). The group has not yet completed its count of people killed as a result of combat operations. The eight files that have been released so far represent only a small portion of the material the group says it obtained.</p><p><i>The Insider</i> recently <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299065">reported</a> on the Rosstat breach. The agency confirmed that it had been targeted by cyberattacks but said it had found no evidence that its databases had been compromised or that information protected by law had been taken.</p><p>In February 2026, <i>The Insider</i> also <a href="https://theins.ru/news/289740">reported</a> that Rosstat’s published wage-arrears data excluded the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. The documents released by the hackers now provide a glimpse into some of the figures that had been left out of Russia’s nationwide statistics.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299065">Hackers say they stole 23 terabytes from Russia’s state statistics agency, including data on war casualties</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 21:38:31 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Associates of former Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić reach Moscow on second attempt after first flight is turned back over Lithuania]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299179</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299179</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299179/l33sgCOFi7HA7Tt1QjKSKCC13l8k2qhwbkzXQtUr.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Three associates of former Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić recently tried to fly from Belgrade to Moscow but failed on their first attempt when their plane was turned around over Lithuania and sent back to the Serbian capital for security reasons, according to a <a href="https://nova.rs/vesti/politika/saznajemo-avion-koji-je-veceras-trebalo-da-sleti-u-moskvu-okrenuo-se-i-vraca-se-za-beograd-sumnja-se-da-su-u-njemu-vulin-bajatovic-i-nenad-popovic/">report</a> by local outlet <i>Nova</i>.</p><p>The Air Serbia plane was scheduled to operate a regular flight, JU134, from Belgrade to Moscow at about 6:48 p.m. Tuesday, Nov. 3. Roughly two hours later, the aircraft reached southern Lithuania, where it was turned around. It returned to Belgrade at about 10 p.m.</p><div><blockquote class="twitter-tweet"><p lang="en" dir="ltr">#1 most tracked flight now: AirSerbia #JU134 from Belgrade to Moscow returning to Belgrade after turning around over Lithuania. Local media are reporting the flight is related to the current political situation, but we have no confirmation at this time. https://t.co/ktV3SW7JDT https://t.co/jL8Py4Secy</p>&mdash; Flightradar24 (@flightradar24) <a href="https://x.com/flightradar24/status/2117719673546604889?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November 3, 2026</a></blockquote>
<script async src="https://platform.x.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></div><p>On board were Serbia’s former Deputy Prime Minister and Movement of Socialists leader Aleksandar Vulin, Serbian People’s Party (SNP) founder Nenad Popović, and director of the Srbijagas state-owned gas company Dušan Bajatović.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeb9d999b3f56.37948258/iqZAjxNqFiJH8casvm8A3vUwjq4IEjTMt4VSRsU3.jpg" alt="Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin shaking hands with Vladimir Putin during the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024"/><figcaption>Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin shaking hands with Vladimir Putin during the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024</figcaption></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeb9dd57c9ed1.60098806/7z9Lwx87hOxnQzf7EOkcNLfgX8eRqHQdRLrjMRws.jpg" alt="Nenad Popović"/><figcaption>Nenad Popović</figcaption></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6ae/6aeb9e50c6dbf3.70729241/RojVaqUWtQEkk5YFEX12lcSOqDHGstdArl2I2iBc.jpg" alt="Dušan Bajatović, director of the state-owned gas company Srbijagas"/><figcaption>Dušan Bajatović, director of the state-owned gas company Srbijagas</figcaption></figure><p>According to <a href="https://nova.rs/vesti/politika/saznajemo-aleksandra-vulina-sproveli-u-avion-bez-provere-direktor-bezbednosti-aerodroma-naredio-vracanje-aviona/?utm_source=onesignal&utm_medium=webpush&utm_campaign=2026-11-03-OTKRIVAMO-Aleks">Nova</a>, the order to turn the plane around came from the head of corporate security at Belgrade’s Nikola Tesla airport and was issued on the grounds that Vulin had managed to board the aircraft without undergoing a security screening. It is unclear how. The flight reservation database also showed no ticket for him on that flight, although it did show that he had traveled to Moscow shortly before the Sept. 21-22 elections.</p><p>Popović had also bought tickets to Moscow for every day after the election through Nov. 7, suggesting he may have expected that he would need to leave the country but did not know exactly when.</p><p>Serbian opposition figures had earlier hinted that they knew about the Vučić allies’ plans for a departure from Belgrade. As the head of the country’s Democratic Party Srđan Milivojević asked rhetorically on social media a few hours before the flight:</p><blockquote><p>“And who is fleeing to Moscow by plane tonight at 6:30 p.m.?”</p></blockquote><div>https://x.com/srdjanmil037/status/2117560859325084029?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E2117560859325084029%7Ctwgr%5E2eaca7e1bab3ebbe3e5c54144132fd983a4107e0%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Ftheins.ru%2Fnews%2F299126</div><p>Vulin and Bajatović later confirmed media reports that they had been on the plane with Popović. The former deputy prime minister <a href="https://www.kurir.rs/vesti/politika/10152680/obracanje-vulina-posle-povratka-aviona-u-beograd">called</a> allegations that he had violated security procedures “lies,” while Bajatović <a href="https://nova.rs/vesti/politika/bajatovic-zasto-su-vulin-i-popovic-putovali-u-rusiju-ne-znam-ja-sam-krenuo-zbog-gasa-i-problema-s-alta-bankom/">said</a> his trip was connected to negotiations over gas supplies and problems with payment transactions following the recent <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c478c8b6-789f-4253-8970-1244b93c1cce?syn-25a6b1a6=1">closure</a> of <span class="termin" data-description="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">Alta Bank</span> in Serbia.</p><p>The plane eventually <a href="https://nova.rs/vesti/drustvo/avion-koji-je-sinoc-vracen-u-beograd-zbog-aleksandra-vulina-sleteo-rano-jutros-u-moskvu/">landed</a> in Moscow on the morning of Nov. 4, with Vulin later posting a video address on Instagram recorded in central Moscow. In it, he <a href="https://n1info.rs/vesti/ja-nisam-nigde-pobegao-vulin-se-javio-iz-moskve-video-porukom-video">said</a> he had “not fled” Serbia but had come to Russia for a series of meetings related to gas deals.</p><div><blockquote class="instagram-media" data-instgrm-captioned data-instgrm-permalink="https://www.instagram.com/reel/DfUe_qVx3PX/?utm_source=ig_embed&amp;utm_campaign=loading" data-instgrm-version="14" style=" background:#FFF; border:0; border-radius:3px; box-shadow:0 0 1px 0 rgba(0,0,0,0.5),0 1px 10px 0 rgba(0,0,0,0.15); margin: 1px; max-width:540px; min-width:326px; padding:0; width:99.375%; width:-webkit-calc(100% - 2px); width:calc(100% - 2px);"><div style="padding:16px;"> <a href="https://www.instagram.com/reel/DfUe_qVx3PX/?utm_source=ig_embed&amp;utm_campaign=loading" style=" background:#FFFFFF; line-height:0; padding:0 0; text-align:center; text-decoration:none; width:100%;" target="_blank"> <div style=" display: flex; flex-direction: row; align-items: center;"> <div style="background-color: #F4F4F4; border-radius: 50%; flex-grow: 0; height: 40px; margin-right: 14px; width: 40px;"></div> <div style="display: flex; flex-direction: column; flex-grow: 1; justify-content: center;"> <div style=" background-color: #F4F4F4; border-radius: 4px; flex-grow: 0; height: 14px; margin-bottom: 6px; width: 100px;"></div> <div style=" background-color: #F4F4F4; border-radius: 4px; flex-grow: 0; height: 14px; width: 60px;"></div></div></div><div style="padding: 19% 0;"></div> <div style="display:block; height:50px; margin:0 auto 12px; width:50px;"><svg width="50px" height="50px" viewBox="0 0 60 60" version="1.1" xmlns="https://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="https://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><g stroke="none" stroke-width="1" fill="none" fill-rule="evenodd"><g transform="translate(-511.000000, -20.000000)" fill="#000000"><g><path d="M556.869,30.41 C554.814,30.41 553.148,32.076 553.148,34.131 C553.148,36.186 554.814,37.852 556.869,37.852 C558.924,37.852 560.59,36.186 560.59,34.131 C560.59,32.076 558.924,30.41 556.869,30.41 M541,60.657 C535.114,60.657 530.342,55.887 530.342,50 C530.342,44.114 535.114,39.342 541,39.342 C546.887,39.342 551.658,44.114 551.658,50 C551.658,55.887 546.887,60.657 541,60.657 M541,33.886 C532.1,33.886 524.886,41.1 524.886,50 C524.886,58.899 532.1,66.113 541,66.113 C549.9,66.113 557.115,58.899 557.115,50 C557.115,41.1 549.9,33.886 541,33.886 M565.378,62.101 C565.244,65.022 564.756,66.606 564.346,67.663 C563.803,69.06 563.154,70.057 562.106,71.106 C561.058,72.155 560.06,72.803 558.662,73.347 C557.607,73.757 556.021,74.244 553.102,74.378 C549.944,74.521 548.997,74.552 541,74.552 C533.003,74.552 532.056,74.521 528.898,74.378 C525.979,74.244 524.393,73.757 523.338,73.347 C521.94,72.803 520.942,72.155 519.894,71.106 C518.846,70.057 518.197,69.06 517.654,67.663 C517.244,66.606 516.755,65.022 516.623,62.101 C516.479,58.943 516.448,57.996 516.448,50 C516.448,42.003 516.479,41.056 516.623,37.899 C516.755,34.978 517.244,33.391 517.654,32.338 C518.197,30.938 518.846,29.942 519.894,28.894 C520.942,27.846 521.94,27.196 523.338,26.654 C524.393,26.244 525.979,25.756 528.898,25.623 C532.057,25.479 533.004,25.448 541,25.448 C548.997,25.448 549.943,25.479 553.102,25.623 C556.021,25.756 557.607,26.244 558.662,26.654 C560.06,27.196 561.058,27.846 562.106,28.894 C563.154,29.942 563.803,30.938 564.346,32.338 C564.756,33.391 565.244,34.978 565.378,37.899 C565.522,41.056 565.552,42.003 565.552,50 C565.552,57.996 565.522,58.943 565.378,62.101 M570.82,37.631 C570.674,34.438 570.167,32.258 569.425,30.349 C568.659,28.377 567.633,26.702 565.965,25.035 C564.297,23.368 562.623,22.342 560.652,21.575 C558.743,20.834 556.562,20.326 553.369,20.18 C550.169,20.033 549.148,20 541,20 C532.853,20 531.831,20.033 528.631,20.18 C525.438,20.326 523.257,20.834 521.349,21.575 C519.376,22.342 517.703,23.368 516.035,25.035 C514.368,26.702 513.342,28.377 512.574,30.349 C511.834,32.258 511.326,34.438 511.181,37.631 C511.035,40.831 511,41.851 511,50 C511,58.147 511.035,59.17 511.181,62.369 C511.326,65.562 511.834,67.743 512.574,69.651 C513.342,71.625 514.368,73.296 516.035,74.965 C517.703,76.634 519.376,77.658 521.349,78.425 C523.257,79.167 525.438,79.673 528.631,79.82 C531.831,79.965 532.853,80.001 541,80.001 C549.148,80.001 550.169,79.965 553.369,79.82 C556.562,79.673 558.743,79.167 560.652,78.425 C562.623,77.658 564.297,76.634 565.965,74.965 C567.633,73.296 568.659,71.625 569.425,69.651 C570.167,67.743 570.674,65.562 570.82,62.369 C570.966,59.17 571,58.147 571,50 C571,41.851 570.966,40.831 570.82,37.631"></path></g></g></g></svg></div><div style="padding-top: 8px;"> <div style=" color:#3897f0; font-family:Arial,sans-serif; font-size:14px; font-style:normal; font-weight:550; line-height:18px;">View this post on Instagram</div></div><div style="padding: 12.5% 0;"></div> <div style="display: flex; flex-direction: row; margin-bottom: 14px; align-items: center;"><div> <div style="background-color: #F4F4F4; border-radius: 50%; height: 12.5px; width: 12.5px; transform: translateX(0px) translateY(7px);"></div> <div style="background-color: #F4F4F4; height: 12.5px; transform: rotate(-45deg) translateX(3px) translateY(1px); width: 12.5px; flex-grow: 0; margin-right: 14px; margin-left: 2px;"></div> <div style="background-color: #F4F4F4; border-radius: 50%; height: 12.5px; width: 12.5px; transform: translateX(9px) translateY(-18px);"></div></div><div style="margin-left: 8px;"> <div style=" background-color: #F4F4F4; border-radius: 50%; flex-grow: 0; height: 20px; width: 20px;"></div> <div style=" width: 0; height: 0; border-top: 2px solid transparent; border-left: 6px solid #f4f4f4; border-bottom: 2px solid transparent; transform: translateX(16px) translateY(-4px) rotate(30deg)"></div></div><div style="margin-left: auto;"> <div style=" width: 0px; border-top: 8px solid #F4F4F4; border-right: 8px solid transparent; transform: translateY(16px);"></div> <div style=" background-color: #F4F4F4; flex-grow: 0; height: 12px; width: 16px; transform: translateY(-4px);"></div> <div style=" width: 0; height: 0; border-top: 8px solid #F4F4F4; border-left: 8px solid transparent; transform: translateY(-4px) translateX(8px);"></div></div></div> <div style="display: flex; flex-direction: column; flex-grow: 1; justify-content: center; margin-bottom: 24px;"> <div style=" background-color: #F4F4F4; border-radius: 4px; flex-grow: 0; height: 14px; margin-bottom: 6px; width: 224px;"></div> <div style=" background-color: #F4F4F4; border-radius: 4px; flex-grow: 0; height: 14px; width: 144px;"></div></div></a><p style=" color:#c9c8cd; font-family:Arial,sans-serif; font-size:14px; line-height:17px; margin-bottom:0; margin-top:8px; overflow:hidden; padding:8px 0 7px; text-align:center; text-overflow:ellipsis; white-space:nowrap;"><a href="https://www.instagram.com/reel/DfUe_qVx3PX/?utm_source=ig_embed&amp;utm_campaign=loading" style=" color:#c9c8cd; font-family:Arial,sans-serif; font-size:14px; font-style:normal; font-weight:normal; line-height:17px; text-decoration:none;" target="_blank">A post shared by Aleksandar Vulin (@aleksandar_vulin_rs)</a></p></div></blockquote>
<script async src="//www.instagram.com/embed.js"></script></div><p>Aleksandar Vulin served as deputy prime minister in the final years of Vučić’s presidency. Before that, he headed Serbia’s Interior Ministry and later its Defense Ministry, and from 2022 to 2023 led the country’s Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) — Serbia’s main civilian security and intelligence service. Vulin has long been known for his pro-Russian positions and for organizing surveillance of opposition activists in Belgrade. In 2021, he <a href="https://theins.ru/news/266493">provided</a> Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev with recordings of conversations involving Russian opposition activists in Serbia. Those recordings may have contributed to the arrest and conviction of Andrei Pivovarov, the former head of the opposition group Open Russia.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeb9ed1c88438.87007231/Q2fC3O7IMz9pzJyXFkEqufMpqPqAcCOR4H69Bt2l.jpg" alt="Aleksandar Vulin"/><figcaption>Aleksandar Vulin</figcaption></figure><p>In 2024, Vulin <a href="https://theins.ru/news/268688">received</a> what was described as an “FSB order for cooperation” in Moscow, honoring his “professionalism” in addition to his work with the Russian security service.</p><p>Vulin’s tenure as deputy prime minister was brief, lasting from May 2024 to April 2025. Shortly before leaving the government, he was <a href="https://n1info.rs/vesti/marta-kos-za-n1-reforme-srbija-mediji-izbori-integracije/">criticized</a> by the EU enlargement commissioner over his pro-Russian stance. In March of 2025, he <a href="https://ria.ru/20250321/vulin-2006356716.html">thanked</a> Russia for helping Serbia “fight a color revolution” in reference to the large-scale <a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/283003">student protests</a> that had swept the country. Vulin had already been under U.S. sanctions since 2023.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6ae/6aeb9f3be2f5a4.81011052/s4V2Fj33r8QkSv42L94wXPJC3UY1oNbZTalUv36K.jpg" alt="Nenad Popović speaking at the Caucasus Investment Forum (CIF) 2026 in Mineralnye Vody, Russia"/><figcaption>Nenad Popović speaking at the Caucasus Investment Forum (CIF) 2026 in Mineralnye Vody, Russia</figcaption></figure><p>Nenad Popović is the founder of the right-wing Serbian People’s Party. He currently serves as a minister without portfolio in Serbia’s government. In 2017, he was <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2017/11/06/paradise-papers-reveal-serbian-minister-s-wealth-11-06-2017/bi/all-balkan-countries/">described</a> as possibly being the country’s wealthiest politician thanks to a fortune built in part through business interests in Russia. Popović <a href="https://www.atomic-energy.ru/news/2023/12/25/141826">owns</a> ABS Electro, a Russian electrical-engineering and industrial equipment group. Like Vulin, Popović is under U.S. sanctions.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeb9f994556c4.77792943/vSYMczQE4q7mdIw88ULg9fN44g9I2db7S1PfDfRI.jpg" alt="Dušan Bajatović"/><figcaption>Dušan Bajatović</figcaption></figure><p>Dušan Bajatović has headed state-owned Srbijagas since 2008. He was also recently <a href="https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/rs/2046212/">appointed</a> Russia’s honorary consul in Novi Sad.</p><p>Serbia’s snap parliamentary elections in late October were won by the protest-driven student movement, with the Student List <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/25/vucic-concedes-defeat-in-pivotal-serbian-elections-says-student-movement-has-won">securing</a> an outright majority in the National Assembly. Shortly before the vote, Vučić <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbias-president-vucic-resigns-paving-way-early-elections-2026-09-27/">resigned</a> as president, and on election day, he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbia-votes-students-seek-unseat-vucic-snap-election-2026-10-25/">conceded</a> the defeat of his Serbian Progressive Party. </p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/yulia-petrovskaya/299175">After Vučić: Serbia’s student movement celebrates victory, but the country still faces deep divisions and pressure from Moscow</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/yulia-petrovskaya/296350">The Belgrade tightrope: How Serbia’s president balances friendship with Moscow and support for Zelensky</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/yulia-petrovskaya/293720">The “ironclad friendship”: How Russia lost out to China in the competition to be Serbia’s key eastern partner</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/290908">Vučić says 3-month extension of Russian gas deal will keep Serbian prices among Europe’s lowest</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/283370">New pipeline project to send Russian oil from Hungary to Serbia </a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/283003">Anti-authoritarian generation: Serbia’s youth are rising up against their president’s 13-year rule</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/280629">Serbia hands hundreds of passports to Russian elites tied to invasion of Ukraine, giving them access to the EU </a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/281138">Lithuania and Latvia close airspace to Serbian President Vučić ahead of planned May 9 Moscow visit</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 21:13:07 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Hungary to give up Russian gas by fall 2027 after years of Orbán government’s reliance on Moscow, foreign minister says]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299177</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299177</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hungary will stop procuring natural gas from Russia by the fall 2027 deadline set by the European Union, according to a statement <a href="https://telex.hu/belfold/2026/11/03/orban-anita-kulugyminiszter-interju">made</a> by Foreign Minister Anita Orbán in an interview with <i>Telex</i>. Asked whether the Hungarian government expects to keep access to Russian gas, the minister answered: “The European Union has set a clear deadline for the phased abandonment of Russian natural gas: the fall of 2027.”</p><p>Speaking about other possible sources of gas for Hungary, Orbán mentioned the Vertical Gas Corridor, which carries Azeri natural gas and regasified LNG from Greece to Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova. According to the country’s Foreign Minister, Hungary could also receive fuel via this route.</p><p>Budapest also seeks to cease its purchases of Russian oil, Orbán said, explaining that the country’s largest oil and gas company, MOL, is working to adapt its refining capacity. It aims to secure supplies of non-Russian oil, for example through the Croatian JANAF pipeline.</p><blockquote><p>“So if we look at the regional energy infrastructure related to natural gas and crude oil, at energy security in general, we will see that Hungary can play a very important stabilizing role, acting as a transit territory and distribution hub for both natural gas and crude oil. We have the largest storage capacity; we are connected to six countries; we can supply other countries too, and in the oil sector MOL’s role is decisive in the region. We hope that thanks to the elections in Serbia, Hungary will become a strategic partner in the region for the United States.”</p></blockquote><p>According to Orbán, negotiations on access to the JANAF pipeline could progress faster if a deal between MOL and the Serbian oil company NIS is finalized. Russia’s Gazprom Neft still holds a controlling stake in NIS — 44.85%. On Oct. 20, Serbian Finance Minister Siniša Mali <a href="https://rs.bloombergadria.com/politika/politika/115472/mali-investitori-cekaju-rezultate-izbora-srbija-sledece-godine-ocekuje-privredni-rast-veci-od-cetiri-odsto/news">told</a> <i>Bloomberg Adria TV</i> that an agreement had been signed to transfer the Russian company’s share to MOL; however, the next day, the MOL Group <a href="https://rs.bloombergadria.com/biznis/kompanije/115538/mol-nije-potvrdio-potpisivanje-ugovora-o-kupovini-nis-a/news">stated</a> that the document had not yet been signed.</p><p>Hungary’s stance on Russian energy resources changed after the opposition Tisza party came to power in May 2026. The previous government of Viktor Orbán opposed giving up Russian gas. This past February, Hungary <a href="https://theins.ru/news/289037">filed</a> a lawsuit with the European Court of Justice challenging the REPowerEU regulation, which provides for a complete ban on Russian gas imports in 2027.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/289062">Hungary files lawsuit to challenge EU decision on phaseout of Russian gas imports</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 19:12:09 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[After Vučić: Serbia’s student movement celebrates victory, but the country still faces deep divisions and pressure from Moscow]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/opinion/yulia-petrovskaya/299175</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/opinion/yulia-petrovskaya/299175</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Yulia Petrovskaya]]></dc:creator>
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      <description><![CDATA[<p>The victory of Serbia’s protest-driven student movement in the Oct. 25 snap parliamentary election triggered widespread euphoria. Many observers saw the result as a turning point that could open the way for sweeping anti-corruption reforms and a revival of the country’s European integration after 14 years of dominance by Aleksandar Vučić. But the winners’ first major test will be forming a new government, which will determine whether those promised changes can move forward. Tensions remain extremely high: new institutions cannot be created overnight, and Vučić, despite conceding defeat, has continued his campaign to discredit the student movement. He is trying to pit his opponents against both the Kremlin and Donald Trump while openly hinting that he is prepared to shift the confrontation into the streets.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For years, Vučić remained Serbia’s dominant political figure regardless of the office he formally held. But after the Oct. 25 election, he lost his status as the country’s unquestioned leader: His gamble of leaving the presidency early in an attempt to return as prime minister failed. For the first time since 2012, he holds no official state position. The victory of the protest movement’s Student List, which won a majority in Serbia’s 250-seat National Assembly — the Skupština — deprived him of the ability to form a government. And under Serbian law, he cannot run again for president after voluntarily leaving that office.</p><p>“Sirens, songs, and tears of joy. What happened on Serbia’s streets showed just how much of a burden Aleksandar Vučić had become for the citizens of his own country. People’s faces showed relief, as though they had thrown off shackles and could walk freely again. No one organized this joy. There were no buses, handouts, or lists needed. It came after the man who captured the state and turned the daily humiliation of citizens into a method of government admitted defeat. We are tired of a state where one person decides who is a patriot, who is a traitor, who is allowed to speak, and whose life should be destroyed. Now there must be accountability for violence, abuses, persecution, and public money spent to preserve one man’s personal power...” Hundreds of similar <a href="https://vreme.com/komentar/kraj/">reports</a> from Serbia have circulated around the world in recent days.</p><p>Vučić’s defeat, despite his extensive use of state resources that included near-total control over much of the media, election bodies, and the judicial system reminded many of events in the fall of 2000, when mass protests brought down the regime of Slobodan Milošević.</p><p>Media outlets and experts have also <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/546f21f5-22d3-4696-8371-7bef8c0410b3?syn-25a6b1a6=1">drawn comparisons</a> with Hungary’s former prime minister Viktor Orbán, who until recently had seemed politically untouchable. Those striking parallels, however, do not answer the central question: after power has been taken from Vučić, can it be retained? The atmosphere is tense, and people want swift justice. But institutions cannot be created and reformed quickly, <a href="https://n1info.rs/vesti/krstic-institucije-ne-mogu-brzo-da-se-formiraju-i-reformisu-sns-u-poljuljani-redovi/">analysts</a> caution.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Musical chairs gone wrong</h3><p>For Vučić, the risky “seat-switching maneuver” was essentially the only option left after nearly two years of mass protests, which <a href="https://theins.ru/news/293931">erupted</a> following the deaths of 16 people at the Novi Sad railway station. Growing public anger could not be suppressed either by <a href="https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/vucic-vladan-djokic-univerzitet/33458433.html">accusations</a> that students were terrorists or by the alleged <a href="https://www.bgcentar.org.rs/zahtevamo-hitno-pozivanje-un-misije-za-utvrdjivanje-cinjenica-o-zvucnom-udaru-na-gradjane-15-marta-2025/">use</a> of a “sound weapon” against protesters.</p><p>In the past, Vučić had repeatedly turned to snap elections to reaffirm his dominance and overwhelm familiar opponents from Serbia’s traditional liberal opposition. But the decentralized student movement, with little political experience and no well-known leaders, proved much harder to defeat.</p><p>Running under the slogan “Serbia or the Mafia,” the students absorbed much of the electorate. At the same time, they <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2026/09/01/explainer-serbia-on-the-brink-of-decisive-elections-how-did-we-get-here/">refused</a> to cooperate with opposition parties, arguing that those parties were themselves part of Serbia’s entrenched political system.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6ae/6aeb7f398b63e4.72332016/otuZGjfxrVFlIhC2MU3WPxQAUlif1Giz6gza8kLl.jpg" alt="“Serbia or the Mafia” became one of the defining slogans of the student protests against Vučić"/><figcaption>“Serbia or the Mafia” became one of the defining slogans of the student protests against Vučić</figcaption></figure><p>A presidential election is also due in the coming months, and Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party, or SNS, will try to advance its own candidate. The task will be difficult: The former president’s personal ability to control domestic political processes and the state apparatus has been sharply diminished, while the protest movement has <a href="https://n1info.rs/vesti/deo-clanova-rik-a-trazio-izvinjenje-biracima-u-inostranstvu-optuzili-vecinu-za-teror-nad-manjinom/">reached</a> the Republic Electoral Commission itself. Several commission members accused the body of pressure and dishonesty and demanded an apology over the failure to open enough polling stations abroad, forcing many voters to travel hundreds of kilometers to cast ballots.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Will Vučić delay the transfer of power?</h3><p>In the Oct. 25 election, the Student List — Students Win movement received 52.54% of the vote, giving it about 140 seats in the 250-seat parliament. Vučić’s United Serbia coalition received 39.29%, goog for 103 seats. The remaining seven seats <a href="https://n1info.rs/vesti/prema-preliminarnim-rezultatima-rik-a-studentska-lista-osvojila-52-odsto/">went</a> to parties representing national minorities.</p><p>All other political forces, including the Socialist Party, Vučić’s longtime coalition partner, failed to cross the 3% parliamentary threshold. It was the first time in 30 years that the Socialists — led until 2000 by Slobodan Milošević and later by his former spokesman Ivica Dačić — failed to win parliamentary representation.</p><p>The protest movement’s victory has opened a window of opportunity, but it is not exactly a  wide one. The winners have no experience governing the country, while state institutions remain under the influence of Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party. Candidates for prime minister and other cabinet posts have not yet been presented, and forming a government could take months.</p><blockquote>Candidates for prime minister and Cabinet posts have not yet been presented, and forming Serbia’s new government could take months
</blockquote><p>Vučić’s team could also delay the transfer of power, creating the risk of a deeper crisis. Vučić, for his part, has <a href="https://beta.rs/content/254731-vucic-priznao-poraz-na-parlamentarnim-izborima">accepted no personal responsibility</a> for the state of the country. He blamed his defeat on independent media, unnamed European countries, and the “American deep state.”</p><p>After Oct. 25, Vučić’s political influence shifted from near-absolute dominance to opposition leadership. He still heads a large parliamentary bloc and can count on the loyalty of a substantial share of voters. His rapid concession surprised many and may have been a tactical move intended to reduce his immediate risks and preserve a political future for himself and his allies.</p><p>Vučić’s associates have already <a href="https://x.com/anabrnabic/status/2115412934121689329?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">promoted</a> claims of supposed “revolutionary terror” and a “witch hunt” aimed at eliminating him. In reality, no member of Vučić’s team has been physically attacked, arrested, or placed on a wanted list. <a href="https://n1info.rs/vesti/studentska-lista-trazi-ostavke-u-policiji-bia-vba-tuzilastvima-proveru-novca-za-sve-projekte-i-ponovno-pokretanje-istraga-u-mnogim-slucajevima/">Demands for the dismissal</a> of senior officials who served the old system hardly match such sweeping claims. Even after the election, acting president Ana Brnabić, a Vučić ally, appeared confident enough to trade insults with passersby on the streets — and even to <a href="https://n1info.rs/vesti/ana-brnabic-se-raspravljala-sa-gradjanima-na-ulicama-beograda/">challenge</a> them to arrest her.</p><p>There are, however, more prominent potential targets for investigation. The allegations against Vučić himself and Finance Minister Siniša Mali include abuse of office, corruption, financial wrongdoing, and unlawful pardons, among other matters. One of the most politically explosive cases reaching the highest levels is the <a href="https://vreme.com/vesti/vucic-saslusanje-pad-nadstresnice-novi-sad/">investigation</a> into the reconstruction of the Novi Sad railway station — where the fatal collapse that sparked the protest movement occurred.</p><p>Another major corruption controversy centers on the removal of cultural heritage protections from the former Yugoslav General Staff complex in Belgrade, which was bombed by NATO in 1999. The move was made to clear the way for a hotel project backed by Jared Kushner; however, Trump’s son-in-law withdrew from the $500 million project amid the controversy, and an investigation into alleged document falsification involving Culture Minister Nikola Selaković <a href="https://www.istinomer.rs/analize/sta-sve-do-sada-znamo-o-slucaju-kompleksa-generalstaba/">remains open</a>.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">From protest politics to governing</h3><p>“Vučić and his team cannot be trusted for a second until a new government is formed. This is a mafia structure, not simply a group of citizens who lost an election,” <a href="https://vreme.com/komentar/srbija-studentska-lista-vlada/">critics of the old government warn</a>.</p><p>The first priority, experts say, should be establishing control over the police and military and removing Vučić loyalists from leadership positions, even as those officials try to negotiate and issue threats. The next step would be appointing professionals to senior posts.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeb7f8c77fc36.72743661/tRo2ze3fdDO8S6ck7ceq6mpd4kLv7XdlHasI7j48.jpg" alt="Vučić has previously faced repeated accusations of creating illegal paramilitary groups to confront his political opponents "/><figcaption>Vučić has previously faced repeated accusations of creating illegal paramilitary groups to confront his political opponents </figcaption></figure><p>Despite its historic victory, the Student List <a href="https://www.euronews.rs/srbija/politika/249173/studentska-lista-posle-izbora-izazovi-za-novu-vecinu/vest">faces</a> numerous challenges. Vučić has already threatened that members of his party would “self-organize” if state authorities failed to respond to an Oct. 26 <a href="https://direktno.hr/eu-i-svijet/novi-udar-informer-nakon-kaosa-beogradu-sljedeci-potez-mogao-bi-biti-kljucan-407396/">incursion</a> by a group of people into the studio of the pro-Vučić television channel Informer, and critics interpreted the statement as a dangerous threat — even an announcement that vigilante groups could be formed to deal with protesters. Vučić’s remarks were particularly striking given that he still retains considerable influence over the security services.</p><p>In addition, internal disagreements among the winners could emerge quickly as well because of their ideological <a href="https://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/studentska-lista-pred-brojnim-izazovima-posle-pobede-na-izborima/0fl25lr">diversity</a>, which ranges from pro-Western liberals to nationalists.</p><p>One possible candidate for prime minister is Ilija Srđanović, a cardiologist from Novi Sad who headed the Student List. However, it remains entirely unclear who might take over key departments such as the Interior Ministry, Finance Ministry and Justice Ministry. Those appointments could become the subject of bitter disputes.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6ae/6aeb7cc84ea455.30604527/m5NgQArJ5Ia7yGbBUNSkXCxHvK3GTITPqZWXCFJq.jpg" alt="Ilija Srdanović, a medical professor and the lead candidate on the &quot;Student List – Students Win&quot; (Studentska lista – Studenti pobeđuju), speaking at a pre-election rally in Novi Sad on Sept. 10, 2026"/><figcaption>Ilija Srdanović, a medical professor and the lead candidate on the &quot;Student List – Students Win&quot; (Studentska lista – Studenti pobeđuju), speaking at a pre-election rally in Novi Sad on Sept. 10, 2026</figcaption></figure><p>The formation of the executive branch will take place in the middle of another election campaign, meaning the new government’s real program is unlikely to take shape fully until after the presidential election.</p><p>The new authorities may also face pressure from the European Union, Serbia’s largest investor and source of financial assistance, and also from Russia, which supplies the country with gas. Serbia has no long-term contract with Gazprom and discounted supplies are currently renewed every three months.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">A flicker of friendship</h3><p>Moscow’s response to Vučić’s defeat has combined official restraint from the Kremlin with approving commentary in some pro-government Russian circles. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/politics/26/10/2026/6adf232424639466d2c1ec05">said</a> that Moscow highly valued Vučić’s contribution to Russian-Serbian relations, and the Kremlin expressed its hope that he would continue supporting bilateral ties from the opposition benches. Moscow also said it hoped Serbia’s new political forces would understand that constructive cooperation with Russia was in Serbia’s interests.</p><p>Some Russian commentators welcomed Vučić’s defeat. For example, the nationalist outlet Tsargrad <a href="https://tsargrad.tv/news/prokljatie-zelenskogo-i-krah-vuchicha-chto-zhdjot-rossiju-posle-smeny-vlasti-v-serbii_1923298">described</a> the change of power as liberation from a “false patriot” who had maneuvered between Russia and the West.</p><p>Although some observers (like Vučić himself) have suggested that the new government could begin reassessing relations with Moscow, this remains speculation. For now, there is little basis for expecting a major shift in Belgrade’s long-standing foreign policy of maintaining relations with all major powers — the EU, the United States, Russia, and China.</p><blockquote>It is far from certain that Serbia’s new government will seek to reassess relations with Moscow
</blockquote><p>Vučić is clearly trying to push his opponents into confrontation with both Russia and the United States. Until recently, he controlled much of Serbia’s pro-Russian electorate and counted closer relations with the United States under Trump among his achievements.</p><p>This summer, the United States and Serbia announced the launch of a strategic dialogue. The initiative was intended to <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8829933">open</a> the way for closer cooperation in foreign policy and defense, as well as a larger U.S. presence in Serbia’s energy sector. That, in turn, could help the country reduce its dependence on Russian oil and gas.</p><p>Washington is unlikely to care greatly who ultimately takes Vučić’s place. Moscow, however, may be tempted to intervene as its influence in the Balkans continues to shrink. After the collapse of Vučić’s team, the Kremlin effectively has no obvious political partner of comparable stature in Serbia.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Not such a valuable ally</h3><p>Vučić successfully cultivated an image, where useful, of being a “Kremlin ally,” but his policies were never truly pro-Russian. Public displays of closeness to Moscow and admiration for Putin’s power never translated into recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea or abandonment of Serbia’s EU ambitions.</p><p>Vučić had no intention of trading the European Union, which accounts for roughly two-thirds of Serbia’s foreign trade, in favor of a Eurasian alternative that simply could not offer comparable economic opportunities, goods, or technology. His favored eastern partner has long been <a href="https://theins.ru/opinions/uliya-petrovskaya/293443">China</a>, and the warm <a href="https://theins.ru/opinions/uliya-petrovskaya/296035">reception</a> given to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Belgrade this summer could even be described, using the language of Russian diplomacy, as a “stab in the back” to Moscow.</p><p>Serbia’s principal contacts with the Kremlin in recent years have <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/forumspb/1093467">taken place</a> at a lower level, through Minister for International Economic Cooperation Nenad Popović and Aleksandar Vulin, <a href="https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2112348/">chairman</a> of the supervisory board of state-owned Srbijagas. Both have been under U.S. sanctions since 2023.</p><p>The United States <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1606">accuses</a> Vulin of links to organized crime and drug trafficking, as well as corrupt dealings that “facilitated Russia’s malign activities.” Popović, who owns numerous companies in Serbia and Russia, was <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1916">accused</a> by U.S. authorities of “embezzlement and tax schemes.”</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6ae/6aeb7fcff0f487.92073403/ocPZBgnSw9OBux1Gdl8sdRX8WPY0dFgBjhYK66jc.jpg" alt="Serbian Interior Minister Aleksandar Vulin (left) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (right) meeting in Moscow on August 22, 2022"/><figcaption>Serbian Interior Minister Aleksandar Vulin (left) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (right) meeting in Moscow on August 22, 2022</figcaption></figure><p>The fact that Serbia did not impose sanctions on Russia was a source of satisfaction for the Kremlin in recent years, as it prevented the West from presenting a completely united anti-Russian front in Europe. But it produced little tangible benefit: since 2022, trade between Russia and Serbia has <a href="https://tass.ru/ekonomika/27215115">fallen</a> by nearly half, to $2.3 billion.</p><p>In practical terms, relations between the two countries have reached one of their lowest points. That is especially true after the future of Serbian oil company NIS — which is 44.85% owned by Gazprom Neft — was thrown into doubt. The United States imposed sanctions and demanded the complete removal of Russian capital from the company’s ownership. <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/business/1123940">Negotiations</a> have continued over a possible purchase of the Russian stake by Hungary’s MOL oil and gas group.</p><p>Direct intervention in Serbia or an attempt to help Vučić return to power would be disadvantageous for the Kremlin. The Student List does not hold an explicitly anti-Russian position, and Vučić himself has recognized the legitimacy of the election results. Russia’s ability to influence Serbia’s political scene is also extremely limited, partly because Serbia is geographically separated from Russia and surrounded by NATO and EU states.</p><p>Moscow could nevertheless use Vučić as a strong pro-Russian counterweight to the new government. The Kremlin still has its traditional tools of influence, from the propaganda outlets Sputnik and RT to the energy lever, which allows Moscow to offer discounts or raise prices as it sees fit. </p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/283003">Anti-authoritarian generation: Serbia’s youth are rising up against their president’s 13-year rule</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/yulia-petrovskaya/293720">The “ironclad friendship”: How Russia lost out to China in the competition to be Serbia’s key eastern partner</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/294636">Power vacuum: Trump is dismantling the security architecture in the Balkans</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/yulia-petrovskaya/296350">The Belgrade tightrope: How Serbia’s president balances friendship with Moscow and support for Zelensky</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 18:47:35 +0000</pubDate>
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